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OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL CRIME

David Kauzlarich, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1994

Criminologists have generally ignored the crimes of government
al actors and agencies.

This study delves into this neglected area

of sociological inquiry by addressing definitional, legal, empirical,
and theoretical dimensions of the phenomenon of governmental crime.
The four research objectives are to:
1.

Demonstrate that socially deleterious governmental actions

can be studied criminologically through the epistemological framework
of international law.
2.

Document the existence of such governmental crimes in the

area of nuclear weapons.
3.

Describe and compare the patterns of the United States'

violations of international laws during the Korean and Vietnam wars.
4.

Inductively generate hypotheses and theoretical proposi

tions on the structurally located etiological factors related to the
United States' criminal threats to use nuclear weapons.
Through relatively detailed legal and sociological arguments,
it is established that violations of international law, particularly
nuclear weapons threats, are illegal acts which can be studied crim
inologically.

Qualitative, socio-historical case studies of U.S.

threats to use nuclear weapons against the countries of North Korea
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and North Vietnam are then presented as empirical examples.

The

similarities and differences between the cases are examined, and it
is concluded that many structural similarities exist between the
circumstances faced by the Administrations of Eisenhower and Nixon.
A structural/institutional grounded theory of international govern
mental crime is then developed which posits that organizational
goals,

ideological and historical constraints, projected social

reactions, and the opportunity for secrecy play key roles in the
decision-making process leading to international governmental crime.
While the theory is quite compatible with the data on which it is
based, and thus sheds insight into factors likely to facilitate a
certain type of governmental criminality, it is acknowledged that
the degree of explanatory power relative to other instances of
governmental crime is difficult to gauge.

The endeavor concludes

with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the study and
recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Crimino’.ogists have historically focused on the etiological
factors involved in an individual's violation of a state's criminal
law.

Thus, scholars of crime have normally investigated the causes

of crimes such as murder, burglary, theft, and other so-called con
ventional forms of criminality.

While the study of these behaviors

is certainly vital to an understanding of crime, the legalistic con
ception of criminality has limited the academic investigation of
crimes committed by governmental agencies.

Criminologists then have

only been examining a part of the picture, glimpsing at only a few
behaviors which can be legitimately studied in a criminological fash
ion.

Such a preoccupation with only particular kinds of criminality

contributes to a myriad of obfuscations, not the least of which is
the production of a falsified image of crime.
This research represents a challenge to the traditional legal
istic conceptualizations of crime by creating a framework in which
deleterious actions of governments can be brought within the para
meters of criminology through the epistemological framework of
international law.

The value of international law for the discipline

of criminology has yet to be discovered by most criminologists.

In

many ways then, the study conducted here stretches the parameters of

1
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the discipline into a new domain of study.

In this endeavor, a dis

tinct framework for the scholarly classification of criminality is
created and then employed in order to shed insight into an ubiquit
ous but overlooked phenomenon: what I shall call governmental crime.
The type of international governmental crime to be investigated
in this research is one which has had a staggering effect on inter
national global economy, politics, and war.

Although used only once

in the history of humankind, nuclear weapons have undoubtedly changed
the face of the world.

For fifty years the citizens of the world,

and particularly the people of the former Soviet Union and United
States, have lived with nuclear weapons aimed directly at their
country's major military facilities, industrial bases, and cities.
From the billions of dollars invested in these weapons to the more
than likely possibility of rendering the entire planet uninhabitable,
the nuclear weapon is an inescapable social, political, and physical
fact.
It is commonly thought that the United States has not actively
considered or threatened to use nuclear weapons since the bombing of
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945.
nothing could be further from the truth.

But

Based on governmental re

ports, memoirs, and secondary histories, this study clearly demon
strates that nuclear weapons have indeed been used by the United
States as a means to achieving political and military dominance in
times of perceived global crisis.
This research represents an attempt to understand nuclear
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weapons policy criminologically.

At first thought, many may find

this goal questionable, if not outlandish.

Indeed, one may ask how

such an objective is plausible, given the undeniable fact that nu
clear weapons and policies regarding these weapons have been prac
ticed by global powers for decades without legal incrimination.
view is understandable, yet far from accurate.

This

Simply because some

activity is engaged in pervasively, or not subjected to prosecution,
it does not necessarily follow that this action is lawful behavior.
One need only recall the absence of enforcement and prosecution of
white collar crimes in the United States as an example.
Three of the many goals of scholarly research, as I understand
it, are to uncover false truths, sensitize others to alternative
routes in which to understand phenomena, and to fill gaps in a dis
cipline via the use of research in other disciplines.
research holds prospect for attaining these goals:

I believe this

It creates an

alternative framework for the understanding of what constitutes
criminality, employs an interdisciplinary approach to understand the
legal status of nuclear weapons, and questions the legality of an
assumed legal activity.

Research Objectives

The four research objectives of this endeavor are:
1.

To demonstrate that socially deleterious governmental actions

can be studied criminologically through the epistemological framework o
international law.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

2.

To document the existence of such governmental crimes in

the area of nuclear weapons.
3.

To describe and compare the patterns of the United States'

violations of international laws during the Korean and Vietnam wars.
4.

To inductively generate hypotheses and theoretical propo

sitions on the structurally located etiological factors related to
the United States' criminal threats to use nuclear weapons.
The first objective of this endeavor is of course theoretical
and conceptual in nature and is designed to act as both a founda
tional framework and prolegomenon to the later empirical sections.
The remaining research objectives require empirical development and
are devoted to the explication of the behavioral qualities of the
phenomenon identified in the introductory definitional chapter.

Temporal Limitations

The examination of violations of international law by the
United States in regard to nuclear weapons is confined to the periods
of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Much has been written about the U.S.

decision to end the hostilities of World War II by using nuclear wea
pons against Japan.

And in spite of the fact that the bombings were

clearly in violation of the principles of international law, there is
a lack of quality data and consensus on the entire incident.

Most

historical reconstructions of the decision are quite speculative be
cause many governmental documents pertaining to the action remain
classified.

Moreover, since the focus of the dissertation is on
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U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons, rather than general nuclear wea
pons policy and the whole history of World War II, to conduct a qual
ity analysis of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would require a
dissertation itself.

Finally, U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons in

the Korean and Vietnam wars appear to be qualitatively and ontologically distinct from the circumstances surrounding World War II.

The

United States never actually threatened to use atomic weapons against
the Japanese, but simply did so.
was reversed:

During the Cold War, the situation

The United States on many occasions did in fact

threaten, both explicitly and implicitly, the use of such weapons,
but never executed a nuclear attack.

Because of limited access to

data, extant research on the issue, and qualitative behavioral dis
tinctions, this research will not delve into the U.S. atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Nuclear Threats Defined
This dissertation is devoted to an analysis of crimes committed
by the United States government in regard to nuclear weapons.

Speci

fically, the crimes studied are those instances in which the United
States has explicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons. Explicit
nuclear threats are defined as verbal or otherwise directly communi
cative warnings that nuclear or atomic bombings are imminent or
forthcoming.

The United States directed explicit threats twice dur

ing the Cold War, in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
There are three basic reasons explicit threats to use nuclear

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

weapons have been selected as the primary focus of this study.
First, the circumstances in which the threats took place represent
the highest level of consideration on the atomic or nuclear option.
That is, while the U.S. has moved its nuclear machinery and re
sources periodically throughout the Cold War in response to changing
global situations, the actual verbal threat to use the weapons indi
cates that the weapons were as close to being used in the Korean and
Vietnam Wars

than on any other occasions.

Thus, in these instances

the danger of nuclear war was more probable than on other occasions.
Secondly, the idea of threat in the body of international law which
regulates military operations requires that for a threat to occur,
an identifiable, concrete provocation or communication must be arti
culated.

Thus, in order to remain consistent with the definitional

approach of the study, only explicit threats to use nuclear weapons
are considered illegal under international law.

This compels the

endeavor to be internally consistent throughout the study.

Finally,

focusing only on explicit threats increases the attention given to
these instances in terms of depth.

Thus, more attention to detail

can be given to explicit nuclear threats.

Sacrificing breadth for

depth, commonly a major dilemma in social research, is not viewed
problematic here, since the study represents a significantly dis
tinct approach to conceptualizing the phenomenon of crime.

Outline of the Research

Chapter II provides the definitional and epistemological frame
work for the project.

Here a review of the definitional literature
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is conducted, criticisms are mounted against previous conceptualiza
tions of governmental crime, and a definition and typology is created
to adequately place governmental activities into the criminological
domain.

Chapter III is devoted to an explication of the bearing

international law has over nuclear weapons.

Here the precise mechan

isms for incriminating U.S. nuclear weapons policy are introduced.
Chapter IV details the methods employed in the latter empirical sec
tions of this work.

It is here that I explain the historical and

comparative method, along with the specific data sources and general
methodological approach of the study.

Chapters V and VI chronologic

ally document the instances in which the United States explicitly
threatened to use nuclear weapons.

These chapters then are the crux

of the study, and entail the articulation of the structural, institu
tional, and individual level factors involved in the decisions to
threaten the use of nuclear weapons;

Chapter V is devoted to threats

during the Korean war, while chapter VI details threats during the
Vietnam conflict.

In Chapter VII, an attempt is made to develop a

grounded theory of the crimes, and thus is comprised of theoretical
reflections and deliberations on the possible causes of governmental
crime, as evidenced by the previous case studies.

Extant theories of

organizational criminality are also explored in order to gauge the
value of the grounded theory.

The final chapter provides a general

summary of the research, a discussion of the limitations of study,
and directions for further research.
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Reflexive Statement on the Study

This research stems from my interest in calling attention to
ignored forms of state violence.

As a humanist attempting to be

consistent with the principle of praxis, I cannot ignore the fact
that many harmful activities of states dwarf the harms, both qual
itatively and quantitatively, caused by civilian acts of criminality.
I view state violence as comprising a variety of manifestations which
act to cause harm to citizens, the environment, and the potential
harmony of the globe.

These harmful acts include the denial of

civil, political, and human rights, the pulverization of democratic
civilian movements, military or political subversion of sovereign
governments, disregard for the environmental consequences of war and
weapons production, and the interference and destruction of indigen
ous cultures.

These acts, inter alia, represent harms which can only

occur with the direct or indirect complicity of the state.

These

acts, however, are rarely investigated criminologically.
A concern with state violence and governmental criminality does
not mean that traditional civilian crimes such as murder, sexual
assault, and robbery are harmless or are unimportant to the disci
pline of criminology;

on the contrary, they are typically devastat

ing to the victim, community, and society as a whole.

It is impor

tant for criminologists to continue the study of these behaviors.
But state violence is in many ways a more deceptive and elusive
phenomenon, in that it is often difficult to discern the real vic
tims and perpetrators, or even if a crime has occurred at all.
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Indeed, most acts of state violence are committed by the more social
ly and economically powerful, and almost always result in harm to the
least powerful.
Traditional academic criminology has a ceiling, a conceptual
limit which acts to preclude the study of certain types of behavior.
Criminology is very much a closed and limited ontological system, but
there is enough room to at least expand the conceptual net of inquiry.
Building on the work of some iconoclastic criminologists, and my own
work in the area of the definition and conceptualization of crime,
this research represents an attempt at raising that criminological
ceiling to a level which allows more harmful behaviors to become sub
ject to criminological study.

I view this attempt at expanding the

criminological parameter as one of the more important purposes of the
study.

Thus, I use international law to criminologically incriminate

state violence, and reject other approaches to the definition of
crime, because I feel a more legalistic approach will facilitate
wider acceptance of the very idea of governmental crime.

Mainstream

ing the concept of governmental crime into the discipline of crim
inology is important for the very reason it is important to speak of
governmental crime and state violence.

I can see no other way which

holds the potential for effectively drawing attention to state vio
lence than by illustrating its importance to the very academic dis
cipline which purports to investigate harmful activities.

This is

why I go to great lengths in illustrating what international law is,
and how it can be employed both scientifically and pragmatically to
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the problem of state violence.
It is hoped that on episteaological, theoretical, ard pragmatic
levels, this research furthers the scholarly understanding of govern
mental crime.

Equally important, it is desired that this scholarly

understanding in some way furthers the movement toward the recogni
tion, and hopefully eradication, of the problem of state violence.
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CHAPTER I I

DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual journey leading to the empirical analysis of
international governmental crime in this dissertation requires the
justification of the logic and definitions employed.

This chapter

provides a review of the intellectual history of the concept of elite
criminality and governmental crime, a discussion of two important
definitional questions which surface from my attempt to create a
distinct conceptualization of governmental crime, and a formal defi
nition of the phenomenon.

The chapter concludes with an explication

of the manners in which governments may be held criminally responsi
ble for their actions under international law.

From White Collar to International Governmental Crime

Edwin Sutherland coined the term white collar crime in his 1939
presidential address to the American Sociological Society.

The two

main goals of his address were to (1) emphasize that white collar
crime is real crime, and (2) show that the poor were not the only
group which engaged in criminality (Green, 1990).

In the years of

1940 and 1949 Sutherland published what are now considered landmark
works in the field of criminology, with the principal importance of
these publications residing in their definition and conceptualization
of white collar crime.

Sutherland's invention of the term white

collar crime changed the face of criminology by spawning an entire
11

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

12
subfield devoted to elite malfeasance.
Although Sutherland's pioneering works were a great achieve
ment, many problems existed in his conceptualization.
his definition of white collar crime was ambiguous.

First of all,
He (1940) de

fined this phenomenon as "a crime committed by a person of respect
ability and high social status in the course of his occupation"
(p. 2).

Obviously this definition was unclear and open to many

different interpretations.

Geis and Meier (1977) have even referred

to it as an "intellectual nightmare" (p. 25).

Another problem with

Sutherland's conceptualization is that he used the term white collar
crime inconsistently.

At various points in his ground-breaking

treatise White Collar Crime he mentions fraud in different repair
businesses (some of which are blue collar occupations), white collar
crimes in politics, fraud in income tax returns, and fraud committed
by a shoe salesman.

Thus, there is considerable confusion as to what

Sutherland actually meant by the concept of white collar crime
(Schlegel and Weisburd, 1992).
It was several years after Sutherland's work that conceptual
breakthroughs in white collar crime research surfaced.

One of the

earliest of these breakthroughs was Clinard and Quinney's (1973) ef
fort to define white collar crime in more operational terms.

They

bifurcated the concept of white collar crime into corporate crime,
crimes organizationally based and directed towards corporate goals,
and occupational crime, acts committed by individuals during the
ccurse of their occupation for their own personal gain.
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Clinard and Quinney's breakthrough prompted another epistemclogical advance in white collar research.

Drawing on the work of

organizational sociologists like Cohen (1977), Ermann and Lundmann
(1978), and Gross (1978), many criminologists in the late 1970s of
fered the argument that crime and criminal activity can be located
on a higher level of abstraction.

These theorists, reacting against

the atomistic epistemology that only individuals could be considered
criminal, advanced the notion that organizations are social actors in
their own rig|ht that can be studied criminologically because they
persist over time, develop and maintain procedures, and pursue goals
(Hall, 1987).

Thus, the organizational theorists maintained that

organizations themselves can and should be the unit of analysis ra
ther than the individual member of the organization.

As Schrager and

Short (1978) stated,
preoccupation with individuals can lead us to underestimate
the pressures within society and organizational structure,
which impel those individuals to commit illegal acts. These
difficulties make necessary and possible the analysis of
organizations as potentially criminal agents. Recognizing
that structural forces influence the commission of these
offenses does not negate the importance of interaction be
tween individuals and these forces, nor does it deny that
individuals are involved in the commission of illegal or
ganizational acts. It serves to emphasize organizational
as opposed to individual etiological factors, and calls for
macrosociological rather than individual levels of expla
nation. (p. 410)
Although there were several different formal definitions of organi
zational crime offered during this time (see Finney & Lesieur, 1982;
Ermann & Lundman, 1978), Schrager and Short (1978) provided the most
popular definition.
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Organizational crimes are illegal acts cf omission or
commission of an individual or group of individuals in a
legitimate formal organization in accordance with the
operative goals of the organization, which have a serious
impact on employees, consumers, or the general public, (p.
411)
The realization that crimes can be committed by institutions
and organizations led to the development of a whole new field of
criminological inquiry.

No longer is the criminologist required to

treat the individual as the only unit of analysis.

Indeed, there is

a growing interest and a substantial amount of empirical and theore
tical work in the area of corporate crime, organizational crime, and
most recently, state-corporate crime (see Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1993;
Kramer, 1992; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990).

While these areas of

criminological investigation have certainly deepened the level of
understanding of what constitutes criminality, there remain several
areas virtually untouched in this tradition, the most important being
the study of governmental crime.
There are only three major criminological works which have
specifically addressed the phenomenon of governmental crime.1 While
each of these attempts have been based on the assumption that organ
izations can be units of analysis, one finds little reference in any
of these works to the manner in which international law may serve as
a framework of incriminating governmental behavior.

This is the ma

jor flaw in past attempts to define and study governmental crime.
The first attempt to define governmental crime was made by
Chambliss in his 1988 presidential address to the American Society of
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Criminology.

Chambliss (1989) invented the concept of state-organiz

ed crime and defined it as a "state's acts defined by law as criminal
and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their job as
representatives of the state" (p. 184).

Chambliss uses the examples

of piracy and smuggling as indicative of the kind of criminality one
could define as state-organized crime.
The second attempt to investigate governmental crime is Grabosky's (1989) work in Australia.

Using 17 examples of governmental

crimes ranging from instances of organizational to occupational
crime, Grabosky, like Chambliss, uses domestic criminal law to
illustrate the wrongdoings of governmental actors and organizations.
Examples of governmental crimes employed in this study are violations
of environmental law, police misconduct, and individual-level politi
cal corruption.
Barak's (1991) anthology is the third important scholarly at
tempt to investigate governmental crime.

Noting that his book is the

first major treatise on the topic, the case studies which are con
tained in this work, like both Chambliss' and Grabosky's, are largely
confined to the study of a government's violation of its own criminal
code.

Examples include political repression in Peru, police abuses

of Aboriginal peoples in Australia, and violations of prisoners
rights in the United States.

Importantly, however, Barak's anthology

is on many occasions not focused on criminality strictly defined, or
as conceptualized in this dissertation.

Instead of limiting the

analysis to violations of domestic criminal law, there are many
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instances in which the governments in question have simply acted
immorally or wrongfully, not illegally.

Thus, unlike Chambliss and

Grabosky's work, Barak's book takes more of a social harms approach,
rather than a legalistic path, to the question of governmental
criminality.
This brief review of the literature on elite criminality and
governmental crime demonstrates that conceptualizations of this
phenomenon have been deficient in that little reference has been made
to the importance of international law as a framework of incrimina
tion.

Additionally, the corpus of work in this area has been more

concerned with the domestic actions of a government, not their
international conduct.

Thus, the research proposed here clearly

fills a gap in the existing literature.

This review also seems to

prompt two other germane questions regarding the sociological analy
sis of international governmental crime proposed here.

The first,

and perhaps most easily answered question is, is governmental crime
real crime?

The second is,

why is it important to reject social

harms approaches for the study of governmental crime?

These ques

tions are answered in the following.

Real Crime?
Governmental transgressions of international law are real
crimes.

To support this contention, one needs only to borrow from

Sutherland who made clear in his 1940 and 1949 works that white col
lar crime is real crime because the actions in question violated some
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form of administrative or regulatory law.

Just as crimes such as

fraud, price-fixing, and bribery are prohibited by law, so too are
many of the actions carried out by the Soviet Union and United States
in regard to nuclear weapons.

Therefore, governmental crime is real

crime because a codified set of legally binding principles or custom
ary laws have been violated.

It must be remembered, however, that

the scholarly classification of an event as criminal and the prosecu
tion of a criminal act are qualitatively different.

In the former,

the requirement of incrimination rests on the ability of the scholar
to recognize acts which violate existing laws, while the latter com
prises a detailed study of factors such as mens rea, concurrence, and
other principles of legality.

This research, then, is not an at

tempt to create a framework in which illegal governmental actions can
be prosecuted.

Nor is its aim to delineate the requirements for

convicting governmental transgressors in a court of law.

Rather, my

intention is to demonstrate that international law has much juris
diction over the actions of governments, and in doing so, one may
classify violations of international law as criminal for the purposes
of scholarly study.

Problems With Social Harms Definitions

The phenomenon of crime has historically been conceptualized as
a violation of a state's domestic criminal law.

This conception of

criminality has been erroneously assumed by mainstream criminologists
to be an objective, natural fact.

While scholars such as Barak (1990;
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1991), the Schwendingers (1970), Sellin (1938), and Tifft and Sulli
van (1980) have observed this academic error, they have not offered
definitions of crime which are thoroughly grounded in law (see
Kramer, 1982).

These social harms scholars instead label what they

feel to be undesirable governmental behavior as crime.

Examples in

clude Henry's (1991) definition of state crime as acts which are
"harmful" (p. 256), Kramer's (1992) definition of state-corporate
crime as acts which are "illegal or socially harmful" (p. 234), and
Sellin's (1938) definition of crime as a violation of "conduct norms"
(p. 222).

While acknowledging the importance of holding governments

accountable for deleterious actions, these approaches must be reject
ed not because of their ideological nature, but because of their lack
of legal reference.
The first defense of my negation of social harms approaches is
largely based on Sutherland's (1940; 1949) argument that criminology
is the study of lawmaking, lawbreaking, and the reactions to lawbreaking.

If one takes this definition seriously, it only follows

that criminologists are not studying crime if such study does not in
some manner concern itself with the reaction, transgression, or
construction of law.

According to this approach, an action can be

profoundly malign and deleterious but be completely a-criminal.

This

approach also appreciates the phenomenological and constructionist
argument that criminality is simply behavior which has been labeled
as such.

Thus, the creation of the phenomenon of international gov

ernmental crime in this dissertation is as much an invention as a
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scientific discovery.

The epistemology developed here then is some

what multi-paradigmatic.
The second argument offered to justify my neo-legalistic ap
proach deals more with prospects of legitimacy than actual substantive
content.

Of the many reasons social harms approaches have been re

jected by traditional criminologists, the most prominent has been the
perceived subjectivity and politicality of the approach.

Indeed,

this criticism is somewhat justified to the extent that social harms
perspectives have been formulated from the critical tradition in
criminology, a tradition characterized by Marxist and anarchist per
spectives.

Thus, because of the perceived political commitments of

social harms scholars, the positivist dominated field of criminology
has acted to marginalize these attempts at offering a new definition
of crime.
But a definitional framework based on actual law, the position
advanced in this dissertation, holds substantially more affinity with
the focal concern of criminology, the study of transgressions against
law.

Thus, this method of incriminating the harmful actions of gov

ernments through international law not only advances a humanist per
spective on crime and criminality (the goal of social harms scholars)
but also is more likely to gain acceptance in the mainstream.

As

Kuhn (1962) brilliantly discovered, a paradigmatic change has less to
do with the intrinsic validity of a theoretical movement than the
political legitimacy of the theory.

It is therefore reasonable to

justify my rejection of social harms approaches on the hypothesis
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that the approach offered here has an substantially larger opportun
ity to become assimilated into the major currents of the discipline
of criminology.

A Definition and Typology of Governmental Crime

Governmental crime is defined in this dissertation as an illegal
act of an individual or group of individuals in an institution of
legitimate governance in accordance with the operational goals of the
institution of governance.

The uniqueness of this definition is

two-fold.
First, the definition demands that for any action to be called
governmental crime, a law or set of laws must exist which prohibit
that action.

Thus, this definition is neo-legalistic in that any

binding law, not simply domestic criminal law, is an acceptable
framework for incrimination.

Moreover, an act which is morally

reprehensible or socially deleterious is not necessarily criminal
because of its malignant character.

Rather the act in question must

be a transgression against law, which could be either domestic or
international.
Second, the definition demands that governmental crime be view
ed in organizational rather than individual terms.

Rather than see

ing governmental crime as caused by the individual's desire for selfgratification or personal profit, the phenomenon is conceptualized
here as a product of institutional and structural pressures for the
achievement of some governmental goal.

Thus, the crucial distin

guishing factor is the motivation of the crime.

This logic is
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consistent with Clinard and Quinney's (1973) definition of organi
zational crime:

crimes which are not motivated from an actor's im

mediate desire for individual personal gain but instead motivated by
the desire to advance organizational goals.

Following this frame

work, a U.S. Secretary of Defense who embezzles millions of dollars
from defense contractors would not be a governmental criminal.

The

U.S. government could, however, be defined as criminally liable if
under the direction of the military, a violation of the Geneva Con
ventions occurred in a time of international conflict.
On an ontological level, the definition proposed here necessar
ily involves at least four general kinds of criminality.

The first,

domestic-international governmental crime (DIGC), refers to criminal
acts by governments that occur within the state's geographic juris
diction which run contrary to the state's obligation under interna
tional law.

Examples of such actions would be transgressions of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Interna
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discri
mination, and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.

The

second, international-international governmental crime (IIGC), refers
to criminal acts by governments which occur abroad in violation
international law.

Examples include violations of the Genocide

Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the Nuclear Non-Prolifera
tion Treaty.

The third, domestic-domestic governmental crime (DDGC)

refers to criminal acts which occur within the state's geographical
jurisdiction in violation of the criminal or regulatory code of the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

22
state.

Examples include police violations of procedural law and

direct violations of a state's constitution.

The forth type of

governmental crime is international-domestic governmental crime
(IDGC). This particular category of crime refers to a state's crim
inal conduct abroad in violation of its own criminal or regulatory
code.

Most illustrative of this phenomenon is the United States-

Iran-Contra incident.
Again, governmental actions can be categorized as governmental
crime if they violate either legally binding domestic or internation
al law.

It is important for criminologists to study all forms of

governmental crime.

Because of space limitations this dissertation

is concerned only with type IIGC, international governmental beha
viors which violate international law.

However, in the theoretical

section of this study, the prospects for understanding all types of
governmental crime created here will be examined.
Using international law as a legal framework, as mentioned
earlier, goes well beyond prior criminological research and theoriz
ing on governmental crime.

While scholars such as Barak (1991),

Frappier (1984), Kauzlarich, Kramer, and Smith (1992), Michalowski
and Kramer (1987) and Tushnet (1988) have made reference to bodies of
law which may serve to regulate international governmental behavior,
their use of the term crime lacks specificity in that it is unclear
whether such laws are actually legally binding on governments.

As

such, these studies are inadequate, as are the social harms approach
es, for the criminalization of governments called for in this study.
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Suitable mechanisms for the scholarly classification of illegal
governmental actions under international law are (a) those laws which
a government has accepted through ratification, the standard used by
traditional scholars of international law; and (b) customary inter
national law, which althougji it is sometimes uncodified, serves as a
legal standard for state behavior.
This study will examine one area of international governmental
crime:

United States violations of international laws regulating the

threat to use nuclear weapons during the Korean and Vietnam wars.
Nuclear weapons violations, because of their grave threats to the
totality of life and their prominent position in international rela
tions, have been chosen as the prototype in this study.

Addition

ally, there is a dearth of criminological studies regarding nuclear
weapons policies.

Thus with many questions both unasked and unan

swered concerning nuclear weapons, this research may provide im
portant insights into this overlooked phenomenon.

Finally, there

is a substantial body of literature on the question of the legality
of nuclear weapons.

Found almost exclusively in the scholarly legal

community, most of the writings in this area treat the nuclear wea
pons issue quite extensively, with the most popular conclusion that
the actual use and threat to use nuclear weapons would be violations
of international law.

Having discussed the research objectives and

definitional framework on which this study is based, the next chapter
is devoted to a review of the research conducted on the legal status
of nuclear weapons.

This review is intended to establish the
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substantive framework by which the nuclear weapons policies of the
United States may be considered criminal tinder international law, and
therefore subject to criminological investigation.
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CHAPTER III

THE ILLEGALITY OF THE USE AND THREAT
TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The overwhelming normative consensus now operative in inter
national society would legally condemn all contemplated
roles for nuclear weapons. Not even a retaliatory use of
nuclear weapons could be easily reconciled with most inter
pretations of the laws of war. (Falk, 1983, p. 527).
History of the Debate

The status of nuclear weapons under international law is a sub
ject which has received a substantial amount of attention in the
scholarly legal community.

All of the scholars interested in this

issue have approached the question by reference to the laws of war,
which are considered legally binding principles governments are ob
liged to conform to both in times of war and in their general mili
tary planning.

The laws of war are essentially a conglomeration of

principles based on the general postulate that humanity and pro
portionality are keys to protecting nonbelligerents in times of in
ternational conflict.

They are also "generally aimed at protecting

individuals and objects in armed conflicts against the effects and
horrors of war" (Mohr, 1988, p. 83).

There are five basic principles

of the laws of war:
1.

That in any armed conflict the right of the parties to

choose methods of warfare is not unlimited.
2.

That only as much force may be used as is required to

25
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overpower the enemy.
3.

That superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering must be

avoided.
4.

That a certain amount of chivalry, fairness, and respect

should prevail even in the relations between hostile parties.
5.

That the use of weapons or tactics that cause indiscrimi

nate harm as between combatants and noncombatants is prohibited
(Bledsoe & Boczek, 1987; Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, 1990).
The laws of war are found in international agreements, treat
ies, and various customary laws.

According to Miller (1975), they

are neither changed nor destroyed on any of the following bases:
1.
2.
3.
4.

That the law is alleged to be vague or uncertain;
That military necessity makes it impossible to comply
with the law;
That the opposing state is guilty of the same or other
violations of the law; and
That the law has been so widely violated that it is no
longer binding, (p. 37).

Thus, the laws of war are indeed legitimate legal principles
which have been interpreted by international courts as holding juris
diction over the activities of a state (Miller, 1975).
Since arguments supporting the contention that the use and
threat to use nuclear weapons are illegal under international law are
fully presented in the next two sections of this chapter, I will dis
cuss the opposing view in this first section.

As we will find, both

arguments for and against the legality of nuclear weapons hinge on
the interpretation of the laws of war.

Thus, there is a high degree

of uniformity in the logic used to adjudicate the legal status of
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nuclear weapons.

It also must be remembered that most legal scho

lars agree that the use and threat to use nuclear weapons violates
international law.

Nevertheless, it seems important to review the

arguments to the contrary, most of which were published between 1945
and I960.2
There are three main theses which have historically guided
legal scholars to the conclusion that the use and threatened use of
nuclear weapons are legal under international law:
1.

There is insufficient scientific evidence on the effects of

nuclear weapons.
2.

The laws of war have become impotent with the emergence of

nuclear weapons.
3.

There is no express prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Each

of these assertions will be reviewed and briefly critiqued.
The

critique is limited in this section because the later por

tions of this chapter illustrate the deficiencies of the approaches.
The first argument, that insufficient scientific evidence
exists to reasonably calculate the effects of an nuclear bombing, is
of course archaic.

This argument is no longer employed to support

the legality of the use and threat to use nuclear weapons.

When

Lauterpacht (1952), Stone (1954), Tucker (1950) offered this argu
ment to defend the legality of nuclear weapons, there indeed may have
been limited information, especially to the general public, on the
effects of nuclear weapons.

The only available evidence on the ef

fects of nuclear weapons at the time these scholars wrote was the
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U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and this information was not
readily attainable during the 1950's.

Given that the primitive ato

mic bombs dropped on the country of Japan did not result in wholesale
deaths of the entire Japanese citizenry, and that some individuals
indeed survived these bombings, these scholars determined that the
laws of war are not necessarily broken by the use of nuclear wea
pons.3
The reason that this argument is no longer used to support the
legality of nuclear weapons is because in the contemporary period it
is almost ludicrous to suggest that we have no scientific understand
ing of the effects of nuclear weapons.

Many studies have established

the general contours of the destruction which would be caused by the
use of nuclear weapons (see Office of Technology Assessment, 1979;
McNaught, 1984; Perdue, 1989; United Nations, 1980, 1990; World
Health Organization, 1987). Although it seems unnecessary to regur
gitate the documented evidence on the power of these weapons, Perdue
(1989), after reviewing the scientific evidence, concluded the
following:
In the event of a major exchange, estimates of quick death
range from several hundred million people to the World
Health Organization's figure of 1.1 billion people. The
number of critically injured who would require available
health care would perhaps approach another 1 billion
persons. Given such an event, the basic services and
organizations of society would collapse. Medical care,
water, electricity, fuel transportation, communication,
food supplies, sanitation, and civil services would all
be devastated, (p. 73)
The total stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world today exceeds the
explosive power of the Hiroshima bombing by over 3 million.

The
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bombings of Hiroshima resulted in 130,000 Japanese deaths within
three minutes of the detonation of the bomb, while 70,000 died later
as a result of exposure to radiation (Weiner, 1990).

Thus, most le

gal scholars find it difficult to accept the argument that the use of
and threat to use nuclear weapons would be lawful because there
exists an inadequate understanding of the results of a nuclear ex
change .
The second argument in defense of the legal status of nuclear
weapons is that the laws of war have become obsolete in the nuclear
age.

Claimed by such scholars as Stowell (1945), Thomas (1946),

Borchard (1946), and Baxter (1953), this contention is based on the
assumption that many of the laws of war were written prior to the
genesis of the atomic weapon, and thus are not subject to the laws
regulating contemporary governmental military planning.

While it is

undoubtedly true that some of the principles of the laws of war were
penned prior to the nuclear age, these laws have been consistently
interpreted by both scholars and the courts as attempts to control
any weapons or any method of warfare.

In like manner one need only

note that while the U.S. Constitution's framers were not cognizant of
all the potential behaviors to consider when creating the Bill of
Rights, the basic principles of the Constitution are continually used
to judge the lawfulness of actions (Meyrowitz, 1990).

It is argued

by many legal scholars involved in the nuclear weapons issue that
since international laws not concerning the laws of war have been
interpreted as binding on new technological and political
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developments, so too do the laws of war hold jurisdiction over nu
clear weapons (Meyrowitz, 1990). Additionally, one must consider that
a significant amount of the conventional laws of war have been deve
loped in the age of the nuclear weapon.

Examples include the Geno

cide Convention and the Geneva Conventions.
The third most common argument in defense of the legality of
nuclear weapons is that there exists no express prohibition of nu
clear weapons in the body of international law.

Thus, scholars such

as O'Brien (1961) and Schwartzenberger (1958) argue that since there
is no treaty, convention, or other international agreement which
specifically prohibits the threat to use and actual use of nuclear
weapons, one must conclude that these weapons and corresponding poli
cies are lawful.4 Although at first thought this argument seems
reasonable, it becomes less valid when one considers that the entire
history of domestic, municipal, and international law is based on
precedence setting in which new behaviors are constantly being weigh
ed against existing principles of law.

International courts, as we

will see in the next section, have consistently allowed the inter
pretation of behaviors not explicitly prohibited by law to be subject
to existing law.
By analogy, one can imagine the foolishness of a claim by a
defendant in a domestic court that they did not commit a murder be
cause they have killed someone in a fashion not specifically pro
hibited by law.

Thus, anyone who purposefully kills another by us

ing, for example, computer disks to bludgeon, video cassette tape to
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strangle, or gardening sheers to stab, would under this logic be
inculpable because the law does not specifically stipulate computer
disks, video cassette tape, or gardening sheers as methods of kill
ing.

Much more seriously, imagine a Nazi commander defending him or

herself on the grounds that the manners of execution employed toward
Jews were not specifically prohibited by law, and therefore were le
gal.

The argument that nuclear weapons are legal because they are

not specifically mentioned in the laws of war is simply invalid.
The three arguments used to justify the legality of nuclear
weapons have little support in the academic legal community.

They

have been reviewed and briefly critiqued here in order to demonstrate
that the legal status of nuclear weapons under international law is
neither a new nor an ignored issue in the legal community.

The next

two sections of this chapter are devoted to an explication of the
specific mechanisms by which U.S. nuclear weapons policies may be
classified as criminal for the purposes of scholarly study.

Illegality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons by the U.S.

Conventionarv Law

The most unquestionable framework in which to adjudicate the
legality of U.S. nuclear weapons policies is by reference to conven
tions which have been signed and ratified by these governments.

By

accepting the provisions of a treaty or convention, a state is obli
gated to comply with both its spirit and specific prohibitions.
Three legally binding frameworks have been offered by legal scholars
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as acceptable frameworks of incrimination in regard to nuclear wea
pons policy, (see Bilder, 1984; Boyle, 1987; Falk, 1983; Feinrider,
1986; Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, 1990; Meyrowitz 1981,
1990; Miller & Feinrider, 1984; Mohr, 1988; Vickman, 1988; Weston
1983; 1983a).
1.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use

in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacter
iological Methods of Warfare (the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol).
2.

The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the 1948 Genocide Convention).
3.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions (I-IV).

Table 1 documents the year each of these agreements entered in
to force, the dates in which the United States became legally obli
gated to comply with these agreements, and the relevant substantive
prohibitions found within these agreements.

The Geneva Gas Protocol,

Genocide Convention, and Geneva Conventions have been interpreted by
many legal scholars as constituting the specific prohibitions which
outlaw the existence of nuclear weapons prima facie (see Lawyers
Committee on Nuclear Policy, 1990; Meyrowitz 1981, 1990; Mohr,
1988; Vickman, 1988; Weston 1983).
Because nuclear weapons are analogous devices of poisonous gas
(the Geneva Gas Protocol), capable of deleting an entire ethnic or
racial group (the Genocide Convention), and would wreak violent death
and mutilation (the Geneva Conventions) it is clear that the actual
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Table 1
Treaties and Conventions Applicable in Determining the
Legality of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

1925 Geneva Gas Protocol
Entered Into Force: February 8, 1928
United States ratified: April 10, 1975
Relevant prohibitions: The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other
gases, and all analogous liquid materials or devices.
1948 Genocide Convention
Entered Into Force: January 12, 1951
United States ratified: October 14, 1988
Relevant prohibitions: Conspiracy, attempt, complicity, incitement,
and actual execution of genocide.
1949 Geneva Conventions (I-IV)
Entered Into Force: October 21, 1950
United States ratified: August 12, 1955
Relevant prohibitions: Violence to life and person, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture of combatants and civilians.

use of these weapons of mass destruction would violate legally bind
ing international laws.

Again, this conclusion has been reached by

the majority of scholars working in this area.

Customary International Law

According to Roberts and Guelff (1982),
despite the importance of international agreements in the
contemporary development of the law, any work concerning the
laws of war which is limited to international agreements
runs the risk of distorting not only the form but also the
substance of the law. The codification of rules into
particular agreements which began to occur in the second
half of the nineteenth century did not displace customary
law. (p. 4)
There are numerous sources of customary international law to
draw upon in adjudicating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.
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The classic statement of the role of customary law is found in the
famous Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention IV (quoted in
Roberts & Guelff, 1982):
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain
under the protection of the rule of the principles of law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the
dictates of the public conscience, (p. 45)
And as stated by the Nuremberg Tribunal (quoted in Roberts & Guelff,
1982), in their deliberations over the genocidal practices of the
Nazis in World War II,
the law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in
the customs and practices of states which gradually obtained
universal recognition, and from the general principles of
justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts.
The law is not static but by continual adaptation follows
the needs of a changing world, (p. 41)
Given these guidelines set by jurists in prominent international con
claves, it is clear that for some state action to be labeled criminal
under international law, no specifically codified law need be broken.
Thus state actions can be viewed as lawful or unlawful to the degree
that they violate basic codes of behavior as established and practic
ed by international audiences.

Thus the argument that the use of

nuclear weapons would be lawful given the absence of an express
prohibition is sophist.

As Meyrowitz (1990) aptly asserts,

the legality of nuclear weapons cannot simply be judged by
the existence or the lack of existence of a treaty rule
specifically prohibiting or restricting their use. Trad
itionally, legal rules, both domestic and international,
have been interpreted to encompass matters not specifically
mentioned or even contemplated by the drafters of those
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legal declarations. As a result, the legal status of
nuclear weapons must be judged in light of the varied
sources of international law. (p. 39)
Similarly (as quoted in Friedman, 1972), a Japanese federal court
ruled in Shimoda et al. vs. the State of Japan (1963), that
it can naturally be assumed that the vise of a new weapon is
legal as long as international law does not prohibit it.
However, the prohibition in this context is to be understood
to include not only the case where there is an express rule
of direct prohibition, but also the case where the prohi
bition can be implied from the interpretation and applica
tion by analogy of existing rules of international law
(customary and treaties). Further, the prohibition must be
understood also to include new cases where, in light of the
principles of international law which at the basis of these
miles of international law, the use of new weapons is deemed
contrary to these principles, for there is no reason why the
interpretation of rules of international law should be lim
ited to literal interpretation, any more than the interpre
tation of rules of municipal law. (p. 1690).
What then are the principles of customary law which hold relevance to
the nuclear weapons challenge?

The first principle is that comba

tants and noncombatants are protected from unnecessary and aggravat
ed suffering.

First articulated in the 1907 Hague Conventions, this

principle is perhaps the most accepted limitation on states involved
in military hostilities (Weston, 1983; Singh and McWhinney, 1989;
Miller, 1975; Bailey, 1972).

The second principle of customary law

relevant to the nuclear weapons challenge, also grounded in the Hague
Conventions, is that the means of injuring an enemy is not unlimited
and that at all times distinction must be made between combatants and
civilians.

Indicating the profound global support for the relevance

of these principles was the unanimously passed December 16, 1965 U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII) which "underscored the need
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to apply humanitarian principles to armed conflicts" (Meyrowitz,
1990, p. 17).
Additionally, many states have incorporated these principles
into their military manuals, a clear indication this principle has
gained nearly universal acceptance.

For example the 1956 Field Man

ual published by the U.S. government contained the following provi
sions (quoted in Singh & McWhinney, 1989):
2.

Purposes of the Law of War: the conduct of armed
hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land
warfare which is both written and unwritten. It is
inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war
by:
a. Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from
unnecessary suffering.
b. Safeguarding certain fundamental rights of persons
who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly
prisoners of war, the wounded, the sick, and civil
ians .
3. Basic Principles
a. Prohibitory Effect: The law of war places limits
on the exercise of a belligerent's power in the
interests mentioned in paragraph 2 and requires
that belligerents refrain from employing any kind
or degree of violence which is not actually neces
sary for military purposes and that they conduct
hostilities with regard for the principles and pur
poses of humanity and chivalry.
b. Force of Customary Law: The unwritten or customary
law of war is binding on all nations, (p. 55)

The U.S. Department of Defense (quoted in Falk, 1983) official manual
also addresses the importance of the laws of armed conflict.
All action of the Department of Defense with respect to the
acquisition and procurement of weapons, and their intended
use in armed conflict, shall be consistent with the obli
gations assumed by the United States Government under all
applicable treaties, with customary international law, and
in particular, with the laws of war. (p. 526)
Similarly the British Manual of Military Law sets the same limita
tions on its citizens in recognizing the "principle of humanity which

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

37
says that all kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary for
the purposes of war are not permitted" (quoted in Singh & McUhinney,
1989, p. 56).
Customary law, then, has much influence in prescribing the man
ner in which states may conduct war.

To further buttress the rele

vance of customary law to the nuclear weapons question a number of
international agreements and United Nations declarations categorical
ly denounce the use and threat of nuclear weapons.

The most impor

tant of these declarations was the United Nations General Assembly
resolution 1653 (XVI) adopted by a vote of 55 to 20 on November 24,
1961.5 The resolution, quoted below, demonstrates the legal and mor
al sentiment of the majority on nuclear weapons (quoted in Meyrowitz,
1990).
The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to
the spirit, letter, and aims of the United Nations and, as
such, is a direct violation of the Charter.
Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be
considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations,
as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing
a crime against mankind and civilization. The use of nu
clear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed the scope of
war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to
mankind and civilization, (p. 26)
Other resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly demonstrate the inter
national community's opposition to nuclear weapons, and thus could be
considered a source of customary international law (Meyrowitz, 1990;
Riggs & Plano, 1988). Of particular importance is Resolution 808 (IX)
which on November 4, 1954 with a vote of 57 to 1 called for "The to
tal prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and
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weapons of mass destruction.n6
While U.N. General Assembly resolutions normally do not have
the force of law in a strict sense, they may have legal force "if
they are regarded as statements of customary international law or
authoritative interpretations of the U.N. Charter" (Riggs & Piano,
1988, p. 23).7 The various U.N. General Assembly resolutions deal
ing with nuclear weapons outlined above are thus satisfactory frame
works for prohibiting the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Because

many of these resolutions have been overwhelmingly passed by the
international community, have been based on interpretations of cus
tomary international law, and have made explicit reference to the
laws of humanity and the United Nations Charter, the only reasonable
conclusion is that the use of nuclear weapons would transgress inter
national law.8 Further buttressing this contention is the case of
Ryuichi Shimoda et al. vs. the State of Japan (1963), which is the
only instance of a governmental court action which has addressed the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons.9
In a class action suit, family members and some actual victims
of the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki filed a grievance in
Japanese federal court seeking damages for injuries sustained from
the bombardment.

The judges based their analysis of the lawfulness

of the bombings, not of nuclear weapons per se.

Nevertheless the

Court ruled that indeed the U.S. bombing constituted a violation of
international law based on both customary and legally binding trea
ties.

The court ruled (quoted in Friedman, 1972), that
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it is proper to conclude that the aerial bombardment with
an atomic bomb of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an illegal
act of hostilities under international law as it existed at
the time, as an indiscriminate bombardment of undefended
cities. (Section 8)
The atomic bombing of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki is believed
to be contrary to the principle of international law prohibit
ing means of injuring the enemy which cause unnecessary suf
fering or are inhumane. (Section 11, p. 1693)
In relevance to U.S. law the court ruled:
With regard to the United States, it is known that treaties
are the supreme law of the land in accordance with article
6, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the United States,
and that customary international law is also part of the law
of the land. Such being the case, it would seem to be a
fair assumption that an act contrary to international law
constitutes an unlawful act in the municipal law of the
United States. (Section 2, p. 1694)
The Shimoda case, as a legitimate legal decision, lends strong support
to the contention that the use of nuclear weapons violates several
existing international laws.10

Illegality of the Threat to Use Nuclear Weapons

The question of whether threats to use nuclear weapons are le
gal practices is best treated as qualitatively distinct from the
question of the legality of the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Hav

ing established that the use of nuclear weapons would clearly violate
extant international laws, the discussion will now turn to a review
of the most germane issues concerning the illegality of the threat to
use nuclear weapons.

Since the focus of the dissertation is inter

national governmental crime exemplified by U.S. threats to use nu
clear weapons, the following is intended to set the specific
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framework for the empirical sections of the study which detail the
criminal threats to use nuclear weapons by the United States in the
Korean and Vietnam wars.
Perhaps most germane in determining the legality of the threat
to use nuclear weapons are the principles found in the United Nations
Charter.

The primary purpose of the U.N. Charter was to render the

use of force between states unlawful and to end the scourge of war
(Henkin, 1S91; Swing, 1991).

According to Henkin (1991), the Charter

"remains the authoritative statement of the law on the use of force
(and) acts as a principal norm of international law" (p. 38).

The

Charter "constitutes basic rules of international conduct that all
member states are ostensibly committed to observe" (Riggs & Plano,
1998, p. 24).

The United States has been a member of the U.N. since

1945, the year the organization was created.
Chapter One, Article One of the U.N. Charter states (quoted in
Riggs & Plano, 1988), that the purpose of the United Nations is
to maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the pre
vention and removal of threats to the peace and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the prin
ciples of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace, (p. 367)
Moreover, (quoted in Riggs & Plano, 1988), Article Two of Chapter One
(4) states that
all members shall refrain from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any state in which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action, (p. 368)
As a source of customary and treaty law, then, the United Nations
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Charter clearly prohibits the threat to use force, and intentional
breaches of peace.
The only exception (quoted in Riggs & Plano, 1988) to the
prohibition of Article 2(4) on the threat to use force is found in
Article 51 of the Charter.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to main
tain international peace and security, (p. 370)
The intention of this article is simply to allow a state under attack
to defend itself.

Importantly, however, the right to defend is lim

ited so that this right is only absolute until the Security Council
provides an international plan of action to halt hostilities.

Thus,

the Security Council ultimately retains the authority to enact the
specific responses to an armed invasion.
In the history of the United Nations, the specific legal mean
ing of the Article 51 exception in relationship to Article 2(4) has
been defined in only one case: Nicaragua v. The United States (1986).
Here the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Article 51
applies only when a state has been subjected to an armed attack.
Specifically the Court ruled that
states do not have a right of collective armed response to
acts which do not constitute an armed attack. If no armed
attack occurred, collective self defense is unlawful, even
if carried on in strict compliance with the canons of
necessity and proportionality, (p. 237)
The conclusion is unavoidable, then, that when a country threatens
or actually uses force against another territory, a criminal act has
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occurred (see Boyle 1991; Nuremberg Campaign, 1990).

Since the

occasions in which the United States has threatened to use nuclear
weapons have not occurred in response to an armed invasion of the
U.S. homeland, the instances in which the U.S. has threatened to use
atomic weapons must be deemed unlawful.11

While it may be true that

some U.S. treaty obligations treat the invasion of a U.S. ally as an
invasion of the U.S. homeland, nuclear weapons threats are still il
legal because of their violation of the principles of proportionality
and necessity.
Another framework by which to judge the lawfulness of the
threat to use nuclear weapons is by reference to the 1945-46 Nurem
berg Principles.

These principles of international law originated

from the Allied prosecution of Nazi war criminals, and are considered
legally binding rules of conduct upon all states (Baudot, 1977).12
Table 2 provides a complete reproduction of the prohibitions created
at the Nuremberg Trials.
What is unusual about the prohibitions found in the Nuremberg
Charter is the outlawing of not only malign conduct of belligerents
in war, but also the significant amount of attention paid to the
crimes of conspiracy, planning, and threatening to commit the crimes
of murder and other inhumane acts.

In its deliberations, the tri

bunal convicted many individuals, as well as organizations such as
the German gestapo, of conspiracy to violate the principles of human
ity and peace (Friedman, 1972).
While the magnitude of destruction and murder committed by the
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Table 2
Substantive Prohibitions Found in the Nuremberg Charter

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which their shall be individual
responsibility.
(a)

Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initia
tion, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing:

(b)

War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder, or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private pro
perty, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity.

(c)

Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, en
slavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during war, or
prosecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

Source:

Roberts and Guelff, 1982.

Nazis dwarfs the h a m that nuclear weapons have been responsible for
up to the contemporary period, this does not mean that the basic pro
hibitions and principles of the Nuremberg Charter are inapplicable to
the nuclear weapons question.

The basic argument used by legal

scholars employing the Nuremberg judgement to adjudicate the lawful
ness of the threat to use nuclear weapons is that since the use of
nuclear weapons is a violation of international law (because of its
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disproportionality and unpredictability), the planning and threat to
use these weapons must also be criminal.
this:

The legal analogy drawn is

Much like a Nazi commander's preparation and threat to exterm

inate Jews and other ethnic groups, the strategies of nuclear deter
rence and mutual assured destruction constitute preparation, plann
ing, and threats to use weapons which, if employed in time of war,
would clearly violate extant international law.

Since the case of

the Nazi preparations to commit unquestionably illegal actions is
conceptually similar to the planning and threatening of committing
unquestionably illegal acts by the governments of the U.S. in regard
to nuclear weapons, there seems little question that threatening the
use of nuclear weapons is criminal under the legally binding princi
ples of the Nuremberg Charter.13 As Falk (1983) states:
To the extent existing doctrines and plans rest on a
conception of deterrence based on threats to civilian noncombatants and non-military objectives, these (threats)
would be illegal under even the narrowest definition of the
applicability of international law. (p. 528)
While the threat to use nuclear weapons is prohibited by many
international laws,

U.S. domestic law can also be employed to crim

inalize these actions.

United States criminal law prohibits attempts

to violate law, whether it be international or domestic.

Conspiracy

is defined in the U.S. Criminal Code (quoted in Myren, 1988) as "two
or more persons conspiring to commit any offense" (p. 204).

As

Francis Boyle (quoted in Vickman, 1988) declared that
the threat to use nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear
deterrence/terrorism) constitutes ongoing international
criminal activity. Namely, planning, preparation,
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solicitation, and conspiracy to commit crimes against peace,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide as well as
grave breaches of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the
Additional Protocol I of 1977, the Hague Regulations of
1907, and the Genocide Convention of 1948. (p. 4)
The framework outlined in the preceding pages sets a solid
foundation for the analysis of the actual violations of international
law committed by the United States.

Formal international covenants

and customary international laws have been shown to have substantial
relevance to not only adjudicating the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons, but also of the threatening to use these weapons.

The next

chapter presents the methods to be employed in the empirical analysis
of these violations.
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CHAPTER IV

METHODS

Qualitative research is generally labelled unsystem
atic, impressionistic, or exploratory, and the flexible
quantitative research sloppy, or unsophisticated. These
critics, in their zeal for careful verification and for
a degree of accuracy they never achieve, have forgotten
both the generation of theory and the need for carefully
appraising the different degrees of plausibility neces
sary for sociology's diverse tasks. (Glaser and Strauss,
1967, p. 223).
This research is historical-comparative in design.

It is his

torical in that the violations of nuclear weapons laws are identified
within stated historical contexts, the Korean and Vietnam wars.
Thus, this research investigates the only instances in which explicit
threats to use nuclear weapons have occurred.

The research is com

parative in design in that the violations of nuclear weapons laws by
the United States are analyzed on two separate occasions.

This

historical-comparative method is employed in order to produce a
grounded substantive theory of international governmental crime
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Level of Analysis and Putative Variables

The foci of this study are the historically situated violations
of nuclear weapons laws by the governments of the United States.
Establishing a structural level approach such as this requires atten
tion to the influences that actors in these governmental structures

46

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

47
become subject.

A social-psychological examination of the heads of

state, National Security advisors, and high ranking military officers
is not executed in this research.

Rather, such actors are viewed as

products of larger economic, social and political pressures which act
to instruct their role performances.

The methodological logic of

this approach holds substantial affinity with Braithwaite's (1984)
classic analysis of crime in the pharmaceutical industry.

In his

structural examination of corporate crime, Braithwaite (1984) oper
ates under the assumption that
most corporate crimes in the pharmaceutical industry cannot
be explained by the perverse personalities of their perpe
trators. One must reject the proclivity in an individual
istic culture to locate the source of evil deeds in evil
people. Rather than think of corporate actors as individ
ual personalities, they should be viewed as actors who
assume different roles, (with) the requirements of these
roles defined by the organization, (p. 2)
Under this structural analysis approach, pressures upon state actors
are anticipated to be such factors as quantitative and geographic
military power, the degree of technological command over nuclear
weapons, and the degree of economic and political vulnerability
perceived by the governments under examination.

These independent

variables, though anticipated to play a germane role in the viola
tions of nuclear weapons laws, are not presumed to be universally
applicable to all historical time frames.

To assume that only these

factors are involved in the association would be a violation of the
principles of grounded theory, explained later in this section.
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Justification of Sample
This research investigates the phenomenon of governmental crime
through an analysis of the behavioral differences and similarities of
the United States' threats to use nuclear weapons.

The sample for

this research has been chosen in the manner prescribed by Glaser and
Strauss (1967), which above all holds that the degree of theoretical
relevance should guide the selection of sample groups.
The empirical sections of this dissertation are comprised of a
complete analysis of the only instances which the United States has
explicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons.

While there have been

instances in which the United States has implicitly or generally
indicated a readiness to use nuclear weapons, only during the Korean
and Vietnam wars were explicit threats directed toward another coun
try.

Thus, this study focuses on the population of violations of

nuclear weapons-related international laws, rather than a sample.
Admittedly, the population is very small:

two cases.

Despite this

small number, the value of this research is intended to extend well
beyond an explanation of these two events.

The two cases then are

considered a beginning point for theoretical progress on the general
phenomenon of governmental crime.

Data Collection and Sources
Since this endeavor examines an established social and physical
fact, the existence of nuclear weapons and policies concerning these
weapons, much of the data spring from historical, biographical, and
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descriptive accounts of the decisions and actions made throughout
the tenure of the nuclear age by the governmental leaders of the
United States.

Thus, this research relies heavily on secondary data.

Examples of Cold War histories include the work of Arbatov and Oltmans (1983), Berman and Baker (1982), Bialer and Madelbaum (1988),
Gray (1977), Hollaway (1983), Laird and Herspring (1984), Newhouse
(1989), and Scott and Scott (1982).
On the more biographical end of the spectrum, data are drawn
from the memoirs and biographical histories of past presidents of the
United States in order to discern the pressures and circumstances
involved in their actions in regard to nuclear weapons.

It is assum

ed that the private and public writings of past leaders may very well
indicate the structural strains and pressures which played a role in
the making of a certain decision.

Additionally, there are a few stud

ies such as Kull's (1988) and Bundy's (1988) which analyze situations
confronted by former United States' heads of state in times of war or
international conflict.
I suspect to gain additional or fresh insights on the United
States' decision to threaten to use atomic and nuclear weapons
against North Korea and North Vietnam by examining writings by Pres
idents Truman and Eisenhower; and insights on the threatened use of
nuclear weapons during the Vietnam war by examining documents con
cerning and authored by Presidents Johnson and Nixon.
More generally, descriptive and historical data abound in var
ious monographs and factbooks which document the policy changes,
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military planning, geographical dominance, quantitative expenditures,
qualitative technologies, and the perceived vulnerability of the
United States.

Thus, many of these extant sources of data provide a

path for the elaboration of the history and contemporary evolution of
global nuclear weapons policy.
Primary data are also collected through the use of governmental
documents.

Reports of the United States Department of Defense and

Department of State are expected to be the most fruitful sources of
data regarding the policies and actions carried out by the United
States during the nuclear age.

Additionally, recently de-classified

documents describing meetings of the National Security Council and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as primary sources of data.
In case study research, the use of as many sources of data as
possible aids in increasing the internal and external validity of
the conclusions. This method, sometimes referred to as triangula
tion, obligates the researcher to cross-check the validity of cltl Ttlii
and arguments as well as to remain cognizant of the fact that the
seemingly true may in fact be false (Denzin, 1989; Feagin, Orum, and
Sjoberg, 1991; Yin, 1984).

As Yin (1984) notes,

the use of multiple sources of evidence in case studies
allows an investigator to address a broader range of
historical, attitudinal, and observational issues. The
most Important advantage presented by using multiple
sources of evidence is the development of converging lines
of inquiry, a process of triangulation. Thus, any finding
or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more con
vincing and accurate if it is based on several different
sources of information, following a corroboratory mode.
(p. 91)
This researcher is not interested in the theoretical conclusions of
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authors, such as why a particular policy took a given form.

Such a

reliance on secondary interpretation may result in the research hav
ing a higher likelihood of reliance on the subjective claims of
individual authors, rather than actual fact.

Thus, the documents

employed as sources of data in this study are only valuable to the
extent that the objective history of nuclear weapons policy is
described.

Again, this history will be triangulated in order to en

sure validity.
Yin (1984) has suggested an important tactic to consider when
collecting qualitative data.

He advises that a researcher create a

data base separate from the final product of the study.

Such a data

base would contain all notes derived from sources, as well as all of
the documents reviewed.

This practice, according to Yin, allows fu

ture research on the issue to be much more manageable for both the
primary researcher and others wishing to use the data base for fur
ther study.

This method is employed in the research to further

establish the reliability of the study.

Historical Method

Historical sociological research has a rich tradition.

Marx,

Weber, and Durkheim constructed many of their theories from the in
spection of past social relations.

In order to fully understand the

dynamics involved in the violation of nuclear weapons laws, a histor
ical analysis is not only insightful, but imperative.
According to Skocpol (1984), historical sociological studies
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have four characteristics:
1.

They ask questions about social structure or processes

understood to be correctly situated in time and space.
2.

They address processes over time, and take temporal se

quences seriously in accounting for outcomes.
3.

They emphasize the interplay of meaningful actions and

structural contexts, in order to make sense of the unfolding of
unintended as well as intended outcomes in individual lives and so
cial transformations.
4.

They highlight the particular and varying features of spe

cific kinds of social structures and patterns of change.
This research is grounded in the tentative substantive hypo
thesis that the transgressions of nuclear weapons laws by the United
States are to some degree enveloped within a historical context which
served to make violations of law more or less likely at a given
point.

Thus, when employing a historical approach this endeavor will

pay close attention to shifts in world political power arrangements,
military strength (both quantitatively and geographically), and lev
els of nuclear technology.

However, as mentioned earlier, the analy

sis is by no means limited to these variables.
The historical analysis offered in this study is not compre
hensive.

Indeed, to tell the entire history of nuclear weapons

policy, with all of its subtle and less pronounced dynamics is both
unnecessary and inefficacious for the purposes of this research.
Independent of the fact that nuclear weapons and policies regarding
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these weapons have received an enormous amount of scholarly atten
tion, one of the objectives of this study is to frame the question
of etiology in a criminological fashion.

This means that particular

attention will be given to the instances in which violations of law
have actually occurred.

Of equal importance, however, are the

structural level precipitating factors which appear to be associated
with these violations.

While it is injudicious to ignore general

historical trends and the visible patterns in which nuclear weapons
policies have resided, this does not mean that all patterns and
trends are associated with the violations of international law under
study here.

Determinations regarding the importance of certain his

torical events must be discovered through the process of research
(Bloch, 1949; 1961; Moore, 1966).
Skocpol (1984) identifies three major strategies in historical
sociology:

(1) those using a general theoretical model to explain

historical instances, (2) studies employing certain basic concepts to
develop a meaningful historical interpretation, and (3) those seeking
to analyze causal regularities in history.

Because this research

project employs Glaser and Strauss' (1967) grounded theory method, a
method which places primacy on inductive approaches to causation, and
is interested in the etiological patterns of international govern
mental crime, this study falls generally into the third strategy
described by Skocpol.

As delineated in the next section of this

chapter, the grounded theory method requires an almost tabula rosa
approach in which the researcher finds both theory and concepts
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through the process of research, not prior to the research act.
According to Skocpol (1984), scholars employing the causal
regularity approach
focus on developing an adequate explanation for a welldefined outcome or pattern in history. Neither the logic
of a single overarching model nor the meaningful exploration
of the complex particularities of each singular time and
place takes priority. Instead, the investigator assumes
that causal regularities-at least regularities of limited
scope-may be found in history. He or she moves back and
forth between aspects of historical cases and alternative
hypotheses that may help to account for those regularities.
The crucial point is that no effort is made to analyze
historical facts according to a preconceived general model.
Alternative hypotheses are always explored or generated.
(P- 374)
Thus, the causal regularity approach to history allows for the se
lective analysis of historical patterns and trends, but more impor
tantly for the purposes of this research, recognizes that inductive
studies require that hypotheses and theories are sketched out during
the process of research.

In other words, hypotheses and theories are

understood to be subject to change, not staticly derived.

The Grounded Theory Method

Glaser and Strauss (1967) have designed a research method which
takes an inductive rather than deductive approach to social reality.
Over two decades ago, these scholars called for the abandonment of the
traditional theory testing form in the social sciences in favor of a
method which placed primacy on generating theory from data.

They

(1967) argued that
generating a theory from data means that most hypotheses and
concepts not only come from the data, but are systematically
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worked out in relation to the data during the course of the
research. Generating a theory involves a process of re
search. (p. 6)
Given the lack of an operable theoretical understanding of the phen
omenon of governmental crime, and the relatively novel idea of the
criminological study of the crimes of the state, the inductive method
of grounded theory is likely to facilitate a deeper understanding of
governmental crime than a logico-deductive test of extant theories of
the state.

Moreover, Glaser and Strauss' (1967) argument for employ

ing grounded theory seems to be particularly appropriate for areas in
which sociological inquiry has been limited or non-existent.
they write:

Indeed,

"The masters have not provided enough theories to cover

all the areas of social life that sociologists have only begun to
explore" (p. 6).

While there are several theories of the state and

of organizations, governmental crime must be studied as a newly in
vented phenomenon which itself requires a focused, albeit
atomistic, comparative examination.

relatively

Thus, the decision to generate a

grounded theory of governmental crime rather than a deductive test of
theories, is based on the operative hypothesis that international
governmental crime is analytically and ontologically distinct from
currently investigated forms of crime.

Thus, it seems that the most

effective and judicious manner to proceed is to start anew; that is
to begin the theoretical understanding of international governmental
crime from data concerning international governmental crime.
Central to Glaser and Strauss' comparative method of generating
theory is the distinction between categories and properties.
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Categories are more abstract conceptual entities which guide the
general comparison of groups.
ability or social loss.

Examples include perceived vulner

Properties are less abstract concepts which

act as components, elements, or attributes of categories.

Properties

of perceived vulnerability may be phenomena such as strength, time,
or geography.

Properties of the category social loss may be entities

such as loss rationales, social class, or race.

Both categories and

properties are concepts indicated by the data and data emergent.

Thus,

for the purposes of this study, little can be said about the pro
spective categories and properties without actual collecting, analyz
ing and interpreting the data.

However, the variables discussed earl

ier in this section (the vitality of military and technological re
sources etc.,) are likely to play some role in the process of gener
ating a grounded theory of international governmental crime.

The

strategy of constructing categories and properties, then, helps in
structuring the comparative analysis and also acts as a guide for
placing concepts into quasi-hierarchial, temporal, and spatial
arrangement.

As Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg (1991) note,

critical to case study analysis is a study of the patterned
actions of related individuals. The study of patterns in
action means a study of the contextualization of actions and
processes. It means an articulating the relationship of the
social phenomenon of interest to the surrounding world in
which it is embedded. The study of total complexes of soc
ial action is indispensable for much social analysis.
(p. 275)
Another important consideration when a scholar employs Glaser
and Strauss' grounded theory method is the type of theory to be gen
erated.

The primary distinction is between substantive theory and
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formal theory.

A substantive grounded theory is area specific and

would be exemplified by theories of gang behavior, the Holocaust, or
obedience to authority.
middle or lower range.

This type of theory is perhaps best labelled
A formal theory, however, seeks to explain a

more general sociological fact such as crime, genocide, or authority
and power.

Glaser and Strauss suggest that to the extent a substan

tive theory holds promise for higher levels of abstraction and thus
more generalized explanatory power, permuting a substantive theory
into a formal theory is encouraged.

Again, however, this decision

can only be made after the creation and comparison of categories and
properties;
produced.

that is after the substantive grounded theory has been
Thus, to the extent that the theory produced in this re

search regarding violations of nuclear weapons laws possesses sig
nificant strength and integrity, a general formal theory of inter
national governmental crime will be constructed.

If the substantive

theory seems incapable of shedding theoretical insight into other
types of international governmental crime (human rights violations,
foreign intervention), there will be no attempt to create a formal
theory of international governmental crime in the dissertation.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

CHAPTER V

ATOMIC WEAPONS AND THE KOREAN WAR

This chapter traces the United States' considerations on the
use of atomic weapons in the Korean War, with particular attention
given to the U.S. threat to use such weapons.14

The general politi

cal and military environment between the years of 1950 and 1953 is
reviewed in order to place the atomic considerations into a proper
historical context.

The status of U.S. and Soviet atomic weapons

during the conflict is then presented along with the particular dis
courses of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations on the atomic
question.

The final section of the chapter is devoted to an analysis

of salient variables which appear to be related to the decisions to
threaten the use of atomic weapons on the countries of North Korea
and China.

First, in order to place the United States' involvement

in the Korean War into proper context, a brief review of the evolu
tion of the Cold War is presented.

The Backdrop of the Cold War

The Cold War has been given an extraordinary amount of scholar
ly and popular attention.

One can reasonably assume that most have

some familiarity with the conflictual relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the period beginning with World War II
and ending in the late 1980's.

Therefore, a complete description and

analysis of this period is not necessary to meet the research goals of
58
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this study.

The first section of this chapter, then, represents an

attempt to place the 1945-1950 period of the Cold War into a context
which allows us to understand the general environment and structural
conditions which preludes and provides a backdrop to U.S. involvement
in Korea.
The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union emerged
from World War II as major global powers.

The Allies successfully

defeated the imperialist endeavors of both Japan and Germany and soon
established themselves as the political and economic carpenters of a
new Europe.

The February 1945 meeting of the Allies at Potsdam,

which took place just after the German surrender and immediately
prior to the Japanese surrender, inter alia, resulted in a plan to
divide Europe into separate areas of occupation.
Germany was essentially divided into two occupation zones.

The

United States, Great Britain, and France occupied the west section of
the country and the west section of Berlin, while the Soviets were
given occupation rights of the eastern portion of the country as well
as the eastern portion of Berlin.

The parceling of Germany was

thought to be a temporary solution to the problem of rebuilding the
physical, economic, political, and social structure of Germany.

How

ever, the temporary solution became a permanent solution in the years
to follow with the formation of two German countries:

The eastern

portion of Germany was established as the Soviet influenced German
Democratic Republic (GDR), and the area to the west was converted in
to the Western style capitalist state Federal Republic of Germany
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(FRG).
Outside of Germany, the geo-politics of the world also changed
significantly.

As a result of the war, both the West and the Soviet

Union gained a massive amount of territory, with the former either
controlling or having great influence in Western Europe, the Philip
pines, and Japan.

The Soviets controlled much of eastern Europe and

created communist regimes in such countries as Yugoslavia, Rumania,
and Poland.

Thus, during the early stages of the Cold War, many

battle lines were drawn between the West and the East, pitting the
antithetical political economies of capitalism and communism against
one another.
After the war, the United States retained its close friendship
with Great Britain.

The Soviet Union, which incurred the most cas

ualties of all the Allies in World War II, was increasingly viewed
with suspicion by the West.

While conflicts between the Soviet Union

and the United States date back decades before World War II, even
during the war President Truman was so skeptical of Stalin's plans
for post-war Europe that he withheld any mention of the U.S. Manhat
tan project from him at the Yalta Conference (Newhouse, 1988).

This

distrust, whether well founded or not, was mutual.
Immediately after World War II, several events solidified the
hostilities between the West and East.

The Soviet occupation and

support of revolutionary movements in the Middle East, in particular
in Iran, serves as a good example.

Prior to the Russian and U.S.

entrances into World War II, the Allies had agreed to share oil

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

61
rights in Iran.

While the Western powers had withdrawn most of their

forces in the region, the Soviets held their positions because they
perceived inequity in the distribution of oil, claiming the West was
reaping all the benefits.

While the Soviets eventually withdrew from

the region, primarily because they indeed ultimately obtained con
cessions from the West, the Soviets had demonstrated their resolve in
Cold War economic and political posturing.

In fact, Truman (1956)

recalled he seriously thought about bombing the Iranian stationed
Soviet troops with atomic weapons during the crisis.
Also adding to the conflict between the Soviets and the U.S.
was the Berlin blockade of 1948.

Since Berlin was approximately one

hundred miles into East German territory, the West had historically
used East German roads and railroads to administer the reconstruction
of West Berlin.

On June 24, Stalin instituted a blockade of all

transportation routes to West berlin with the intent of severing the
West's ties to the city.

While there is some evidence to suggest the

United States considered using atomic weapons in order to break the
blockade, the decision was made to air-lift supplies into West Ber
lin, thus avoiding another world war.

Stalin eventually lifted the

blockade in July 1949, but the rifts caused by the event reinforced
already significant antagonisms.
Another important event in the early stages of the Cold War was
the 1949 communist revolution in China. The United States had sup
ported Chiang Kai-shek's fight against Mao's communist forces, but
only half-heartedly since Europe was perceived as the more important
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area of the post-war geography.

When China became communist, the

United States found itself facing more than one large country influ
enced by Marxist doctrine.

The situation became exacerbated in 1950

with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Defense Treaty, which in effect
galvanized the Chinese and Soviet relationship against the West.
The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States
in the years immediately following World War II undoubtedly played a
role in the United States' decision to intervene in the Korean con
flict.

Communism, exercised through the political economies of the

Soviet Union and its satellites was perceived as the real enemy of
the United States.

In the U.S. view, the economic and political im

portance of protecting developing nations from the influence of com
munism soon began to dominate the military and political discourse.
The military manifestations of the early Cold War period seldom found
the United States and Soviet Union directly squaring off.

It was in

areas prone to influence by either country, areas such as Europe,
Asia, and Southeast Asia, where the conflicts and interventions most
often occurred.

Perhaps no other statement confirms the underlying

logic of the United States' concern during this period than the 1947
thoughts of Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1969).
Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on northern
Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly
possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to
Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one
rotten one, the corruption of Greece would effect Iran and
all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa
through Asia minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy
and France, (p. 219)
The background of the Cold War has been summarized in an
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attempt to flush out the general global climate of the years immed
iately following World War II.

Several details have been omitted

from the review because it seems more appropriate to discuss them
within the context of 1950-1953 Korean War.

It is to this conflict

that the remaining sections of this chapter are devoted.

Of parti

cular interest is the United States' threat to use atomic weapons in
violation of international law.

Political and Military Background of the Korean War
Communist North Korea, supported in purpose by both China and
the Soviet Union, invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950.

The invasion

prompted a strong U.S. military response aimed at protecting the
South Koreans from communist imperialism and a unified communist
Korea.

This was the first occasion, with others to follow, the

United States deployed massive ground troops to thwart communist
aggression in Asia.

While the intervention was formally conducted

under U.N. auspices, the United States accounted for 85 percent of
the armed forces supporting the South (Riggs & Plano, 1988).

The war

itself lasted only three years, but as the case study will document,
there exists a substantial amount of evidence that the U.S. seriously
considered the use of atomic weapons both during the war and also to
enforce the 1953 Armistice.

Korea had been historically used by Rus

sia and Japan as a strategic weapon for influence in Asia.

As a re

sult of a treaty signed in 1896, Korea was divided in to North and
South regions, with the Russians controlling the former and the
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Japanese controlling the area below the 38th parallel.

Toward the

end of World War II, as a result of the Soviet's declaration of war
on Japan in late August 1945 and the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in early August of that year, a formal agreement between
the Soviet Union and the U.S. was reached:

Japanese forces north of

the 38th parallel would surrender to the Soviets, while Japanese
forces south of the parallel would surrender to the U.S.

Ultimately

this agreement turned North Korea into a Soviet satellite and South
Korea into a occupied U.S. state.

The cold war battle line was thus

drawn in Korea.
While the U.S. vigorously supported the South Korean government
led by Rhee, it was not entirely convinced of the strategic value of
the region.

Indeed, Truman felt that even during the early phases of

the war, Korea was only of marginal importance to U.S. interests
(Acheson, 1969).
The U.S. had in 1946 just sponsored, via the United Nations,
free elections to be held in the South. Although aware of the poli
tical and economic instability of the region, the U.S. was more con
cerned about Western Europe and further Soviet influence in Germany.
In fact there was nearly a complete U.S. withdrawal from Korea cul
minating in June 1949:

South Korea was left with no tanks, air

planes, or other heavy artillery, only a few rocket launchers, rif
les, and small arms ammunition (Goulden, 1982).

The Soviet Union,

on the other hand, held a great deal of interest in North Korea.
It installed a dedicated and faithful communist regime and deployed a
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significant amount of military personnel, artillery, ammunition, and
weapons immediately following World War II.
The invasion of South Korea was assumed to be the product of
the Soviet Union's desire to further establish communist authority in
Asia.

Although there is some degree of uncertainty on this issue,

most U.S. policy makers seem to have subscribed to the theory that
even if the invasion was not a direct product of Soviet imperialism,
it was an indirect result of Soviet attempts of hegemony.

Interest

ingly, Khrushchev (1970, p. 370) later denied that Stalin directly
supported the invasion, but added that "Stalin did not try to dis
suade" (p. 370).
The U.S. decision to commit itself militarily in Korea rests in
part on the goals articulated in the Truman Doctrine, the famous for
eign policy delivered before a joint session of Congress on March 12,
1947.

Truman (1956) remembered this speech as "a turning point in

American foreign policy, which now declared that wherever aggression,
direct or indirect, threatened the peace, the security of the United
States was involved" (p. 106).

The Truman Doctrine, undoubtedly

influenced by George Kennan's (1947) essay on the importance of con
taining communism, was primarily grounded in concerns over the poli
tical stability of Greece and Turkey, countries which played a key
role in Cold War military posturing.15 While attempting to persuade
Congress to grant funds to these struggling countries, the larger
point of the address was to set the framework for supporting potent
ially friendly sovereigns, or politically unstable developing
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countries, for the purposes of United States influence and superior
ity across the globe.

The President ended his address looking to the

future (quoted in Lincoln, 1968).
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured my misery and
want. They spread and grow in the evil soul of poverty and
strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a
people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope
alive. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the
peace of the world-and we shall surely endanger the welfare
of our own nation, (p. 20)
Less than three months after the announcement of the Truman
Doctrine, Secretary of State George Marshall outlined a similar ap
proach to the problem of Europe which emphasized the importance of
economics.

The Marshall Plan eventually set a more concrete basis

for U.S. influence in Europe, and ultimately served, as evidenced by
the Soviet rejection of the plan, as another instance in which Cold
War lines were drawn.

Thus, the Marshall Plan solidified Western

influence in Western Europe, and at the same time forced the Soviets
to structure their own economic vision of Eastern Europe.

Perhaps

more importantly, the nature and form of U.S. foreign policy changed
most dramatically as a result of the U.S. National Security Council
study entitled NSC-68, submitted to Truman at a meeting on April 25,
1950.

This study called for a significant increase in defense spend

ing in order to confront the challenge and threat posed by the com
munists in general and the Soviet Union in particular.

Secretary of

State Dean Acheson (1969), a primary drafter of the document, remem
bered,
our analysis of the (Soviet) threat combined the ideology of
communist doctrine and the power of the Russian state into
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an aggressive expansionist drive, which found its chief op
ponent and, therefore, target in the antithetic ideas and
power of our own country. While our own society felt no
compulsion to bring all societies in conformity with it,
the Kremlin hierarchy was not content merely to entrench its
regime but wished to expand its control directly and indir
ectly over other people within its reach, (p. 375)
In Sian, NSC-68 pointed to the need of containing the Soviet Union by
surrounding the country with both conventional and atomic weapons, a
more specific but nevertheless generally consistent approach with the
policy articulated in the Truman Doctrine.

The report envisioned a

6,000 mile belt of nuclear bases spreading from bases in northern
Europe, through the Middle East, across Southeast Asia, and extending
into Japan and Korea.

This led to the recommendation that an immense

increase in atomic weapons research, design, and manufacture would be
the most effective means of keeping the Soviets in check.

In the re

port, atomic weapons were seen as playing a key role in the U.S. po
licy of calculated and gradual coercion.
As for NSC-68's impact on the decision to enter the Korean War,
Acheson (1969) believed that the conflict put the theoretical and
hypothetical scenarios of containment and thwarting communist expan
sionism into practice.

And as Nitze's admitted to Newhouse (1989)

”It [the war] translated a think piece into an operational document"
(p. 82).

Status of Atomic Weapons During the Conflict

The Soviet Union first produced a nuclear reaction in December
1946, detonated its first atomic device in August 1949 and its first
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thermo-nuclear device in August 1953 (Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig,
1984).

Soviet nuclear weapons, however, were not fully operational

or deliverable until late 1955.

The United States was well ahead of

Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities, having at least 2 weapons in
1945, 9 in 1946, 13 in 1947, 50 in 1948, 250 in 1949, and 450 in 1950
(Cochran et. al, 1984).

While the U.S. certainly had the atomic ad

vantage, both in megatonnage and numbers of weapons, the monopoly was
soon viewed as questionable after the first Soviet atomic test in
1949 (see Table 3).
The Soviet's first atomic in 1946 test was quite a surprise to
the U.S. Administration.

Indeed, the estimates of Soviet atomic

capabilities was predicted to be at least four to ten years away
(Acheson, 1969; Powaski, 1987).

Truman (1956) recalled that while he

had expected the Soviets to test such a weapon sometime in the future,
he was surprised that it had occurred so soon.

Other accounts sug

gest that there was more anxiety over the Soviet test than Truman
indicated:

Acheson (1969) recalled that the Soviet explosion "was

the immediate cause of the review of our military and foreign poli
cies" (p. 345);

Powaski (1987) has argued that the general citizenry

was shocked and frightened with the explosion, despite the U.S. Ad
ministration's attempt to reassure the U.S. people; and York (1975)
found that Truman was so shaken that he required his informants to
personally sign a document stating that they believed the Soviets had
dentated the bomb.
One of the more significant effects of the Soviet detonation,
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Table 3
United States and Soviet Union Atomic Stockpile
During the Korean War
1945 United States
Soviet Union

2
0

1946 United States
Soviet Union

9
0

1947 United States
Soviet Union

13
0

1948 United States
Soviet Union

50
0

1949 United States
Soviet Union

250
First

1950 United States
Soviet Union

450
0

1951 United States
Soviet Union

650
0

1952 United States
Soviet Union

1000;
10-20

1953 United States
1350
Soviet Union
fewer than 280; First Hydrogen Bomb
Detonated

along with the buttressing of the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68, was the
U.S. decision to develop the hydrogen bomb.

As early as

fall 1949,

Truman had considered developing the weapon, one with several times
the explosive power of the fission atomic weapons currently in the
U.S. stockpile.

Two committees were charged to examine the problem:

The General Advisory Committee (GAC) of the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), comprised mostly of scientists, and a special committee of the
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National Security Counsel comprised of Secretary of State Acheson,
Chair of the AEC David Lilienthal, and Secretary of Defense Louis
Johnson (Powaski, 1987).

In the end the president concurred with

the latter committee, and approved production of the weapon.

Tru

man's ultimate decision on the H-bomb was grounded in concerns over
the Soviet Union's atomic program.

In the final meeting on the sub

ject, Lilienthal presented his reservations about the project but was
interrupted by Truman who asked "Can the Russians do it?"

When all

the participants responded affirmatively, Truman (quoted in Powaski,
1987) said "In that case, we have no choice.

We'll go ahead"

(p. 56).
By 1952 the conventional forces of the U.S. were rapidly rising
along with a particular emphasis placed on the Air Force's role in
the transferring and preparation of nuclear-ready airplanes and sub
marines.

Quantitatively, the Soviet Union was still significantly

behind in the atomic race.

Despite the testing of a thermo-nuclear

device in 1953, the weapon had only 20% of the explosive power of a
comparable U.S. bomb (Clarfield and Wiecek, 1984).

The Soviets had

no nuclear capable bombers until the 1955 production of the Bear A,
while the U.S. had operationalized the nuclear capable B-47 and B-52
bombers by 1952 (Clarfield and Wiecek, 1984).

All told, U.S. defense

spending quadrupled between the years of 1950 and 1953.

When Eisen

hower became president in 1953, the U.S. atomic stockpile approached
1350.

At that time the delivery systems of atomic weapons still re

lied on aircraft;

it was not until the successful operationalization
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of the thermo-nuclear bomb in 1955 that ground-released inter
continental missiles entered official U.S. strategic policy.

Truman and Atomic Weapons in Korea
The June 25, 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea prompted
a quick response from the United Nations.

While the Soviet delega

tion was not present, the other members of U.N. Sectority Council
adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of North Korean
forces below the 38th parallel.

This resolution, adopted on the same

day of the invasion, not only lamented and criticized the actions of
North Korea, but also requested military support from all U.N. mem
bers to the repel the attack.

The United States accepted this offer

on June 27, and ultimately provided the vast majority of military
personnel and equipment.
On June 30 Truman ordered an embargo on all U.S. exports to
Korea, a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast, and most import
antly, aerial bombardments and ground troop attacks of North Korean
strongholds.

After initially incurring significant losses, U.N.

forces, under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, crossed the
38th Parallel into North Korea on October 9 and besieged the North
Korean capital of Pyongyang.

The result of this U.N. victory was

that the West's troops maintained a highly threatening position by
their presence on the Chinese mid-eastern border.

Subsequently, the

Chinese entered the war on November 27 and promptly forced U.S.
troops beneath the 38th Parallel.

Now the U.N., in actuality the
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United States, was fighting a second country and faced the uncomfort
able position of risking a third world war.
Suddenly a relatively small conflict began appearing as a more
pervasive and potentially explosive military situation.

The intro

duction of the Chinese into the civil war of Korea certainly raised
the likelihood of an international war, pitting communist versus cap
italist.

With an estimated 200,000 Chinese ground soldiers in the

war, the result was an immense escalation of hostilities.

Consider

ation of the vise of atomic weapons then began to surface.
The first major possibility of the use of atomic weapons since
World War II developed within the later stages of the Truman Admin
istration.

In July 1950, prior to the entrance of Chinese forces

into the conflict, Truman ordered atomic bombs to be delivered to
Great Britain.

This marked the first time the U.S. allowed atomic

bombs to be transferred across the Atlantic.

Presumably this action

was quite prefatory, given that Truman (1956) believed the fighting
in Korea would come to a close quickly and thus perceived it as a
relatively minor conflict.

But shortly after the Chinese allied

themselves militarily with North Korea, the question of the use of
atomic weapons surfaced.
Truman soon authorized a Joint Chiefs of Staff report ordering
atomic bomb components to be stored on a warship patrolling the Med
iterranean (Kaku and Axelrod, 1987). Furthermore, according to then
Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1969) the Commandant of the U.S. Air
Force College Orville Anderson announced at a speaking engagement
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that "the Air Force, equipped and ready, only awaited orders to drop
its bombs on Moscow" (p. 478).
At a press conference (quoted in Newhouse, 1988) on November
30, 1950 Truman asserted that "we will take whatever steps are neces
sary to meet the military solution" (p. 355).

Furthermore, he an

swered the question of the possibility of using atomic weapons on the
Chinese and North Koreans by stating "That includes every weapon we
have," and that "There has always been active consideration of its
use.

I don't want to see it used."

When furthered asked if the bomb

would be used against civilian or military targets Truman responded
"It's a matter the military people will have to decide" (p. 355).
It is difficult to interpret these statements as overt threats
to use atomic weapons against the Chinese and North Koreans. Indeed,
immediately after Truman made these comments he added, (quoted in
Newhouse, 1988), "it is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used
on innocent men, women and children who have nothing whatever to do
with this military aggression.
(p. 356).

That happens when it is used"

The British press, and several erroneous reports in U.S.

newspapers appeared shortly after the speech implying that not only
was Truman prepared to use the bomb but that General MacArthur, a vo
cal advocate for the weapon's use in Korea, had been given the auton
omy to order an atomic attack (Acheson, 1969). This prompted a visit
from high ranking British officers to confer with the President on
the meaning of his statements.

According to Acheson (1969) and Ei

senhower (1963) the British were always more tentative about NATO use
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of nuclear weapons.

At the meeting, the foreign delegation was

briefed on the issue and were told that the use of atomic weapons was
not actively being planned.

Later that night Truman released a press

statement to the citizens of the United States (quoted in Acheson,
1969), in an attempt to normalize the situation.
Replies to the questions do not represent any changes in
this situation. Naturally there has been consideration of
this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea,
just as there is consideration of the use of all military
weapons whenever our forces are in combat. However, it
should be emphasized that, by law, only the President can
authorize the use of the atomic bomb, and no such author
ization has been given, (p. 479).
The extent to which Truman actively considered using atomic
weapons is difficult to discern.

Most data suggest that the atomic

option was not popular among Truman's closest advisors.

In an inter

view with Newhouse (1988) Paul Nitze, director of the State Depart
ment's Policy Planning Group during the Korean War, confided that
no one in the executive branch to my knowledge was pushing
for the use of nuclear weapons. We were persuaded that the
stockpile was too small to have allowed nuclear weapons to
be used to any decisive effect against China, North Korea,
or the Soviets in the event they entered the war. (p. 83)
Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, General Hoyt Vandenberg, and
the remaining Chiefs of Staff decided for a number of reasons against
the use of the bomb on Korea and China.

Fear of a Soviet-Chinese

conspiracy to divert U.S. atomic weapons to Korea in order to allow
for an easier invasion of Europe as well as the lack of good targets
are identified were identified as important factors in this decision
(see Newhouse, 1988).
There were others in high military positions, however, who
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thought of the atomic option in Korea as viable.

Stuart Symington,

Chair of the National Security Board, Major General Orville Anderson,
Commandant of the Air War College, and Secretary of the Navy Francis
P. Matthews all called for a nuclear attack against China and pos
sible targeting of the Soviet Union in various speeches and top se
cret reports (see Kaku and Axelrod, 1987).

In fact Matthews approved

of the September 3, 1952 recommendation of the Deputy Assistant Sec
retary of State to spread the word on the possible U.S. use of nu
clear weapons "so that it would get circulation in Korea and Japan,
and China" (Department of State, 1984).

This plan called for pam

phlets to be dropped which read:
The U.S. has consistently refused to accept prohibitions on
the vise of atomic weapons. As the Presidential campaign
grows, the pressure (to use them) will get much greater.
The Government will probably not be able to resist it.
There is one way to prevent the use of atomic weapons in
Korea. This is to get an armistice without delay.
(p. 484)
While there is no evidence that this plan was carried out, it is
clear that the nuclear weapons option was considered quite promising
by many political and military officials.
Truman, despite some of his public announcements to the con
trary, evidently thought very seriously about using atomic weapons.
In an entry (quoted in Kaku & Axelrod, 1987), in his personal diary
on January 27, 1952, he wrote:
It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an
ultimatum with a ten day expiration limit, informing Moscow
that we intend to blockade the China coast from the Korean
border to Indo-China, and that we intend to destroy every
military base in Manchuria. This means all-out war. It
means Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostock, Peking,
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Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and every
manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be
eliminated, This is the final chance for the Soviet Gov
ernment to decide whether it desires to survive or not.
(p. 73).
There is no indication that Truman seriously discussed with others or
actually planned to implement such a massive attack on China and the
Soviet Union.

His memoirs and other data support this interpretation.

Publicly, at least, Truman also appeared keenly aware of the impact
and import of the use of atomic weapons.

In his final message (quot

ed in Kaku & Axelrod, 1987) on the state of the union, he asserted
that
the war of the future would be one in which man could ex
tinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great
cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of
the past-and destroy the very structure of a civilization
that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds
of generations. Such a war is not a possible policy for
rational men. (p. 79).
After all the consideration of using atomic weapons in Korea at
the time of Truman's presidency, why were they not used?

Recently

declassified documents reviewed by Kaku and Axelrod (1987) as well as
a close reading of the discussions by the National Security Council,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other governmental officials suggests
that the principal reason was the fear of depleting the U.S. stock
pile, rendering an atomic defense of Europe against a Soviet attack
significantly improbable.
To understand the situation, it must be remembered that the
Soviet Union was viewed suspiciously by the U.S. government.

Indeed

Stalin had succeeded in establishing numerous satellite countries in
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Eastern Europe, contrary to his pledges of withdrawal at the 1945
Potsdam Conference.

United State's foreign policy was characterized

by an immense preoccupation with the security of Europe.

The primary

threat at that point was not so much the security of some isolated
civil war in Asia, but the Soviet Union's perceived global imperial
ist aspirations.

This perception was officially codified in the top

secret report SHAKEDOWN, soon recognized as a contingency war plan by
Truman.

The basic tenet of the proposal was to respond to a Soviet

movement into Western Europe by a apocalyptic nuclear attack on Moscow.
The report (quoted in Kaku & Axelrod, 1987), just recently declassified,
deserves extended citation because of the degree of specificity and
conviction contained within its pages.
The initial strike would be launched on approximately D+6
days. Heavy bombers flying from Maine would drop 20 bombs
in the Moscow-Gorky area and return to the United Kingdom.
Simultaneously, medium bombers from Labrador would attack
the Leningrad area with 12 weapons and reassemble ar British
bases. Meanwhile, medium bombers based in the British Isles
would approach the U.S.S.R. along the edge of the Mediter
ranean Sea and deliver 52 bombs in the industrial regions of
the Volga and Donets Basin; they would return through Lib
yan and Egyptian airfields. More medium bombers flying from
the Azores would drop 15 weapons in the Caucasus area and
then stage through Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Concurrently,
medium bombers from Guam would bring 15 bombs against
Vladivostock and Irkutsk, (p. 74)
This elaborate plan to completely destroy major military and govern
mental bases in Moscow was penned in 1949, a time in which the United
States possessed only 250 weapons.

The mission described in SHAKE-

DOWN require a first day assault of over 100 weapons, plus several
hundred secondary and contingency bombs.

If this war plan was taken

seriously by Truman, and by all indications it was, using the atomic
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bomb on North Korea and China would have significantly compromised
the U.S. position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

An atomic attack over

the Korean War would, quite simply, leave the U.S. in a relatively
vulnerable defensive posture in terms of atomic weapons, personal,
and delivery systems.
Truman left office in January 1953, a few weeks before Joseph
Stalin died.

The Korean War, however, was continuing and U.S. cas

ualties were estimated at that time at 21,000 killed, 91,000 injured,
and 13,000 missing (Eisenhower, 1963).

Republican Dwight D. Eisen

hower, who was one more than one occasion labeled the peace candi
date, had promised if elected to bring the war to a quick end.

Kis

strategy concerning the conflict was clearly more combative, perhaps
because of his military background, and he clearly displayed a posi
tion of intolerance with the present U.S. strategy in Korea.

Truman

considered the atomic weapons option quietly, and ultimately found it
unworthy of further analysis.

It was in 1953 that the world witness

ed for the first time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki the atomic option
being more than simply entertained.

It was in 1953 as well that the

world witnessed the first explicit threat to use atomic weapons
against an adversary.

Eisenhower's Atomic Strategy in Korea

Eisenhower's public statements and private ideas concerning
atomic weapons are somewhat enigmatic, and often times inconsistent.
His farewell address to the nation in 1961, the famous speech warning
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against the dangers of the military-industrial complex and his Atoms
for Peace plan delivered in 1953 to the U.N. General Assembly all
indicate his sensitivity to the deleterious effects of militarism and
his hope for a peaceful world without the threat of global nuclear
war.

Eisenhower also reportedly shunned the use of atomic weapons

later in his presidency in a meeting with Robert Cutler, his special
assistant for national security, when there was talk of using atomic
weapons: "You boys must be crazy.

We can't use those awful things

against Asians for the second time in less than ten years.

My God"

(quoted in Newhouse, 1988, p. 102).
In the spring after his election, Eisenhower (1963) reports
having felt that there were three possible lines action in Korea:
(1) continue the war hoping for a quick armistice, (2) reinforce pre
sent troops and add more conventional forces, and (3) use atomic wea
pons to end the war quickly.

He (1963) appeared to find the atomic

option most attractive.
To keep the attack from becoming costly, it was clear that
we would have to use atomic weapons. This necessity was
suggested to me by General MacArthur while I was president
elect. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were pessimistic about the
feasibility of using tactical atomic weapons on front-line
positions; but such weapons would obviously be effective for
strategic targets in North Korea, Manchuria, and on the
Chinese coast, (p. 180)
Eisenhower recalled that his two major reservations about using
such weapons were (1) the possibility of a Soviet retaliation, since
in 1953 it was (erroneously) suspected to have a significant nuclear
weapons stockpile; and (2) the British response, which would undoubt
edly been less than positive given the U.K.'s general dislike of

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

80
nuclear weapons.
Eisenhower (1963) felt that atomic weapons provided the most
fruitful avenue for a U.S. victory in part because of his conviction
that "it would be impossible for the United States to maintain the
military commitments it now sustains did we not possess atomic wea
pons and the will to use them when necessary" (p. 180).

Ever aware

of British and French opposition to the use of atomic weapons on any
occasion, Eisenhower (1963) thought that even if the use of such wea
pons on Korea and China occurred, "the rifts so caused could, in
time, be repaired" (p. 180).

However, in a meeting of the National

Security Council on March 31, 1953 (Department of State (1984),
Eisenhower indicated
there were not many good targets, tactical targets. It
would be worth the cost if, through vise of atomic weapons,
the U.S. could (1) achieve a substantial victory over the
Communist forces, and (2) get to a line at the waste of
Korea, (p. 826)
Eisenhower and his administration was also concerned about the Soviet
Union's response to a massive atomic attack on China.

Knowing that

China had yet to develop atomic weapons (thus being a relatively min
or threat), it was well known that the Soviets possessed several wea
pons (although yet un-operational) . It was also suspected the Sov
iets were working on a hydrogen bomb.
Retrospectively, Eisenhower's contemplation of the use of atom
ic weapons can be understood by examining his general attitude toward
the nature of the weapons versus traditional weapons.

He commented

on October 30, 1953, some three months after the war's end that "in
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the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear
weapons to be as available for use as other ammunition” (quoted in
Newhouse, 1988, p. 91).

In March 1955 he also indicated his support

for the use of atomic weapons in any conflict: "In any combat where
these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strict
ly military purposes, I see no reasons why they shouldn't be used
just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else" (quoted in
Newhouse, 1987, p. 91).

Eisenhower also turned phrase-maker by

referring to atomic weapons as a Bigger Bang For the Buck, and began
a policy of reliance on atomic weapons rather than conventional
forces, known as the New Look.

These statements, as mentioned be

fore, do contradict other public statements he made on the horrible
effects of nuclear weapons versus other weapons.

The goal here is

not too delve into the cognitive dissonance or conflictual socialpsychology of Dwight Eisenhower.

The data presented here are

enough, however, to establish the fact that Eisenhower did in fact
contemplate the use of atomic weapons in Korea.
In the winter and spring of 1953, the advantages and disadvan
tages of using atomic weapons on North Korea and China were discussed
at several secret meetings of the NSC and JCS.

According to a Na

tional Security Council study released for deliberation on April 2,
1953, (Department of State, 1984), the major political advantages of
using atomic weapons were identified as (Department of State, 1984:
1.
2.

The avoidance of a United Nations and United States
military disaster in Korea;
A decisive end to the war which would make unneces
sary continued military confrontations with China;
and
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3.

A decisive end to the war which would make unneces
sary a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.
(p. 846)

While it was perceived that there were numerous military and
political advantages entailed in using atomic weapons on Korea, the
administration found many more political disadvantages.

The NSC re

port identified these problems as:
1.

The disproportionality of destruction of Korea and China

relative to military objectives in Korea.
2.

Use of such weapons on Korea would involve the West in gen

eral hostilities with Communist China.
3.

Use of such weapons against China would involve the West in

hostilities with the Soviet Union.
4. Use of such weapons would lead to enemy retaliation in kind
against vulnerable U.S.-U.N. targets;
The NSC report also recommended that U.S. allies should be
consulted prior to the use of atomic weapons in order to avoid a
political fallout.

The Council also advised the President to consid

er to what extent the political fallout from other free nations might
dissipate support for the general objectives of the United States in
Korea.
Eisenhower communicated his concern with the possible backlash
resulting from the vise of atomic weapons in several meetings.

In the

January 8 1954 meeting of the National Security Council, where possi
ble courses of action were discussed if the truce were broken, he
asserted, "our people have understood the atomic weapon, but we must
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be a little more patient with our allies, who had not fully grasped
the import of atomic weapons" (Department of State, 1984, p. 1704).
At a December 10, 1953 meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower was deeply
concerned about Secretary of State Dulles' report of his meeting with
British Prime Minister Churchill when Dulles informed the president
that Churchill believed "there would be a world-wide revulsion" to
the use of weapons (Department of State, 1984, p. 1654).

Also at the

meeting the President recalled agreeing with Churchill's recommenda
tion earlier that year that he should not mention the United States'
considerations on vising the atomic bomb at his address to the United
Nations.

Eisenhower did not mention the plans in his December 8

Atoms for Peace plan.

On January 8, 1954 during a National Security

Council meeting, Eisenhower again brought up his concerns with re
actions to the use of atomic weapons if North Korea violated the
truce:

"The real problem was how to get public opinion in the free

world to grasp the fact that the Communists did renew their aggres
sion" (Department of State, 1984, p. 1705).
There is little doubt that Eisenhower and his administration
seriously considered world opinion in their deliberations over the
use of the bomb.

It is clear that the global social reaction to

their use was anticipated to be negative and potentially damaging to
the U.S.

Perhaps this explains Eisenhower's concern for changing the

perception of atomic weapons, a tactic detailed in the following.
On February 11, 1953, at a NSC meeting which included all of
Eisenhower's key military and political advisors, serious consider
ation on the use of tactical nuclear weapons on North Korean
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strongholds surfaced,

while their was some disagreement, Secretary

of State Dulles and Eisenhower eventually came to the conclusion
that, as a general policy, atomic weapons should not be distinguish
ed from conventional weapons (Department of State, 1984).

The min

utes of the meeting read, (Department of State, 1984):
Secretary Dulles discussed the moral problem and the
inhibition on the use of the A-bomb, and Soviet success
to date in setting weapons apart from all other weapons
as being in a special category. It was his opinion that
we should try to break down this false distinction.
(P- 770)
Following Dulles' statement, Eisenhower then indicated his agreement
and suggested that perhaps U.S. allies should be consulted on the is
sue and even that the allies should be requested to supply more con
ventional military personnel and equipment if they refuse to consider
the atomic option.

According to the minutes of the meeting, Eisen

hower ultimately concluded that he would not make that demand upon
the British.

It is unknown whether he eventually employed this

tactic.
This subject again took center stage in a March 31, 1953 dis
cussion of the National Security Counsel.

The minutes of the meeting

state, (Department of State, 1984):
Mr. (Deane) Malott (special civilian advisor to the
president) argues that he nevertheless believed that we
ought to use a couple of atomic bombs in Korea. The
President replied that perhaps we should, but we could not
blind ourselves to the effects of such a move on our allies,
which would be very serious since they feel that they will
be the battleground in an atomic war between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the President
and Secretary Dulles were in complete agreement that somehow
or another the tabu which surrounds the use of atomic
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weapons would have to be destroyed. While Secretary Dulles
admitted that in the present state of world opinion we could
not use an A-bomb, we should make every effort now to dis
sipate this feeling, (p. 825)
On May 20, 1953 (Department of State, 1984), Eisenhower furthered
discussed how the atomic weapon could be normalized:
It was the President's view that we ought to at once to
(sic) begin to infiltrate these ideas into the minds of our
allies. If the ground were prepared and the seeds were
planted in a quiet and informal way, there was a much better
chance of acceptance than if we suddenly confronted the
allied governments with a full-fledged plan to end the war
by military decision. There was general agreement with the
President's point. Secretary Smith re-emphasized his views
that a quick victory would go far to sell our allies on even
the most drastic course of action in Korea, (p. 1066).
Thus, not only do we find that the possible social and political re
actions to the use of atomic bombs in Korea were considered important
in the Eisenhower Administration's deliberations, but also that the
Administration indeed believed that attempts should be made to norm
alize the atomic bomb into the category of conventional weaponry so
that the social reaction to their use would be less pejorative.

In

deed, it appears as though the Administration operated under the as
sumption that atomic weapons should be regarded not qualitatively but
quantitatively distinct from conventional weapons.
Several meetings were scheduled in the winter and spring to
consider the question of targets.

By March, as Chair of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley recalled (quoted in Kaku & Axel
rod, 1987), that
the JCS took the unprecedented step of recommending that the
timely use of atomic weapons should be considered against
military targets affecting operations in Korea and planned
as an adjunct possible military course of action involving
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dirsct action against Communists China and Manchuria. In
the meantime, Ike had independently reached the decision the
JCS were now voicing: if necessary, use atomic weapons in
Korea, (p. 81)
All of the evidence, both secondary and primary, points to Eisenhow
er's serious consideration and actual targeting of U.S. atomic wea
pons.

There is no question that the use of atomic weapons was viewed

as an acceptable method of ending the hostilities in Korea.

Indeed,

of the six courses of action outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the National Security Council during the latter parts of the war,
four were considered possible only if they were implemented with the
aid of atomic weapons drops on Korea and China.
The strongest evidence that an atomic threat was made against
North Korea and China is found in Eisenhower's (1963) memoirs:
The lack of progress in long-stalemated talks demanded
definite measures on our part to put an end to these
intolerable conditions. One possibility was to let the
Communists authorities understand that, in the absence of
satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively
without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no
longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the
Korean Peninsula. We would not be limited by any world wide
gentleman's agreement. In India and in the Formosa Straits
area, and the truce negotiations at Panmunjon, we dropped
the word, discreetly, of our intention. We felt quite sure
it would reach Soviet and Chinese Communist ears. Soon the
prospects for armistice negotiations seemed to improve, (p.
181)
Adding further validity to the existence of the threat (quoted in
Lens, 1982), Eisenhower claimed later in his presidency:
I let it be known that if there was not going to be an
armistice, we were not going to be bound by the kinds of
weapons that we would use. I don't mean to say that we'd
have used those great big things and destroyed cities, but
we would use them enough to win. (p. 43)
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The next stage of the threat was carried out by Secretary of State
Dulles on a visit to India on May 20, 1953.

At a meeting with Indian

Prime Minister Jawaharal Nehru, Dulles, according to his notes,
Dulles dropped the word that "if the armistice negotiations collaps
ed, the United States would probably make a stronger rather than a
lesser military exertion, and that this might well extend the area of
conflict" (quoted in Adams, 1962, p. 34).

Later, Dulles admitted to

Berding (1965, p. 129), that the intent of the meeting was to make
clear our "intention to wipe out the industrial complex in Manchuria
if we did not get an armistice."

The message was transferred from

India, probably through the Ambassador to China, to Bejing. Eisen
hower was very careful not to make such an atomic threat directly to
the face of the Chinese.

All of the data indicate that the Chinese

were very much made aware of the threat given by Dulles, as well as
the earlier threat by Eisenhower's negotiators at Panmunjon.
Obviously, the threat was not carried out.

On July 27, 1953 a

truce was signed between the United Nations and North Korea.

The

question of whether the atomic threat was instrumental in ending the
war is not easily answerable.

According to Eisenhower, Nixon, and

many other top decision makers, the threat of an atomic attack ended
the war.

While an informed hypothesis, one cannot ignore the fact

that the Chinese continued to attack U.S. forces after the threat,
and perhaps more importantly the death of Joseph Stalin might be
considered an important variable as well.
concern here, however.

This question is of no

What is of concern, and what has been
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demonstrated here rather clearly, is that both the Eisenhower and
Truman administrations actively considered using atomic weapons dur
ing the three year conflict.

While Truman discarded the idea of an

atomic bombing of Korea rather quickly, Eisenhower saw threatening
the use of the bomb as a effective manner to end the war.

Salient Variables in the Atomic
Decisions Involving Korea
What were the key factors involved in Eisenhower's decision to
threaten the use of atomic weapons?

Although there appear to be

several, I will focus on only the most salient here.

The following

identification of salient factors is preliminary, in the sense that
it is intended only to flesh out the contextual variables believed to
be significant in the decisions.

These variables are anticipated to

play a significant role in instructing the last chapters of this dis
sertation, at which time they will be compared to the circumstances
surrounding the U.S. nuclear threat against Vietnam.

Goals and Means

On a preliminary analytical level, the most obvious answer to
the question of why this threat occurred is that Eisenhower and his
administration wanted to end the war.

Given that one of his more sa

lient campaign promises was to halt hostilities quickly, we should
not be surprised that he indeed intended to resolve the conflict as
quickly as possible.

While campaign promises are on many occasions

just that, left to wither away after election, there is reason to
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believe the promise to end the Korean War was intended to be ful
filled.

This is also evidenced by primary and secondary accounts of

his frustration with armistice negotiations, and his desire to secure
a final peace agreement quickly both as the president and as a mili
tary advisor prior to 1953.

Thus, one may identify Eisenhower's

threat to use atomic weapons as a means to achieving a goal.
While identifying the ending of the war can accurately be des
cribed as a goal, more specificity is needed to flesh out the speci
fic mechanisms that instructed the particular means to achieve that
goal.

Thus, the question must be:

Why were atomic weapons perceived

as an effective means to achieving armistice?.

The obvious answer

here is that atomic weapons were accurately believed to be much more
powerful than conventional weapons, capable of completely destroying
any given target.

Additionally it was perceived by the U.S. that in

terms of cost-effectiveness, the use of atomic weapons would require
less money and person-power to deliver than conventional bombings or
a heavy ground troop deployment.

Since the United States indeed pos

sessed several hundred atomic weapons between 1950 and 1953, it is
reasonable to assume that the goal of ending the war could be, both
militarily and economically, most successful via the use of atomic
weapons.
That the threat to use atomic weapons was largely a product of
the U.S. desire to end hostilities in Korea is an assumed fact.

Like

much organizational behavior, the calculations involved in assessing
the most efficacious manners in which to achieve goals are extremely
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instrumental in nature.

That is, these decisions are made through

the intellectual exercise of cost-benefit calculation.

However,

since the U.S. only threatened the use of atomic weapons and did not
carry out the threat, we must examine other factors which influenced
the decisions not only regarding the threat, but the failure to exe
cute the threat.

This is where other variables enter the equation.

Vulnerability

The idea that the perception of vulnerability may seriously
influence organizational behavior seems to apply very well to U.S.
behavior in Korea.

On a structural level of analysis, the entire

discourse on the use and threatened use of atomic weapons in Korea,
as well as the initial decision to intervene in Korea, can be con
fidently surmised to have resulted from the U.S. fear of communism
spreading throughout Asia.

Indeed, the data reveal that the most

important factor involved in U.S. entry in the conflict was to free
South Korea from the imperialism and influence of the Chinese and
Soviet backed forces of North Korea.

This belief was of course in

full congruence with the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and offi
cial U.S. foreign policy codified in such documents as NSC-68.
It is in this sense that the primary cause of U.S. involvement
in Korea, and ultimately the threatened use of atomic weapons, was
the fear of ideological, political, and economic vulnerability.

This

is the structural explanation for many U.S. activities in Korea.
as the summary of the beginning stages of the Cold War earlier in
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this chapter illustrates, the antagonistic climate from post world
War II to Korea provided the backdrop for concerns of vulnerability.
But there is also another way in which to conceptualize the impor
tance of this notion when considering U.S. actions in Korea.

While

on a less abstract level of analysis, the importance of military
power, particularly atomic power, during the Korean conflict is also
important for understanding the behavior of the United States.
The United States possessed several hundred atomic weapons dur
ing the early periods of the conflict.

Even during the latter stages

of the war, the U.S. was extremely concerned of the possibility of
draining their stockpile through an attack on North Korea and China.
The fear of overextending U.S. atomic resources, personnel, and
equipment in Asia acted as a major impediment to the execution of
atomic attacks.

Indeed, by stationing a majority of atomic para

phernalia several thousand miles from the volatile areas in Europe,
the United States could find itself atomically unprepared in the
event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe or Allied controlled
West Germany.

It seems appropriate then to identify the perception

of military vulnerability as an important variable in the U.S.'s
decision not to stage an atomic attack during the Korean War.

While

this holds especially true for the Truman administration, it was
undoubtedly a major factor for Eisenhower's administration as well.
The notion of vulnerability then seems to have two sides.

On

the one hand, the perception of vulnerability to a Soviet attack of
Europe by the U.S. allocation of large amounts of atomic resources
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in Korea and in Asia acted as a control mechanism to restrain the use
of atomic weapons.

On the other hand, the principal reason the U.S.

intervened in Korea was to protect its economic, ideological and po
litical interests from the vulnerability which would result in the
event of a world heavily influenced by Soviet and Chinese communism.
Anticipated Allied Reactions

The historical data indicate that the Eisenhower Administration
was immensely concerned about the reactions of its allies in the
event of an atomic bombing of Korea.

The data also indicate that the

Administration predicted a hostile global response.

On more than one

occasion entire meetings of the National Security Council were devot
ed to this very issue.
One way to place this perception, and in many ways a very real
fear, in connection with other discourses on the atomic option is to
consider the Administration's desire to erase the distinction between
atomic and conventional weapons.

A considerable amount of politick

ing occurred with the British in order to convince them that atomic
weapons were simply more powerful weapons, not ontologically dis
tinct entities.

Despite these attempts, Churchill consistently dis

couraged their use in the war.
While identifying the very real concern the Administration dis
played over the nature of global reaction to the use of atomic wea
pons, it is difficult to argue that it was the only major deterrent
to their use.

Indeed, the data point to two other factors which also
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appear logically related with the decision not to drop the weapons:
the successful negotiation of an armistice and the concern of overextending atomic resources in Asia at the expense of protecting
Western Europe. This, however, does not mean that the expectation of
negative reaction could not have played a decisive role in the deci
sion not to vise the weapons.

Indeed, it would be reasonable, simply

by the sheer quantity of discourse over the issue, to argue that the
United States' policies during the conflict reflected this concern.
In fact it is clear that the concern manifested itself behaviorally
given Eisenhower and his administration's attempts to convince others
to consider the atomic option.
Now if we take the variable of global reaction seriously, a
reasonable conclusion is that since a successful lobby for erasing
the distinction between atomic and conventional weapons was not
foreseeable, perhaps secretly threatening to use the weapons would
accomplish the goal of ending the war.

Thus, in order to avoid nega

tive global reaction, the atomic weapon could be used only as an
instrument of threat rather than of actual use.
On one level it could be argued that the attempt to normalize
and minimize the awesome power and effects of atomic weapons occurred
because of the perception of necessity and urgency on the part of the
Eisenhower and his Administration.

Since data clearly support the

urgency hypothesis was quite extant, perceived by both Eisenhower and
his advisors, we come back to the idea of goals.

Indeed, what better

way to end the war than to fully destroy major military bases and
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ground troop stations in Korea?

And what better way to execute these

attacks than through the use of atomic weapons?

Discussion
It is impossible to determine whether Eisenhower would have
eventually carried out his atomic threat.

While data indicates that

specific targets were selected for the mission, and that Eisenhower
and his advisors seriously considered the particulars of such an at
tack, it would be speculative to conclude the atomic plans would have
come to fruition.

Data indicate, however, that Eisenhower viewed his

threat as instrumental in expediting armistice talks.

Perhaps his

threat was indeed a bluff, intended only to scare the communists into
submission.

Regardless of whether the threat would have been carried

out, one cannot ignore the fact that negotiations improved signifi
cantly after the threat was made.

It is possible then, that Eisen

hower and his associates discarded the idea of using atomic weapons
because of the now likely possibility of an end to the war.

But even

after the July 27 armistice was officially concluded, many NSC and
JCS discussions were occupied with the possibilities of the atomic
option if the war resumed.

The majority of Eisenhower's advisors

reached the substantive conclusion that if indeed the war resumed,
atomic weapons would certainly be used (see Kaku and Axelrod, 1987).
In this last section of this chapter, I have attempted to
identify important structural and institutional variables which ap
pear to related to the decisions relating to the use of atomic wea
pons in Korea. Three important variables have surfaced from the
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analysis: Goals and means, vulnerability, and anticipated global
response.

These variables, in the truest sense data-emergent, will

be juxtaposed with other variables which emerge from the remaining
case study on the U.S. threat to use atomic and nuclear weapons dur
ing the Vietnam conflict.

The final analysis of these variables will

be conducted on a more theoretical level in the final chapter of the
dissertation, in which a conceptual framework for understanding the
violations of international law will be attempted.

It is here that

a grounded theory of governmental crime will be constructed.
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CHAPTER VI

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE VIETNAM WAR
This chapter is devoted to an examination of United States'
nuclear weapons threat during the Vietnam War.

Much like the preced

ing chapter on the atomic threat during the Korean War, the main
objectives of this chapter are to: (a) place the Vietnam conflict
into proper historical perspective via a review of the 1953-1965
period of the Cold War, (b) identify the military and political back
ground of the Vietnam War, (c) describe the global status of nuclear
weapons during the conflict, (d) expose the instances in which the
United States threatened to use nuclear weapons, and (e) extract
variables from the case study which appear to be associated with
decisions to threaten the use of nuclear weapons.

The Cold War 3etween 1953 and 1965

Antagonistic relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States accelerated with the passing of the Korean War.

The United

States, under the executive leadership of Eisenhower until 1961,
continued its policy of containment.

Although the U.S. did not com

mit itself to any particular region to the same quantitative degree
it had in Korea, the U.S. did engage in economic, political, and lowintensity wars in a variety of areas around the world.
Perhaps the area in which the United States held the most

96
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Interest immediately following the Korean War was Southeast Asia.
The U.S. did not commit a significant number of troops to Vietnam
until 1965, but supported the French occupation of the region since
1950.

Between the years of 1950 and 1954, the United States funneled

over $1.2 billion to the French, accounting for nearly 70% of cost of
the occupation (LaFeber, 1991).

The U.S. commitment to this region be

came even more significant when in 1954, the French were defeated at
Dieribienphu, and Vietnam was divided into North and South.

By 1955

French influence in the area had diminished and the United States
installed Ngo Dinh Diem as president of South Vietnam.

As described

in much richer detail later in this chapter, heavy U.S. commitment in
this region continued until 1973.
Outside of Southeast Asia, the United States also applied its
policy of containment, again enveloped in the fear of communist expan
sion.

Of particular importance is the policy designed by the Eisen

hower administration, eventually labeled the Eisenhower Doctrine,
which held that the United States would support any Middle Eastern
country threatened by communism.

In part, U.S. involvement in the

brief Suez Crisis of 1956 can be viewed as exemplar of this policy.
More indicative of the policy, however, was the direct military in
volvement of the United States in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, when
14,000 U.S. troops landed on Lebanese soil to support the government
of President Chaumon.

Although the Lebanese conflict was in real

terms a civil war, the Eisenhower administration nonetheless applied
the policy of containment to the region, attempting to both deter
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Soviet expansion into the area and to prevent instability in remain
ing pro-Western Arab countries (Blechmar. and Kaplan, 1978).

Indeed,

during the mid to late 1950's, the Middle East was viewed by the U.S.
as susceptible to communist infiltration, especially because of
Egyptian President Nasser's apparent sympathy for communism and his
more than casual association with the Soviet Union.
In relative terms, Germany and Berlin had become somewhat
stable since the 1948 Soviet Blockade.

However, in the late 1950's

and early 1960's Berlin and Germany once again became principal maneu
vering areas of the Cold War.

On November 10, 1958, Soviet Premier

Khrushchev demanded Western surrender of West Berlin.

With Allied

reaction extremely hostile to this proposal, Khrushchev hinted at
the possibility of using "the greatest possible force" to enforce the
proposal (Slusser, 1978, p. 357).

The Soviet Premiere set a deadline

of six months for the completion of negotiations on the question.
For the next ten months, the U.S. and Soviet Union played a minia
ture war game by blocking roads and refusing passage to one another
in various sections of Berlin.

It wasn't long before the crisis came

to a halt, and by September 1959, the Soviets withdrew their demands.
This battle in the Cold War ended where it began.

Two years later

the question of Berlin and the two Germanys again took center stage
when Khrushchev made similar demands upon the Kennedy administration
to allow the reunification of the entire city of Berlin with the
communist East.

The confrontation resulted in the construction of

the Berlin Wall and the famous Checkpoint Charlie tank confrontation.
While Western Europe, the two Germanys, and the divided city of
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Berlin were major sources of confrontation during this period of the
Cold War, it was in 1961 and 1962 that the United States became in
volved in two of the most dangerous clashes between the Korean and
Vietnam Wars:
Crisis.

The attempted invasion of Cuba and the Cuban Missile

These events represent the general geographic movement of

the Cold War from direct confrontation in Europe to peripheral, but
nonetheless important areas of the globe.
On New Year's Day, 1959, the small island of Cuba, located some
90 miles from southern Florida, came under the leadership of the re
volutionary communist Fidel Castro.

The Kennedy administration fear

ed such a close geographical relationship with a Soviet-supported
government.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency provided military

training and equipment to revolutionary Cuban exiles, and promised
air support for a coup de tat of the Castro regime.

The 1961 Bay of

Pigs invasion, fully supported and designed under both Eisenhower and
Kennedy, failed miserably, with the Cuban revolutionaries sustaining
total defeat, principally because of the U.S. decision to not supply
the promised air support.

In the end, the U.S. attempt to overthrow

Castro represented the Cold War's dominant traits:

fear of the dom

ino effect and the importance of containment.
The last major confrontation between the Soviet Union and the
United States prior to the U.S. entrance in the Vietnam War is the
Cuban Missile Crisis, which again demonstrated the United States'
concern with Soviet influence in areas outside of Eastern Europe.
The crisis, although serious, was uncomplicated:

In October 1962,

the United States became aware of the construction of Soviet nuclear
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missile bases on Cuban soil and instituted a thirteen day blockade of
Soviet ships suspected of transporting nuclear weapon materials.
Within two weeks of the blockade, the Soviet ships turned back to the
Atlantic with the agreement that the United States would not attempt
to re-invade Cuba and that it would evacuate some of its nuclear mis
sile sites in eastern Turkey.

Despite both sides considering the

outcome beneficial, the antagonisms between the U.S. and Soviet Union
were not reduced or diminished in intensity.

The Kennedy and John

son administrations maintained a policy of containment consistent
with the cannons of the earlier administrations of Eisenhower and
Truman.

Indeed, President Kennedy (quoted in Lincoln, 1968), applied

this logic to Cuba and other areas of U.S. interest.
It is clear that the forces of communism are not to be
underestimated, in Cuba or anywhere else in the world.
It is clear that this Nation, in concert with all the free
nations of this hemisphere, must take an even closer and
more realistic look at the menace of external Communist
intervention and domination in Cuba It is clearer than
ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of
the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even
nuclear armaments. The armies are there. The nuclear arm
aments are there. But they serve primarily as the shield
behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other
tactics steadily advance. (p. 133).
The Cold War continued throughout the post-Korean War era just
as it had preceded immediately following World War II:

A series of

crises erupted every few years which manifested the deep animosity
permeating superpower global relations.

The only real thawing of the

Cold War occurred during the period of detente, or lessening of inter
national tension, which existed in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
The 1968 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the successful
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Nixon Administration policy of forcing competition between the
Soviets and Chinese abetted this relative time of peace between the
superpowers.
U.S. policies, though undergoing slight revisions in different
Presidential administrations, nevertheless maintained a commitment to
thwart communist expansion influence via low intensity war.

While in

Cuba and Germany the world escaped a full military confrontation be
tween the superpowers, the small country of Vietnam, which measures
less in size than the state of California, proved to be the region
where the Cold War turned exceedingly hot.

Much like the U.S. en

trance into the Korean War in 1950, U.S. intervention in Vietnam was
the logical behavioral manifestation of U.S. containment policy.
It is to this conflict, especially considerations on the use of nu
clear weapons during the Vietnam War, that the rest of this chapter
is devoted.

Political and Military Background of the Vietnam War

Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in
Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger on
the dike. Her economy is essential to the economy of
all of Southeast Asia. (President Kennedy, quoted in
Lafeber, 1991, p. 232).
In the contemporary age, Vietnam has never experienced a pro
longed period of peace.

Controlled by the Chinese until the early

15th century, the country was first granted independence in 1428.
However, the French invasion in 1861 further established the region
as a colony, despite numerous clashes between the indigenous peoples
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of the area and the French occupying forces.

It was not until the

defeat of French in 1954 that the country of Vietnam gained any de
gree of sovereignty (Kamow, 1983).
The country of Vietnam, however, ceased to exist by 1954.

Much

like the experience of Korea, antithetical political ideologies be
tween the dwellers of the north and south solidified severance.

In

July, as a result of negotiations in Geneva, Vietnam was divided into
two sovereigns, North and South.

The United States, Britain, the So

viet Union, and France designed the plan along with representatives
of the north and south regions of Vietnam.

In what was thought to be

a temporary solution to the problems of area, the areas of North and
South were demarcated at the 17th parallel.

The Geneva negotiators

agreed to the creation of a communist-led North Vietnamese government
and a pro-Western South Vietnamese government.
The United States soon became the major supporters of the
government of South Vietnam, led by the brutal anti-communist Ngo
Dinh Diem, who ruled until his U.S. supported assassination in 1963.
The U.S. provided military advisors, ground troops, and other person
nel and equipment to the South Vietnamese until its exit from the war
in 1973.

By the year 1963, the U.S. funneled over $500 million in

aid and provided nearly 15,000 military personnel to the Diem admin
istration (Kamow, 1983).

In the North, Ho Chi Minh's communist

government received significant support from the Soviet Union and
China.
Between the years of 1954 and 1965, the two Vietnams were
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engaged in constant lew-intensity warfare.

The North Vietnamese,

inspired by a nationalist ideology which called for a return to a
united Vietnam, increasingly stepped up attacks on bordering cities
and chief military and political areas in the South.

The Southern

country too engaged in offensive attacks against the North, with a
comparable level of violence directed toward communist sympathizers
and dissenters in both areas of the region.
The decision of the United States to intervene in the civil war
of Vietnam bears close resemblance to its decision to intervene in
Korea:

Fear of expanded communist influence in a pro-Western country

threatened U.S. political and economic interests.

The U.S. decision

to fully commit and significantly escalate the hostilities was made
in August of 1964, when the U.S. destroyer Maddox was purportedly
attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin, a
small body of water adjacent to the Chinese-North Vietnamese border.
While there are serious questions about the authenticity of the
claims made by the U.S. government, the image invoked of the Gulf of
Tonkin incident served to justify U.S. escalation of hostilities.
On August 5, President Johnson requested Congress to allow him to
take "any measures necessary to repel any armed attack against the
United States and to prevent further aggression" (quoted in Lincoln,
1968, p. 294). Permission was granted by Congress two days later in
the form of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
President Johnson order the first bombing campaign of North
Vietnam, code-named ROLLING THUNDER, in early 1965 and committed more
than 200,000 troops to the region by December of that year (Kamow,
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1983).

Under the Johnson Administration, the policy employed was one

of gradual escalation whereby it was hypothesized that small quanti
ties of ground troops and air-attacks would throughout the years lead
to larger scale attacks, and ultimately U.S. victory.

In large part,

this policy was enacted to protect the secrecy of the U.S. bombing
missions and to attempt to confine the hostilities within Indochina.
It is unnecessary for the purposes of this research to delve
into the repeated negotiations, the quantity of bombings, and the
specific operations designed by either party to the conflict.

Never

theless, it is important to note the general U.S. commitment during
the war:

By the end of the war in 1973, the U.S. had dropped over

seven and one-half million tons of bombs on both North and South
Vietnamese soil; committed 500,000 soldiers; employed over 400,000
tons of napalm to deforest suspected communist strongholds; lost
over 50,000 soldiers; and had invested $150 billion in the effort
(Harrison, 1982; Lens, 1982).16
After eight years of war with the North Vietnamese, the United
States withdrew from the conflict.

South Vietnam's president Nguyen

Van Thieu pleaded with the West to maintain its commitment in the
area, but widespread disapproval in the United States with the war
and continued failure in suppressing Vietcong influence ultimately
made the decision to withdraw relatively easy (Nixon, 1986).

The

United States lost more than 50,000 soldiers (the third most deadly
war of the U.S.) and had been solidly defeated by a less technolog
ically developed third world country.

All U.S. troops had evacuated
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Vietnam by March 1973 (Harrison, 1982).
The U.S. withdrawal did not cease the fighting in Vietnam.
North Vietnamese forces, in ultimate irony to the United States,
drove again to the South and ultimately took control of the entire
country with the capture of the South Vietnam capital of Saigon on
April 30, 1975.

Vietnam was no longer divided into the sovereigns

of North and South.

For the first time, U.S. containment policy had

failed.
As noted earlier, the United States committed itself to Indo
china, and particularly Vietnam, well before its 1965 commitment to
full-scale escalation.

The policy of containment, which guided U.S.

foreign policy since World War II, also guided the final step of fullscale military intervention in Vietnam, even as early as 1952, when
the U.S. was in the midst of the Korean War.

In August of that year,

the National Security Council (Pentagon Papers, 1971) formed its
objectives on Southeast Asia,
to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into
the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop will and
ability to resist communism from within and without and to
contribute to the strengthening of the free world, (p. 27).
The Council also recommended continued and complete support of the
French occupying forces, as well as contingency plans for air-strikes
and ground troop deployment should the French come under Chinese at
tack, and an assortment of "aggressive military, political, and psy
chological program(s) to defeat or seriously reduce the Viet Minh
forces" (Pentagon Papers, 1971, p. 30).
President Kennedy, as Eisenhower, continued the policy of
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gradual escalation in Vietnam less than five months after taking
office.

In a proposal offered by an interdepartmental task force,

Kennedy approved the following measures:

Expanded "intelligence,

unconventional warfare, and political-psychological activities,"
penetration of North Vietnamese communication systems, enlarged
Central Intelligence Agency training for South Vietnamese nationals,
and enhanced propaganda techniques to include the "testimony of reha
bilitated prisoners, stressing the errors of Communism broadcast to
Communist held areas, including North Vietnam, to induce defections"
(Pentagon Papers, 1971, p. 120).
As detailed in a later section, Presidents Johnson and Nixon
also maintained a strong commitment to Vietnam throughout their ten
ure in office.

While other Administrations had covertly battled the

North Vietnamese, these two Presidents escalated the conflict to a
state of war.

While the nuclear option was considered by the Johnson

administration, it was under Nixon that the United States explicitly
threatened to use nuclear weapons to force an end to the hostilities.
Before discussing these considerations and threats however, it is
necessary to review the status of nuclear weapons during the time of
the U.S. intervention.

Status of Nuclear Weapons During the Conflict

The qualitative and quantitative expansion of nuclear weapons
immediately following the Korean War made the situation faced by the
United States and Soviet Union during the Vietnam War much more pre
carious.

While Great Britain, France, and China also maintained a
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nuclear stockpile by 1965, the former two countries' weapons were
largely under the control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) alliance, while Chinese nuclear weapons remained primitive in
comparison to U.S. and Soviet stockpiles.

With the nuclearization of

Western Europe by NATO in 1954, and the Soviet stationing of nuclear
delivery systems and warheads both within their country and in sec
tions of the Baltic states, the Cold War progressively revolved
around the ability to deter and threaten the use of nuclear weapons
to maintain security.

This is in sharp contrast to the military

situation during the Korean War when both the U.S. and Soviets de
pended mostly on conventional methods of warfare.
Table 4 illustrates the United States' and the Soviet Union's
nuclear weapons stockpile from the end of the Korean war through the
Vietnam War.

The United States has always maintained the lead in

pure numbers of nuclear weapons.

However, if one takes into account

the actual megatonnage of weapons during the early 1960's, there is
nearly parity.

But in the years after 1967 to the present, the So

viet Union possessed the advantage in pure destructive capacity:
From the years of 1969 to the mid 1980's the Soviet Union maintained
at least twice the amount of total megatonnage of the United States;
in the years between 1972 and 1980, Soviet megatonnage was three
times more powerful than U.S. destructive capabilities (see Cochran,
et al. 1984).

The noticeable difference between actual weapons and

megatonnage is explained by the Soviet's tendency to build highyield inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
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Table 4
U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles:

United States

1955-1973

Soviet Union

1955

2760

280

1956

4000

900

1957

5800

1590

1958

8190

2440

1959

13,000

3550

1960

18,900

4520

1961

23,300

5770

1962

26,700

7180

1963

29,000

8970

1964

31,100

10,600

1965

32,400

12,300

1966

33,000

13,700

1967

32,800

15,500

1968

31,300

17,400

1969

29,100

19,000

1970

27,000

20,800

1971

26,700

22,100

1972

27,500

23,600

1973

28,700

25,400

Source:

Cochran, Arkin, Norris, and Sands (1984).

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the United
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States' strategy of making more of those weapons with lower yields.
Comparing the quantitative destructive capabilities of U.S.
nuclear weapons during the Vietnam period and the bomb used on the
Japanese city of Hiroshima, one realizes the astounding pace of ad
vancement in nuclear weapons technology.

The 12 kiloton (12,000

tons) bomb dropped on Hiroshima is estimated to have killed at least
130,000 people (Perkins, 1991).

The U.S. had stockpiled 2,000 mega

tons (2 million tons) by the end of the Korean War, and 10,900 mega
tons (11 million tons) at the start of the Vietnam War.

If the

United States, during the Vietnam War era, had detonated all of its
nuclear weapons, the destructive capacity would have been enough to
kill the world's population some 35 times over (Perkins, 1991).
Fortunately, the undoubtedly omnicidal results of a total re
lease of a nuclear weapons stockpile has not come to fruition.
Rather, U.S nuclear weapons policy has always been based on the con
cept of deterrence.

This doctrine holds that a Soviet invasion of

Western Europe or another pro-Western region would be deterred if it
was made clear that the United States would respond to such an inva
sion with nuclear forces.

This strategy, known as the first-use op

tion, has been official NATO policy since 1967.

Additionally, the

policy of deterrence was hypothesized, especially during the 1950's
and 1960's under the mutual assured destruction doctrine (MAD), to
prevent any Soviet or U.S. first strike of homelands, since such a
strike would be guaranteed to provoke equally damaging attacks on
the country which first used nuclear weapons.

While U.S. deterrence
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policy has undergone minor changes throughout the tenure of the nu
clear age, the theory most popular during the period of the Vietnam
War was flexible response, which, in congruence with the first-strike
policy of earlier years, held that any region threatened with Soviet
occupation or invasion would be assisted by U.S. nuclear forces.
Johnson and Nuclear Weapons Considerations

President Johnson inherited the complicated situation in Viet
nam fully aware of most of the U.S. covert operations in the region.
As Vice-President, he had played, if not a major role in shaping U.S.
policy in the area, the privileged position of informed spectator.
His basic view on the importance of U.S. influence in the area again
exemplifies the doctrine of containment.

In a series of interviews

with Doris Kearns (1973) Johnson recalled his position.
The Communists' desire to conquer the world is just like
the lawyer's desire to be the ultimate judge on the Supreme
Court or the politicians desire to be President. You see,
the Communists want to rule the world, and if we don't stand
up to them, they will do it. And we'll be slaves, (p. 316)
In the same interview (Kearns, 1973) Johnson very bluntly professed
his belief in the domino theory.
So I knew that if the aggression succeeded in South Vietnam,
then the aggressors would simply keep on going until all of
Southeast Asia fell into their hands. Now I know these
academics thought all they had to do was to write a lot of
words proclaiming the death of the domino theory and their
words alone could make the Communist threat vanish over
night. But while the impotent academics were talking,
Moscow and Peking would be moving to extend their control
and soon we would be fighting in Berlin or elsewhere, And
so would begin World War III. (p. 330)
The question of the use or threat to use nuclear weapons during
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the Johnson Administration manifested itself on a number of occa
sions.

While there was considerably less discussion of the issue

than in the Eisenhower or Truman Administrations, Johnson's advisors
did examine their possible use frequently, but not in enough parti
cularity to warrant the conclusion that the U.S. was close to execut
ing a nuclear attack on the North Vietnamese.
Prior to full U.S. involvement in Vietnam, South Vietnamese
General Nguyen Khahh and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk met in May
1964 to discuss the possibility of an U.S. military intervention.
With Khanh delighted at the prospect, Rusk delineated President John
son's major concerns (Pentagon Papers, 1972), in the event of fullscale intervention
the U.S. would never again get involved in a land war in
Asia limited to conventional forces. Our population was
190,000,000. Mainland China had at least 700,000,000. We
would not allow ourselves to be bled white fighting them
with conventional weapons, (p. 322).
Rusk continued, (Pentagon Papers, 1972) this time emphasizing the
likelihood of using nuclear weapons.
This meant that if the escalation brought about a major
Chinese attack, it would also involve the use of nuclear
arms. Many free world leaders would oppose this. Many
Asians seemed to see an element of racial discrimination
in the use of nuclear arms; something we would do to Asians
but not to Westerners, (p. 322).
According to the minutes of the conversation,

Khahh replied "he

certainly had no quarrel with American use of nuclear arms if the
Chinese used masses of Humanity, we would use superior firepower"
(Pentagon Papers, 1972, p. 322).
This meeting was probably based, at least in part, on the
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discussions which took place a month earlier in a National Security
Council meeting in April 1964.

According to the minutes of the meet

ing, (Pentagon Papers, 1973), the discussion on whether to bomb North
Vietnam into submission flirted with the nuclear option and
there was speculation about whether the use of nuclear
weapons against North Vietnam would bring in the Russians.
Rusk had been impressed, so he said, by Chiang Kai-shek's
recent, strongly expressed opposition to any use by the
United States of nuclear weapons. Bundy conjectured for
argument's sake that nukes used in wholly unpopulated areas
solely for the purposes of interdiction might have a differ
ent significance than if used otherwise. It is not reported
than any examination of effectiveness was essayed (p. 65).
At the U.S. sponsored Honolulu conference in June of 1964, top
military and political officials discussed further plans of action
against North Vietnam.

When debating the possibility of conventional

versus nuclear campaigns, Secretary of Defense McNamara noted that
all of the planning thus far was on the basis that a Soviet or
Chinese reaction to an attack on North Vietnam was likely only if
such attacks were massive (Pentagon Papers, 1973).

He argued that in

order to ensure that the larger communist nations would not get in
volved, the first stages of attacks should be limited.

He noted

however, that it was essential that contingency plans be made in the
event of the expansion of belligerents.
According to the minutes of the meeting (Pentagon Papers,
1973), the nuclear weapons issues then took center stage.
McNamara then went on to say that the possibility of a major
ground action also led to a serious question of having to
use nuclear weapons at some point. Admiral Felt responded
emphatically that there was no possible way to hold off the
communists on the ground without the use of tactical nuclear
weapons, and that it was essential that the commanders be
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given the freedom to use these as it had been assumed under
the various plans. He said that without nuclear weapons,
the ground force requirement was and had always been com
pletely out of reach, (p. 175).
There is also mention of the possible use of nuclear weapons in
the November, 1964 National Security Council Working Group paper
Courses of Action, Southeast Asia.
This report (Pentagon Papers, 1973), submitted to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for analysis, acknowledged the fact that a full mil
itary commitment to the region
would involve high risks of a major conflict in Asia, which
could not be confined to air and naval action but would
almost inevitably involve a Korean-scale ground action and
possibly even the use of nuclear weapons at some point, (p.
623).
The Joint Chiefs responded critically to the analogy of Korea and
replied to the nuclear weapons hypothesis by stating:
[the phrase] possibly even the vise of nuclear weapons at
some point" is of course why we spend billions to have them.
If China chooses to go to war against us she has to contem
plate their possible use, just as anyone else. (p. 623)
It would be erroneous to conclude that there were not serious
doubts about the use of nuclear weapons on the North Vietnamese in
the period prior to full U.S. military escalation.

Surveying the

opinions of the more powerful advisors such as McNamara, Rusk, and
Bundy during this time, there appeared to be a consensus that if
employed, they could be successful only if used sparingly, or "to
hold off an enemy to save a force threatened with destruction, or
to knock out a special target" (Pentagon Papers, 1973, p. 624).
A strategy which included major roles for nuclear weapons simply did
not exist at this time.
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This does not mean, however, that all high-level advisors were
against the use of the weapons in the region.

In his autobiography,

Commander Westmoreland (1980) criticized the Johnson Administration
for not using them.
If Washington officials were so intent on sending a message
to Hanoi, surely small tactical nuclear weapons would be a
way to tell Hanoi something, as two atomic bombs had spoken
convincingly to Japanese officials during World War II, and
the threat of atomic bombs induced the North Koreans to
accept meaningful negotiations during the Korean War. It
could be that the use of a few small tactical nuclear
weapons in Vietnam-or even the threat of them-might have
quickly brought the war there to an end. (p. 91)
Despite Westmoreland's position, which paralleled a few other
important advisors of Johnson, the President had difficulty accepting
the argument.

To understand this, it is important to note the strain

Johnson experienced during the bombing campaigns against North Vietnam.
While some of his military advisors recommended significantly in
creased forces and attacks against communist strongholds, Johnson was
at first reluctant to expand the conflict.

One of his greatest fears

of such an increase was that excessive bombing could trigger Soviet
or Chinese entrance into the hostilities.

One should not underesti

mate the importance of this concern, since Johnson enacted morator
iums on bombings several times during the war in an attempt to end
the war politically.17

Johnson outlined his position to Kearns

(1973):
I saw our bombs as my political resources for negotiating a
peace our bombs could be used as sticks against the North,
pressuring North Vietnam to stop its aggression against the
South. If China reacted to our slow escalation by threaten
ing to retaliate, we'd have plenty of tine to ease off the
bombing. But this control-so essential to preventing World
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War III-would be lost the moment we unleased a total assault
on the North, (p. 264)
Johnson very much feared an expansion of the war to a global dimen
sion, as illustrated by the following comment to Kearns (1973) :
I never knew as I sat there in the afternoon, approving
targets one, two, and three, whether one of those three
might just be the one to set off the provisions of those
secret treaties. What if one of those targets triggers
off Russia or China? (p. 270)
But Johnson did escalate the war, ordering more than 400,000
troops to the region by the end of 1966 and
paigns of North and South Vietnam.

continued bombing cam

Indeed, the United States secret

ly expanded the geography of the war into some regions of Laos and
Cambodia, citing the areas as communist troop refuges.

Nuclear wea

pons, however, were never a key ingredient in Johnson's war policy.
According to the Commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, General
William Westmoreland (1976), the President did charge the JCS on a
few occasions with analyzing the option, but never considered their
use any-thing but improbable.

This should not be surprising con

sidering Johnson's concern with Soviet or Chinese entrance into the
war; it was believed by the Administration that the use of nuclear
weapons would undoubtedly bring about World War III.

Indeed, in an

interview with Kearns (1973) he went to great pains in illustrating
his fight for a conservative bombing campaign, despite his general’s
desire to completely saturate the North Vietnamese with bombs.
In late 1968, Johnson announced he was not seeking reelection.

Dejected by the failure of both the U.S. effort in Viet

nam and his plans for the Great Society, he retreated from politics
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until his death in 1973.

Again, while there was some discussion on

the issue, Johnson did not seriously consider nuclear attacks against
the North Vietnamese.

Nixon and Nuclear Weapons in Vietnam

The United States intervened in the Vietnam War to prevent
North Vietnam from imposing its totalitarian government on
South Vietnam through military conquest, both because a
Communist victory would lead to massive human suffering fcr
the people of Vietnam and because it would damage American
strategic interests and pose a threat to our allies and
friends in other non-Communist nations. (Nixon, 1985,
p. 46).
I do not believe that the United States should threaten any
other nation. (Public Papers of Richard Nixon, 1971,
p. 249).
Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in 1969, four years after
Johnson had initiated the air-attack operation ROLLING THUNDER.
While there are several reasons Nixon prevailed in the election,
many have identified his position on the Vietnam War as an impor
tant variables in his election.

Prior to and throughout the Viet

nam War, Nixon emphasized two general goals:
war, but to win it honorably.

Not only to win the

On several occasions, Nixon (1985)

made public this concern, promising he would not be "the first U.S.
president to lose a war" (p. 181).

During his tenure in the White

House, he repeatedly underscored the point that the United States
would not tolerate defeat, and that such a defeat would symbolize
U.S. inferiority and a lack of commitment to thwarting the spread
of communism.
Nixon asserted a number of times during his campaign that he
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had a secret plan to end the war and that he would bring peace (see
Time, 1985; Haldeman, 1978).

The U.S. public did not know the de

tails of this secret strategy even after some year and one half later
it failed.

Nixon's plan involved the threat to use nuclear weapons,

and is known as the November Ultimatum.

The scheme, known among top

officials as a part of operation DUCK HOOK, involved a dramatic esca
lation of the war, and the a solemn broadcast to the North Viet
namese that if a settlement was not reached by November 1, 1969, the
United States would "be forced to take measures of the greatest conse
quences" (Nixon, 1978 p. 396).

The plan, not dissimilar to Eisen

hower's strategy some 16 years earlier, included a calculated threat
to use nuclear weapons.
Nixon had been President Eisenhower's vice-president, and pos
sessed knowledge of the internal dynamics of the settlement of the
Korean War.

He firmly believed the threat of the use of nuclear wea

pons could be used against the North Vietnamese in the same way that
Eisenhower used the threat against the North Koreans:
into an armistice.

to scare them

There is no question Nixon held the opinion that

the chief reason for the abrupt end to the Korean War was Eisen
hower's threat to use atomic weapons.

At the national Republican

convention in 1968, Nixon publicly announced this conviction when
he stated:

"I'll tell you how Korea was ended.

Eisenhower let the

word go out diplomatically that we would not tolerate this continued
ground war of attrition" (Public Papers of Richard Nixon, 1973,
p. 339).

In a Time (1985) magazine interview, Nixon again expressed

how instrumental he thought the atomic threat was in ending the war
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in Korea.
Dulles (through Eisenhower) said, You know, we are very
concerned about Korea, and the President's patience is
wearing thin, and finally saying that unless the logjam is
broken, it will lead to the use of nuclear weapons.
It
worked. The Chinese were probably tired of the war. And
the Russians did notwant to go to war over Korea. But it
was the Bomb that did it. (p. 50)
According to Haldeman (1978), one of Nixon's closest advisors,
the President saw great affinity in the situation faced by Eisenhower
and his predicament in the Vietnam War.

Nixon believed Eisenhower's

military background distinguished him from other presidents in the
sense that a threat made to foreign governments would be taken very
seriously.

Nixon, however, felt that his twenty year career in pro

moting anti-communist policies gave him comparable leverage in times
of international crisis.

Haldeman (1978) recalled his impression of

Nixon during the first few weeks of his presidency:
Nixon not only wanted to end the Vietnam War, he was abso
lutely convinced he would end it in his first year. I re
member during the campaign, walking along a beach, he once
said I'm the one man in this country who can do it, Bob.
They'll believe any threat of force that Nixon makes because
it's Nixon, (p. 82)
The President undoubtedly viewed the threat to use nuclear wea
pons as the threat which would make believers out of the North Viet
namese.

Haldeman (1978) also remembered a conversation with Nixon on

the secret plan which offers the earliest evidence that the President
strongly favored the nuclear threat.
Nixon said, I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the
North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I
might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word
to them that 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed
about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry-and
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he has his hand on the nuclear button'-and Ho Chi Minh
himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.
(P- 83)
Haldeman (1978) then identifies the messenger of the threat.

"As it

turned out it wasn't Bill Rogers, the future Secretary of state, who
slipped the word to the North Vietnamese, but a brilliant, impulsive,
witty gentleman with an engaging German accent-Henry Kissinger"
(p. 83).
Henry Kissinger, selected as the President's assistant for
national security, engaged in secret meetings with the North Viet
namese beginning in early August 1969.

These meetings were designed

to ensure that the enemy was told in clear terms that the U.S. would
no longer tolerate the present state of the war.

Kissinger had been

sent to Paris at least twelve times to engage in secret negotiations
with the North Vietnamese.

These meetings were so secret that only

Nixon and a few of his advisors in the Defense and State Departments
were made aware of the substance of the conversations.

Nixon has

offered several official reasons for this secrecy. "Privately, both
sides can be more flexible in offering new approaches and also pri
vate discussions allow both sides to talk frankly, to take positions
free from the pressure of public debate (Public Papers of Richard
Nixon, 1974, p. 101).

In fact, the issue of secrecy was so important

that Nixon ordered his entire staff of both the State and Defense
Departments to say nothing if asked "whether private talks have begun,
as to when they begin, (or) as to what occurred" (Public Papers of
Richard Nixon, 1971, p. 247).

The Kissinger meetings in Paris exemp

lify this fear of exposure, and were characterized by Nixon (1978) as
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"full of cloak and dagger episodes, with Kissinger riding slouched
down in the back seats" (p. 396) of unmarked vehicles.

In numerous

statements it is clear that Nixon felt that if progress was to be
made, it would come from these secret talks, not through negotiations
in the public forum.
Kissinger's threat to use nuclear weapons against the North
Vietnamese occurred on August 4, 1969.

According to both Nixon's and

Kissinger's (1979) memoirs, the Paris meeting was scheduled at the
same time Nixon was meeting with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu
in Bucharest, which according to Nixon (1978) provided "the perfect
camouflage" (p. 394) for Kissinger's secret meeting.

Nixon (1978)

decided that a two-pronged approach to promulgating the November
Ultimatum would make more of an impression on the North Vietnamese,
so he informed Ceausescu, who's government was known to have good
relations with the North Vietnamese, that "we cannot indefinitely
continue to have two hundred deaths a week in Vietnam and no pro
gress in Paris.

On November 1 this year if there is no progress, we

must re-evaluate our policy" (p. 395).

Nixon apparently made other

remarks to the Romanian President which pressed the point of the
deadline, and that the U.S. was prepared to take extreme measures to
end the war.
The first meeting between Kissinger and North Vietnamese chief
negotiators Xuan Thuy and Mai Van Bo began surprisingly blunt, with
Kissinger immediately threatening to use nuclear weapons if no pro
gress was made.

As Nixon (1978) describes:
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Kissinger opened by saying that he wanted to convey a
message from me personally. Kissinger said, I have been
asked to tell you in all solemnity, that if by November 1 no
major progress has been made toward a solution, we will be
compelled-with great reluctance-to take measures of the
greatest consequences, (p. 396)
The threat produced no immediate results for the U.S. Administration.
While Nixon and Kissinger do not mention in their memoirs that the
phrase nuclear weapons was used during this meeting, Nixon later ad
mitted in a Time (1985) magazine interview that the threat had indeed
been a nuclear one.

This meeting ended as abruptly as it had begun

with the North Vietnamese representatives demanding complete U.S.
withdrawal from the conflict.

Even though the U.S. was threatening

to unleash its weapons of mass destruction, the North Vietnamese
appeared uninhibited by the warning.

The stalemate between the

parties thus continued.
During the first stages of the series of secret discussions,
Kissinger created a special research panel to look into escalation
methods.

In August and September, (quoted in Hersch, 1983), a panel

consisting of top military and political advisors examined the Navy's
DUCK HOOK plans, which are to this day still classified, and was
ordered by Kissinger to
examine objectively a number of options with regard to the
war and the first task will be the most difficult of all.
We've had a series of talks with the North Vietnamese in
Paris. We've been very forthcoming; we've attempted to make
concessions which have been unrequited and I refuse to
believe that a little fourth-rate power like North Vietnam
does not have a breaking point. It shall be the assignment
of this group to examine the option of a savage, decisive
blow against North Vietnam. You start without any preconcep
tions at all. You are to sit down and map out what would be
a savage blow. (p. 126).
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Roger Morris was placed in charge of compiling the research into
summary form and had numerous private conversations with Kissinger
on the panel's findings.

Morris (1977) reports that at one point

during the panel's discussion someone asked Kissinger about the use
of nuclear weapons.

Kissinger replied somewhat in the negative, but

added, "you are not to exclude the possibility of a nuclear device
being vised for purposes of a blockade" (p. 103).

Morris recalls that

despite Kissinger's apparent disinterest in full nuclear planning, he
received several folders on target sites to be bombed by nuclear
means, and the predicted results of such nuclear attacks.
There are two other instances which indicate Kissinger serious
ly considered the nuclear weapons option.

In an interview with

Hersch (1983), Charles Colson, a close aid of Nixon, recalled NATO
Ambassador Robert Ellsworth asserting in early 1969 that Nixon and
Kissinger were planning nuclear bombings, and that the bombs would
be dropped by the end of the year.

Colson also added that the word

around the Pentagon was that Kissinger had been lobbying for the use
of nuclear weapons.

Another occasion has been discussed by Hersch

(1983) via interviews with two scientists retained for comment on the
nuclear option by both Kissinger and the special panel charged with
developing a "savage, decisive blow" (p. 129).

According to the

scientists, they "knew Henry (Kissinger) was involved in the planning
and that he wanted it.

The implications went way beyond local tact

ical considerations" (p. 129).

The scientists also reported that

many were against the nuclear option because of election politics.
In his memoirs, Nixon (1978) remembered the dilemma he faced
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over the November Ultimatum.
I the weeks remaining before November 1, I wanted to orches
trate the maximum possible pressure on Hanoi. I was confi
dent that we could bring sufficient pressure to bear on the
diplomatic front. But the only chance for my ultimatum to
succeed was to convince the Communists that I could depend
on solid support at home if they decided to call my bluff.
(p. 398)
Nixon (1978) also worried over the perceived legitimacy of his
threat.
Having initiated a policy of pressure on North Vietnam that
now involved not only our government but foreign governments
as well, I felt that I had no choice but to carry it
through. Faced with the prospect of demonstrations at home
that I could not prevent, my only alternative was to try to
make it clear to the enemy that the protests would have no
effect on my decision. Otherwise my ultimatum would appear
empty, (p. 399)
In order to make his ultimatum seem legitimate, Nixon instituted sev
eral courses of action:

Advanced pressure on the Soviets toengage

in discussion with the North Vietnamese on an armistice;threats

of

terminating U.S. aid to countries which continued exporting their
products to Hanoi; and leaking an exaggerated report on plans to
massively invade North Vietnam as well as to institute new port block
ades.

The most serious episode engineered to reaffirm the Ultimatum

to the North Vietnamese was the movement of nuclear forces to situa
tion DEF CON 1 in the month of October (Hersch, 1983).
The DEF CON system housed at the Pentagon is an alert device
with five different levels of preparation for war, with DEF CON 1
commanding maximum nuclear force readiness.

Not since the 1962 Cuban

Missile Crisis had the U.S. gone to this war imminent stage of de
fense.

Joseph Urgo, (quoted in Hersch, 1983) an Air Force security
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sergeant, remembered being stunned by orders to guard two B-52 nu
clear equipped aircrafts.
Nobody was telling us anything. All days off were cancelled
and it went on and on. Putting those planes on the runway
freaked me out. All my experience told me that they would
never take a chance by putting two nuclear-loaded airplanes
out in the open. Obviously we were in some sort of real
situation, (p. 124).
In all, there were six aircrafts fully loaded with tactical nuclear
weapons on the military portion of the Atlantic City, New Jersey
airstrip as well as other aircrafts fully-loaded with nuclear bombs
still hidden in the hangar.

There is also evidence to suggest that

dozens of nuclear-equipped airplanes around the U.S. were also placed
on full alert.

The alert lasted an unprecedented 29 days, during

which time nuclear forces commander Air Force Colonel Ray Sitton was
told nothing about the reasons for the alert (Hersch, 1983). Undoubt
edly, the reason for the DEF CON 1 stage was to make the Soviets, who
are known to have been aware of the alert, pressure the North Viet
namese into withdrawing from the region, emphasizing that the U.S's
nuclear threat appeared to be materializing.
It is important to note that United States-Soviet relations
were significantly less antagonistic during the latter part of John
son's Administration and the majority of Nixon's presidency.

The

Soviets were still viewed with caution and suspicion, however the
clashes between the superpowers which regularly occurred during the
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations were rare in the
1960's and 1970's.

But while detente between the Soviets and U.S.

prospered, Soviet-Sino relations depreciated significantly.
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It is well documented that Nixon and Kissinger felt that the
Soviets could be instrumental in ending the North Vietnamese pre
sence in the South; indeed, Kissinger had met with Soviet Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin on numerous occasions in 1969 to request the Soviets
help in negotiating a settlement.

Sometimes these meetings took on a

strange character, like when Nixon purposely interrupted a KissingerDobrynin meeting by phone to order Kissinger to say to his Soviet
counterpart:

"The President just told me in that call that as far as

Vietnam is concerned, the train has just left the station and is now
headed down the track" (Nixon, 1978, p. 399).

This meeting took

place just days before the full nuclear alert commenced.

None of

the Kissinger-Dobrynin meetings, however, resulted in any cooperation
between the U.S. and Soviet Union on the issue.

The October 1969 DEF

CON 1, the readying of nuclear-equipped aircraft, and possibly the
strange message from Nixon to Kissinger were clearly an attempt to
fortify Nixon's Ultimatum to the North Vietnamese through the Soviet
Union.
Nixon was deeply frustrated with the lack of Soviet effort, and
on many occasions spoke directly to Dobrynin on the issue.

On October

20, at a private meeting between the two leaders, Nixon (1978) tried
to make clear to the Soviet Ambassador these disappointments, while
tacitly implying a reversal in detente if the Soviets did not involve
themselves in ending the war.
I want you to understand that the Soviet Union is going to
be stuck with me for the next three years and three months,
and during all that time I will keep in mind what is being
done right now, today. All you have done is repeat the same
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tired old slogans that the North Vietnamese used six months
ago. If the Soviet Union found it possible to do something
in Vietnam, then we might do something dramatic to improve
our relations, but until then, I have to say any real
progress will be difficult, (p. 407)
Again, despite the clear demands and candid scolding of the Soviets,
Moscow did not involve itself in any meaningful way in the U.S. ef
fort to end the war.
The plan to escalate the war on November 1 if no major progress
was achieved by that date never reached fruition.

While Nixon (1978)

was worried about future perceptions concerning the legitimacy of the
threat, he notes in his memoirs that he simply could not escalate the
war at that time.
I had to decide what to do about the ultimatum. I knew that
unless I had some indisputably good reason for not carrying
out my threat the Communists would become contemptuous of us
and even more difficult to deal with. I knew, however, that
after all the protests and the Moratorium, American public
opinion would be seriously divided by any military escala
tion of the war. (p. 402).
Nixon knew that his ultimatum had failed on October 4 when an offi
cial North Vietnamese letter supporting and congratulating the peace
movement was leaked to the U.S. press.
It is important to note two occurrences during the delibera
tions on the Ultimatum.

The war had many stages, but in respect to

the threat to use nuclear weapons as a part of the Ultimatum, the
1968 Johnson bombing halt and the

secret bombing of Cambodia in

early 1969 should not be underestimated as factors associated with
Nixon's strategy.
While the U.S. was continuing ground wars in both North and
South Vietnam, aircraft bombings of the region had been halted by
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President Johnson on November 1, 1968.

Nixon did not break this

moratorium because he felt that if bombings were reinstated without
his Administration setting a clear policy on the conflict, Johnson's
work on negotiating a settlement may have been compromised.

In fact,

it is not unreasonable to assume that the Ultimatum date, set for
exactly one year after the halt of bombings, was an attempt to show
the differences in strategy between the Johnson and Nixon Administra
tions.

Indeed, Nixon had severely criticized Johnson's handling of

the war, particularly his relatively conservative approach to mili
tary bombing campaigns, arguing that a continued ground war of attri
tion without either escalation or further steps toward an armistice
was an improper path.

Thus, the Ultimatum can be viewed not only

as a threat to escalate the war, but to interject
ferent dimensions to the conflict:

(1)

two entirely dif

the more radical position of

the Nixon Administration; and (2) the possibility of nuclear attacks.
The second important occurrence during the formative stages of the
Ultimatum was Nixon and Kissinger's secret bombings of Cambodia, a
region paralleling the two Vietnams on the west.

Considerable dis

cussion took place in March 1969 on the question of where to bomb:
North Vietnam or Cambodia.

Nixon (1985) notes in his memoirs that

he chose not to resume bombing the North region because it would
"produce a violent outburst of protest (and) would have destroyed our
efforts to bring the country together" (p. 107).

Instead, the plan,

known only to a handful of Nixon's advisors, was to bomb Vietcong
ammunition posts in Cambodia, which were particularly damaging to the
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U.S.'s efforts to gain victories on the western side of the two Viet
nams.

The fourteen month, 110,000 ton bombings of Cambodia were kept

under the strictest secrecy, with full public and Congressional knowl
edge of the events not surfacing until 1973.

Both Kissinger and Nixon

make clear in their memoirs the reason for the secrecy:

To prevent

domestic uproar.18
Salient Variables in the Nuclear Decisions
Involving Vietnam

While President Johnson commenced the full-scale military en
trance of the United States into the civil war of Vietnam, it was
President Richard Nixon who seriously considered nuclear options dur
ing the hostilities.

There is no evidence to suggest that Johnson

threatened to use nuclear weapons against the North Vietnamese as
Nixon did.

The following extraction of variables is therefore con

fined to the structural and institutional forces which shaped the
Nixon Administration's nuclear strategy in Vietnam.

As in the pre

vious chapter on Korea, this extraction is limited to the identifi
cation of the more outstanding factors involved in the decision, and
is intended to set the foundation for the more detailed theoretical
analysis conducted in the next chapter.
Goals and Means

Nixon's campaign platform rested, inter alia, on a promise to
end the war.

There is no indication that he planned to eschew’ this

pledge--he fully intended to implement his secret plan.

Indeed, his

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

129
first few months in the White House were characterized by signifi
cant planning and deliberations on exactly how to end the war.

As

noted earlier, Nixon was in stark disagreement with Johnson's con
servative approach to military operations in Vietnam, and saw the
solution to the problem as requiring the use or threat to use
sive force.

mas

While the Administration did ponder purely diplomatic

avenues without considering nuclear weapons, this approach was deemed
ineffective after such negotiations failed to bring progress.

The

strategies of diplomacy and military force were then integrated:

The

answer to the problem eventually took the shape of threats to use
significant nuclear force through diplomatic means--the specific plan
was the November Ultimatum.
But why was the threat to vise nuclear weapons deemed the most
effective maimer in which to achieve the goal of ending the war?
simple answer is that they were simply available.

One

Since the Adminis

tration concluded that massive military force (or the threat of such
force) was required to bring the hostilities to a halt, it was un
doubtedly viewed as reasonable to threaten the use of those weapons
which were most likely to invoke the greatest fear into the North
Vietnamese--those weapons of nuclear nature.

Indeed, it was no se

cret to the global community that the U.S. stockpile maintained the
capacity to destroy the world some 35 times over.

It was however, a

secret to the global community, save the Soviets, the North Viet
namese, and possibly the Chinese, that nuclear weapons were being
threatened to force an armistice.

The secrecy was no accident, since
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Nixon himself demanded the strictest confidentiality during Kissin
ger's visits to Paris.

But why was this threat kept so secretive?

Anticipated Domestic Reaction

The Nixon Administration was fully cognizant of the U.S. pub
lic's distress over the U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

While John

son's bombing halt in November 1968 was received warmly by the U.S.
public, a sustained lack of progress in the negotiations demanded
that the new President do something more significant to end the war.
Opinion polls indicated that the U.S. public preferred a peaceful
settlement through negotiation, rather than a prolonged military ef
fort.

Thus, the Nixon Administration faced two major possibilities,

both of which demanded expediency:

withdrawal or victory.

As dis

cussed earlier, the former option was quickly discarded by the Ad
ministration.

Facing the prospect of reneging on a campaign promise

and thus being accused of continuing the status quo in Vietnam, Nixon
and his advisors came to the realization that pure diplomacy without
the use or threat to use force would bring little progress.
The reason for the secrecy becomes apparent when one considers
the deliberations on the secret bombing activities of Cambodia.

Data

clearly indicate that public opinion haunted Nixon and his associates
on the nuclear option as it did on the Cambodian strategy.

Recalling

data on the Cambodia decision, Nixon undoubtedly expected that if
knowledge of the bombings was disseminated, his Administration would
meet with profound protest.

Now, if the perception of losing legiti

macy and support from the U.S. public explains Nixon's decision to
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keep the conventional bombing of Cambodia and North Vietnam secret,
there is little doubt that this same fear impacted the decision to
maintain extreme secrecy in the strategy of nuclear diplomacy.

If

the U.S. public would not accept a conventional bombing, how could
the

Administration possibly publicize the nuclear option?

Thus,

the secretive nature of the Kissinger meetings was designed to shield
the Administration from anticipated dissent.

Moreover, since the

secret bombings of Cambodia were conducted concurrently with Kissin
ger's meetings in Paris, the evidence strongly suggests that public
opinion played a major role in the decision to secretly threaten the
use of nuclear weapons.

Thus, the eoal of winning the war was viewed

as most attainable via the threat to use nuclear weapons, but with
public opinion projected to be hostile to the strategy, the nuclear
threat was kept secret.

Social Learning

Nixon was Vice-President of the United States for the entire
tenure of the Eisenhower presidency.

Under Eisenhower, he came to

appreciate the importance of the policy of containment, as well as
the significance of U.S. commitments to developing countries which
for whatever reason dangled on the edges of capitalist and communist
economies.

As an extremely active Vice-President, Nixon made numer

ous official trips to both Korea and Indochina in support of the
Eisenhower Doctrine.

While Nixon's involvement in ending the hos

tilities in the Korean was negligible, he learned the benefits which
could be reaped from threatening uncooperative countries with weapons
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of mass destruction.

As noted earlier, Nixon was, and presumably

until his death, convinced that Eisenhower's threat to use atomic
weapons against North Korea had single-handedly ended the Korean War.
The import of Nixon's belief that Eisenhower's atomic threat
was instrumental in ending the hostilities in Korea should not be
underestimated.

Nor should the fact that Nixon believed Eisenhower

was a brilliant foreign policy methodologist be ignored.

While there

is no way in which to be absolutely sure that Nixon learned the value
of nuclear ultimatums from Eisenhower, one cannot ignore the fact
that these two presidents are alone in the extent to which they em
ployed the nuclear threat.

And while it is true that the post World

War II Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations did not immedi
ately inherit executive responsibility of directing an ongoing war,
only Eisenhower and Nixon employed nuclear weapons as direct and
immediate instruments of foreign policy.

The emulation of Eisenhower

by Nixon is further supported by data which indicate Nixon thought
his position in respect to Vietnam was parallel to Eisenhower's in
Korea.

Indeed, it would negligent to disregard the structural and

behavioral similarities between the situations.

Vulnerability

Adopting a more structural level of analysis, a foundational
cause of the nuclear weapons threat against the North Vietnamese was
the general ideological posture of the U.S. toward communism.

De

cades of U.S. foreign policy have been formulated under the assump
tion that a global communist majority, or even a large minority of
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communist states, would jeopardize U.S. economic and political inter
ests.

The early Cold War policies of containment devised by the Tru

man and Eisenhower Administrations never really showed any signs of
diminishing.

Indeed, just as the Korean War can be considered an

outgrowth of the legacy of containment theory, equally exemplary was
U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

Discussion

It is certain that the Nixon Administration's threat to use
nuclear weapons was an empty threat.

Despite the fact that in his

memoirs Nixon indeed called the Ultimatum a bluff, the fact that nu
clear attacks on North Vietnam never commenced is more than enough
evidence to suggest that even if sophisticated nuclear bombing raids
were planned by governmental committees, the nuclear option was
deemed improper well before the expiration of the Ultimatum.

Thus,

the Nixon Administration's threat to use nuclear weapons was indeed
only that, a threat.
this:

The case study reveals the chief reasons for

anticipated domestic reaction to the actual use of nuclear

weapons.
The case study presented here, like the previous chapter on
Korea, has resulted in the identification of variables likely to have
played a major role in the criminal threat to use nuclear weapons by
the United States in the Vietnam War.

These data-emergent variables

will be juxtaposed with the variables extracted from the analysis on
the U.S. nuclear threat against Korea in order to form a grounded
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theory of international governmental crime.

It is to this endeavor

the study now turns.
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CHAPTER VII

TOWARD A GROUNDED THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNMENTAL CRIME
Having presented data on the illegal nuclear and atomic threats
by United States against the countries of North Korea and North Viet
nam, it is now appropriate to theorize about the causes of these
threats.

This is the first goal of the chapter.

The discussion

then moves to a more abstract level of discourse and is intended to
advance the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of interna
tional governmental crime.

Finally, this grounded theory is compared

with extant approaches to the theoretical understanding of organiza
tional criminality in order to gauge its originality and value.

Explaining the Threats

United States interventions in Korea and Vietnam can be confi
dently viewed as a result of the general Cold War beliefs--beliefs
which manifestly entails constant preparation for war.

The chief

reason for U.S. involvement in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts is
not difficult to identify:

The possibility of communist expansion

into South Vietnam and South Korea was viewed as disastrous to U.S.
economic, ideological, and political interests.
the problems envisioned with the

It was not simply

transformation of the political

economies of these two countries that disturbed the U.S., but more
importantly, the effect such revolutions were thought to have on
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other areas of the globe.

Since the approach to foreign policy most

prevalent during these periods of the Cold War was containment
theory (and the domino theory in the case of Vietnam,

it was hypo

thesized that communist revolutions in one area would lead to com
munist revolutions in adjacent countries. The projected snowball
effect, then, of communist revolutions was the chief concern of U.S.
policy makers, and ultimately serves as a foundational cause of the
interventions.

Given this ideological climate, it is not surpris

ing that U.S. decision makers viewed the interventions in Korea and
Vietnam as battles which mandated victory.

The consequences of fail

ing to contain communist revolutions, it was believed, would decrease
U.S. credibility and influence in the global politick as well as open
other politically and economically precarious countries to the possi
bility of communism.

With communism becoming more prevalent during

these periods of the Cold War (primarily because of expanded Soviet
and Chinese influence) the U.S. viewed its role as that of world pro
tectorate.

Korea and Vietnam, for a myriad of reasons, were deemed

by the U.S. as particularly vital to the containment of communism.
A battle loss in either of these regions would be a major setback in
the larger war:

the dismantlement and containment of communism.

The situations faced by the Eisenhower and Nixon Administra
tions were quite comparable:

Both presidents had taken office during

an ongoing war, had pledged during their campaigns to end the respec
tive wars, and opted for the threatened use of unconventional weapons
as the primary method by which to end the wars.

Thus not only did

the Administrations face very similar problems at similar points in
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their Administrations, but also saw the solution to the problems in
the same way--secret threats to use atomic and/or nuclear weapons.
Given the profound degree of U.S. commitment to both of the
wars, and the policy of no defeat, it should not be surprising to
find that when traditional methods cf diplomacy and warfare failed to
bring a successful settlement, the methods were re-evaluated, supple
mented, and altered.

Indeed, both Administrations had attempted for

quite some time to find a solution to the wars through traditional
ground and aerial warfare, and diplomatic means.

And as the data

indicate, both Administrations experienced frustration with conven
tional armistice tactics.

The decision was made to elevate and rein

force U.S. resolve in the conflicts.

It was thought that the most

effective manner in which to accomplish these goals was to threaten
the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Again, since all the avail

able military means for winning the wars (aircraft, ground troops,
and propaganda dissemination) had been exhausted, it was concluded
that weapons of a different caliber were needed to force an end to
the conflicts.

Data show that both Administrations found the ulti

mate trump card in the atomic and nuclear weapon.
But the ultimate weapon which would guarantee U.S. victory was
not dropped on Asian soil.

Despite the meticulous planning of bomb

ing targets and numerous estimates of the destructive capabilities,
the small group of U.S. decision-makers in charge of military policy
opted for a more subtle strategy.

This strategy did not require

actual bombing, only the threat to bomb.
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One reason such relative caution found its way into the offi
cial threat policy during the wars was the U.S. fear of an expansion
of the hostilities.

During the Korean War, the U.S. experienced tre

pidation over the possibility of reprisals, since it was (erroneous
ly) thought the Soviets had the capacity to stage a considerable
retaliatory atomic or nuclear attack.

Another reason the Eisen

hower Administration opted for threat tactics was the fear that the
over-investment of atomic forces in Korea would jeopardize the secur
ity of Western Europe.

By only threatening the use of atomic wea

pons, rather than actually using them, the U.S. could maintain its
military fortitude in regions other than Korea.

Nixon faced a simi

lar problem with the Chinese during his nuclear deliberations.

While

detente flourished with the Soviets, United States-Chinese relations
were much more unstable, and since China did indeed possess operable,
albeit primitive, nuclear weapons, the U.S. decided not to risk glo
bal nuclear war.

In the case of Vietnam, this concern was more pre

valent since there now existed five nuclear powers with much more
powerful and advanced nuclear weapons missiles and delivery vehicles.
Generally, both of the case studies point to the importance of
the estimated international reaction, most significantly the mili
tary reaction, in deliberations over atomic and nuclear policy.

An

expansion of hostilities was viewed as undesirable by both Admini
strations, and thus it was believed the actual use of weapons of mass
destruction would compromise a variety of U.S. objectives.

But this

is only part of the reason threats were selected over the actual use
option.
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Social Control

The cases illustrate that the anticipated international and
domestic response to nuclear and atomic threats played an important
part in both deliberations and the actual execution of policy.

The

predicted response also shaped many of the specific tactics employed
by both the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations at the time of the
threats.

In the former case, it is clear that the projected interna

tional response to both the threat and contemplated use of nuclear
weapons forced the Eisenhower Administrations to relay the threat
inconspicuously.

It is also apparent that the Eisenhower strategy of

attempting to normalize the atomic weapon vis-a-vis conventional wea
pons was in response to U.S. knowledge of the aversion its Allies
held to the use of atomic weapons.

The Nixon Administration, too,

predicted that public reaction to a publicized threat or use of nu
clear weapons would be disapproving.

This is why the meetings and

deliberations in which the nuclear threat was conducted and design
ed were so secret in nature.

This leads to the proposition that the

nuclear threats during the Korean and Vietnam wars were conducted in
secrecy in order to shield government decision makers from antici
pated disapproval and rebellion

In Korea, it was the fear of inter

national disapproval, in Vietnam, the fear of domestic outrage.
The social control mechanism of anticipated disapproval was in
form similar, but in content dissimilar in the two cases.

Nixon had

inherited an extremely unpopular war, while Eisenhower continued the
directorship of a moderately supported intervention.

On this level,
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data lead to the conclusion that the strain Nixon experienced over
Vietnam was much more significant than Eisenhower's in Korea.

Nixon

felt he had everything to win or lose by his decisions, while Eisen
hower, though committed to a settlement, was subject to less public
pressure to end the war.

Additionally, Nixon faced not only the man

date to end the war, but to end it in the most peaceful of ways.
Indeed, many U.S. citizens favored a complete withdrawal.

The Korean

War was less opposed than the Vietnam conflict, and there existed no
substantial social movement which demanded the war end peacefully.
In many ways then, Nixon's Ultimatum reflected a concern with founda
tional presidential legitimacy, while Eisenhower's plan was more
influenced by his desire not to lose Allied support for future U.S.
intervention endeavors.
While social control mechanisms such as domestic and interna
tional reactions played a chief role in U.S. decisions to threaten
rather than use unconventional weapons, this control also forced the
Administrations to conceal their illegalities.

On one level, then,

it can be argued that while social control prohibited the actual
dropping of nuclear and atomic weapons, it also forced the threats to
be conducted in secrecy.

Since the actual use and threatened use was

believed to be received disapprovingly, the conclusion reached by the
Administrations was to execute the latter method because it could be
shielded from important control audiences.

While social control

entities probably prevented the much more serious crime of the actual
use of atomic or nuclear weapons, ironically, social control moved
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the actual criminality into a concealed environment.
The obverse proposition would be that if the social control
mechanisms were not operative, i.e. there was projected social ap
proval, the threats would not have been secretive.

There is little

reason to question this postulate since the data clearly demonstrate
that the reason the threats were concealed was to shield against
international or domestic disapproval.
While it can be argued that social control played a chief role
in preventing the use of nuclear and atomic weapons, it cannot be ar
gued that this social control prevented illegalities.

This is a sim

ple, but important point not only because the threats, of course,
occurred, but because the U.S. government's opportunity to conduct
and design certain plans, which if publicized would prompt negative
reactions, was a hallmark of the nuclear and atomic deliberations.
The luxury both Administrations enjoyed, that cf secrecy, lack of
oversight and unaccountability for certain actions, acted to provide
a degree of autonomy and discretion to the governmental actors.

In

sum, while social control prevented a greater harm, it was limited by
the nature of governmental design--a design which allows for some
decisions, designs, and behaviors to be conducted without the know
ledge of social control entities.

Summary

The above explanation of the nuclear threats is relatively
straightforward:

Having committed itself to war in order to prevent
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communist expansion, and having exhausted all traditional methods of
achieving victory in those wars, U.S. decision-makers interjected in
to the predicament their most powerful military instrument--the nu
clear and atomic weapon.

But because of the perception that social

and political disapproval would ensue, the weapons could not be
actually dropped on the enemy.

Instead, the weapon was threatened

through secretive channels in order to achieve the operative goal.
In the case of Korea, it is quite reasonable to identify the threat
as the key in the ending of the war; in Vietnam, the threat was en
tirely unsuccessful.
This explanation appears to possess enough explanatory power
to allow a more abstract level of theoretical analysis to be attempt
ed.

The following aspires to that goal:

An increased theoretical

understanding of the phenomenon of international governmental crime.
It is important to note the following attempt is not intended to be a
complete explanation of the phenomenon of international governmental
crime.

Rather it is an attempt to chart a course of theoretical

understanding, with parsimony and clarity being the principal aims.

Toward a Grounded Theory

This section consists of four parts:

(1) presentation of the

presuppositions and assumptions which guide the theory, (2) discus
sion of the variables and decision making process which may lead to
governmental crime, (3) recapitulation and synopsis of the forgoing
through a diagramed model, and (4) a brief comparison of the grounded
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theory with the most popular theoretical explanations of organiza
tional crime.

Presuppositions and Assumptions
One of the first things to note about international government
al crime, as defined in this study, is that it should not be viewed
atomistically. The individuals involved in the illegalities are
occupiers of certain roles/positions, and their role expectations are
defined within a larger environment which transcends individual
actors.

Governmental officials are charged, inter alia, with the

responsibility of directing a country's general course of interna
tional policy--its basic position in the international arena.

Most

governmental actors do not create these broad role expectations,
rather they become subject to them by virtue of the positions they
occupy.
a priori.

That is, the general outline of appropriate behavior exists
Although each individual, President, or Administration may

confront a problem differently, or attempt solutions which others may
not, it is imperative that we do not ignore the historical con
straints which structure certain goals and behaviors--especially when
speaking of international governmental behavior.

In this study, it

is reasonable to identify the theory of containment as the exemplar
of these historical constraints.

It is quite likely that other forms

of international governmental criminality have their genesis because
of the same, or similar, structural antecedents.

The general point,

then, is that in order to gain a clear understanding of international
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governmental crime, we must view the actors as both subjects and ob
jects of history.

Actors follow a preexisting script, but also pos

sess the ability to improvise.
Secondly, we must also realize that international governmental
crime is composed and designed in a highly instrumental manner.

Far

from being capricious, the decisions leading to the execution of this
type of criminality are beyond much question formulated through cal
culated cost-benefit analysis.

Salient decisions are arrived at

through a consideration of the probable latent and manifest benefits
and costs of the action.

Although not every possible ramification of

an action cannot be accurately or confidently identified, every at
tempt is made to consider both the short and long range implications
of a proposed behavior.

Ad hominem and individual motivations have

little to do with the genesis or continuation of international gov
ernmental crime.
Thirdly, the ontogenesis of international governmental crime
should be viewed separately from conventional forms of criminality
on two levels.

It is important to distinguish the differences be

cause, as discussed earlier, criminologists and the general public
often times have a quite myopic view of nature, form, and definition
of criminality.

First, the actions which have been labeled criminal

here are generally not perceived by the actors as criminal.

While

the action may be viewed as unfortunate or offensive, perhaps neces
sary, the type of activity in question is rarely considered within a
legal framework.

Indeed, deliberations over such actions are unlike
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ly to include considerations of how to avoid legal prosecution or
punishment.

It is as though actors go about their business without

recognition of relevant laws at all.

Unlike conventional forms of

criminality where the actor is normally cognizant of the criminal
nature of her or his acts, actors involved in international govern
mental crime are both unlikely to think of their behavior as crim
inal, or to become officially labeled as criminal.

Secondly, there

exists no legitimate system of international justice which regularly
defines as one of its interests the business of governmental viola
tions of law.

Institutions like the World Court do exist, but have

substantially little power and autonomy when compared to most state
legal institutions.

Thus, there is no recognition of either a legal

framework which prohibits certain actions, or a system designed to
enforce, prosecute, and punish those who engage in international
governmental crime.

On this level, perhaps the only similarity be

tween conventional crime and international governmental crime is that
they violate some set of laws.

Traditional criminological explana

tory variables such as belief in law and formal deterrents, then,
seem inapplicable to phenomenon under study here.
A final presupposition, or assumption of the theory, is that
international governmental crime tends to be a more radical, severe,
or extreme method of goal achievement.

This assumption, while pos

sibly handicapping the theory's ability to shed insight into less
discomforting or less extreme instances of international governmental
criminality, is nevertheless consistent with the focus of this study-threats and considerations of atomic or nuclear attacks.

Because the
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case studies in which the grounded theory are based upon represent
instances in which drastic, dangerous, and potentially omnicidal
methods were either considered or employed, the content and form of
the theory is expected to reflect this degree of seriousness. While
this assumption, again, may limit the explanatory power of the theory,
it nevertheless is consistent with the research on which it is based.

Goals and the Process of Selecting Means

Structural antecedents largely shape individual actions.

If we

accept the proposition that leaders of a state inherit generally, and
specifically design, a course of international foreign policy designed
to advance the economic and political interests, as well as eliminate
the vulnerability of that state, it seems appropriate to conceptualize
this process as aspiring to a goal.

The process demands that a set

of behaviors be designed to advance, further, or achieve these objec
tives.

And though there are small and large goals, essential and

nonessential goals, it reasonable to theorize that international
governmental crime results from deep-seated ideologies which them
selves produce important structural level goals.

Principally, these

goals are the eradication of vulnerability and the advancement of the
political and economic interests of the state.

Since the general

structural-level theory of containment has dominated U.S. inter
national policy, and since every U.S. Administration has applied this
larger principles to smaller regional areas, it can be proposed that
structural level goals are reinforced and maintained to the degree
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that the attainment of the general goal would remove or ameliorate
state vulnerability in a specific instance.

Again, on a fundamental

level, international governmental crime is likely to result from
individual and/or organizational interpretations of historical and
structural mandates.

If we accept this proposition, it follows that

if these structural antecedents are powerful enough to create role
expectations, they are powerful enough to sustain interest in the
general goal.

The sheer power that historical mandates such as the

prevention of communist expansion hold allows us to theorize that if
decision making processes are not designed in congruence with the
mandate, the legitimacy of the decision-makers might be questioned.
Conversely, the power of historically situated ideology can be theor
ized to be so forceful that deviation from the ideology is uncommon,
if not unthinkable.
Based on the data presented earlier in this study, the decision
making process to behaviorally pursue structural level goals, and thus
behave in congruence with broad role expectations, can be generally
theorized to be first explored through deliberations on the costs and
benefits of a proposed method.

In this and subsequent stages of the

decision-making processes, only a few military and political elites
engage in the deliberations.

There may be disagreement among those

few policy makers on the most appropriate and efficacious means, or
even differences of opinion regarding the costs and benefits of a
proposed action.

But while lower level elites may have input into

the discussions, as the data in this study have shown, the ultimate
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interpretation of the perceived costs and benefits of a method of
goal attainment rests with the very powerful, most often the Presi
dent, sometimes the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State.
In this first stage of deliberations on whether to employ a
specific method of goal attainment, the most salient variables in
volved in the calculus are the projected economic, political, and
military costs and benefits of the proposed action.
in such an analysis are

Probable factors

military capacity and readiness, avail

ability of funds, temporal mandates, and the degree of geographical
importance a region possesses.

Based on these factors and others,

if the method is viewed as too costly, it will either be eschewed or
tabled for future consideration.

Conversely, if it is projected that

the method costs little relative to the benefits, the action will be
subjected to further examination, principally in order to gauge its
acceptance to important audiences, a process described below.
The case studies clearly establish that the anticipated social
response to methods and goals weigh heavily on the minds of decision
makers.

Thus, whether a particular method is applied for goal attain

ment does not solely rests on the economic and military based cost/
benefit analysis.

As the case studies illustrate, governmental

elites devote considerable energy to

the projection of the degree

of acceptance a certain action may have on their constituents, be
they international or domestic audiences.

While concerns over the

economic and military costs of a proposed action certainly play key
roles in decision-making, social control lingers, perhaps transcends,

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

149
the process.
Governmental decision-makers are to some extent accountable to
the public for their actions, and to the extent accountability and
disclosure exists, governmental decision-makers will either attempt
to conform their policies to those wishes or attempt to convince the
audience to conform to theirs.

This normally means that there are

either plans which are designed in congruence with public demands or
plans which are designed to be made palatable to the audience, if
public opinion is unknown or suspected of being disapproving.

Either

way, as far as international policy is concerned, there appears to be
a strong aspiration on the part of the governmental elite to place
governmental actions and public opinion in congruence, whether
through justification or accommodation.

The case studies indicate

that both methods can be found in the decision-making processes which
may lead to governmental crime.
If a particular method is deemed acceptable through cost/
benefit analysis, the projected social response to that method is
then deliberated.19 If important social control audiences are pro
jected to react positively to the method, that method will under most
circumstances be applied toward goal attainment.

Actions which are

criminal are unlikely to result in this case because it is assumed
that if social control agents approve of a certain course of action,
that method is unlikely to be criminal because of the very reason
that it is thought to be socially and politically acceptable.

While

this assumption, that social control entities are opposed to criminal
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methods, may perhaps be injurious to the theory's ability to explain
some forms of international governmental criminality, it is for the
reasons discussed earlier that this assumption is made.

Indeed, it

is based on the conception that international governmental crime is a
more radical, severe, and certainly a more morally questionable meth
od by which to attain goals.

In other words, the methods are not

deemed unacceptable because they violate the law, but that they tend
to be more extreme.

By definition, such acts would be defined as

deviant or unacceptable by audiences, and thus unlikely to enjoy
widespread public or political support.20
If social control audiences are perceived to be disapproving of
a certain method of goal attainment, that method will confront one of
two principal consequences.

First, there may be an attempt to

market the method to important domestic and/or international aud
iences in order to convince them of the its appropriateness.

If the

solicitations succeed, which indicates a sufficient degree of agree
ment is reached between the state and its important audiences, the
method will most likely be applied.

It is unlikely that this method

is criminal, but quite likely it is more radical, or less tradition
al, than other means.

The second governmental response to the percep

tion of audience disapproval is to bypass attempts at solicitation
and consider whether the method could be conducted in secrecy.

Sol

icitation may be bypassed for the simple reason of time, or a lack of
confidence and/or resources to successfully forge approval.

This

sets the stage for the secret implementation of methods, and is theo
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rized to be the path most likely to lead to governmental crime.
After a method has been determined to be the best course of
action, which indicates it has successfully passed cost/benefit analy
sis, has been perceived as acceptable to important audiences whether
through solicitation or not, or holds the capacity to be conducted in
secrecy if legitimation attempts fail or are unattempted, is finally
selected and behaviorally applied in order to achieve the structural
goal.

Its effectiveness is then analyzed in much the same as when it

was proposed, only at this time there are physical data to aid in the
calculus.

If it judged that the method appears to be furthering the

goal, and sustains its relative cost/benefit ratio, that method is
likely to be continued because it represents the most effective
method of goal attainment.

However, if it is determined ineffective,

it will either be eschewed, or tabled for future refinement or supple
ment.

In the latter case, if the method is viewed as having some

positive results, but not the success envisioned during initial delib
erations, it is likely to be supplemented by a different approach
which has undergone similar projected cost/benefit evaluation.

If,

however, the method is producing very limited results, it is likely
to be withdrawn from policy and fully replaced with another method.
This process may be labeled osmosis, meaning the

practice

eliminating unsuccessful methods in favor of methods thought to
hold more effective capabilities.21 It is very much a process of
trial and error which is permeated with speculation and physical
evidence.

In respect to conditions conducive to international

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

152
governmental crime, criminal methods are probably not the first
choice of governmental decision-makers.

Rather they are likely

to be one of the latter methods which actors employ when more
traditional methods fail.

This is not to say that the objectively

criminal methods are subjectively defined as criminal by the perpetra
tors, and thus are selected last because of the fear of legal repris
als.

Instead, as argued at length earlier this section, criminal

methods tend to be the perceptibly more severe, radical, or drastic
means of goal attainment.

Propositions and Diagrammatic Model

Figure 1 illustrates the grounded theoretical model of the
decision-making process which may lead to governmental crime.

The

model, as the theory, does not assume every or even most decision
making processes lead to international governmental criminality;
rather, governmental criminality is presumed to be a product of the
failure of or need to supplement more traditional or acceptable
methods of goal attainment, if only because the criminal option tends
to be the far more radical method.
It is important to keep in mind that the model found in Figure
1 presumes a number of things:

(a) State actors, because of role

expectations, actively pursue the achievement of structural-level
goals; (b) operative instrumental rationality; (c) consideration of
only available means/methods; and (d)

methods may be selected and

performed via knowledge of the success or failure of past methods
of goal attainment.
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As suggested in Figure 1, governmental criminality is not like
ly to result from the path in which cost-benefit analysis reveals
satisfactory results and projected social approval is anticipated to
be positive, because we can presume that social approval of criminal
methods is unlikely.

Again, not because the methods are defined

criminal by the participating actors or audiences, but because of
their tendency to be more severe, or radical methods of goal consum
mation.

As discussed earlier, criminality is more likely to result

from the path of satisfactory cost/benefit analysis and projected
negative social disapproval, again because criminal methods are like
ly to be considerably more radical than other means.
Figure 1 can be interpreted through the following theoretical
propositions:
1.

Available methods to achieve operative goals are subjected

to cost/benefit analysis in order to determine their economic and
military utility.
2.

If the benefits of a method are perceived to outweigh the

costs of the method, the probable social response to the method will
then be determined.

If the costs are perceived to outweigh the bene

fits, the method will either be eschewed or reevaluated.
3. If the social response is projected as positive, the method
will be applied to the goal and evaluated for its effectiveness; if
the method is perceived to be met with disapproval, actors will eith
er attempt to market/sell the method to important audiences, or deter
mine whether the method can be conducted without public knowledge.
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4.

If efforts at soliciting the method succeed, the method

will be employed for goal attainment and evaluated for its effective
ness;

this particular method is likely to be a more radical measure,

but unlikely to be criminal.

If efforts at solicitation fail, delib

erations turn to whether the method can be employed secretly.
5.

If it is determined the method can be executed secretly, it

will be employed for goal attainment.
both radical and criminal.

This method is likely to be

If the method cannot be conducted in

secrecy, it will be eschewed.
6.

After a method has been applied toward goal achievement, it

will be evaluated for its effectiveness through cost/benefit analysis
if the method is successful, the goal no longer requires other means;
if it is unsuccessful, it may be eschewed, supplemented with other
methods, or reconsidered in a different form.
The theoretical model outlined here is not intended to be a
grand theory of the full etiology and genesis of international gov
ernmental crime.

The theory, as the research upon which it is based,

of course, has qualities which limit its applicability to some in
stances of international governmental crime.

These limitations are

discussed in more detail in the next chapter of this study, when the
entire research and theoretical endeavor is critically examined for
weaknesses and limitations.

At this point, it seems appropriate to

discuss the theory's originality when compared to other theoretical
explanations of organizational criminality.

This is the goal of the

next section.
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Juxtaposition to Extant Theories of
Organizational Criminality
There are many theoretical explanations of organizational
crime.

The goal of this section is not to fully review these theor

ies or to gauge their explanatory power with respect to international
governmental crime Rather, the section is intended to generally com
pare these theoretical approaches to the grounded theory in order to
discern the theory's originality.
Social-Psvchological Theories

Sutherland's (1949) differential association theory and allied
social-psychological theories have been popular explanations of white
collar crime and elite criminality.

These theories have typically

been more successful in explaining an individual's act of criminal
ity, not concerted, organizationally based crimes.

Theorists of this

persuasion place primacy on the interactions between an individual
and close, intimate others, with the chief premise being that crim
inal behavior is learned in association with those who define crim
inal activity as favorable.

The effects of these definitions, wheth

er criminal or non-criminal, are primarily dependent on the frequen
cy, duration, and intensity of the definitions, as well as the belief
of the individual, so that if one is more exposed to criminal then
non-criminal definitions, criminality is likely and vise-versa.
The grounded theory proposed here does not regard the socialpsychological level as a significant force in the genesis of govem-
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mental crime.

Clearly, the grounded theory focuses on a more struct

ural level of analysis, paying considerably more attention to larger
social and political forces--not the intimate associations of the
actors.

Despite this meta-theoretical difference, the theory does

touch on the possibility that methods of goal attainment can be
learned from experiences with others and from knowledge concerning
the degree of effectiveness past methods of goal consummation have
engendered. Additionally, the theory leaves some room for consider
ing the effect certain actors have on their partners in decision
making, especially during deliberations and analyses of the effec
tiveness of means.

Despite the occasional importance of this level

of analysis, however, neither the case studies nor the grounded
theory reveal it as critical to an adequate explanation of govern
mental crime.

Organizational Level Theories

As their name implies, organizational theories locate the
causes of criminality in the structure of an organization itself.
Rather than focusing on individual pathologies or the effects in
which individual peers or colleagues may have on a person's behavior,
these theorists insist that individual's within the organization are
socialized into institutionally mandated role performances, and that
many times such socialization facilitates, or occurs within, a crim
inogenic environment.
Even more importantly, these scholars employ a type of Mer-
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tonian rational-goals-blocked model to explain organizational crim
inality.

Taking note of Merton's (1938) argument that conventional

forms of criminality largely result from structural-level socializa
tion devices which render individuals to be desirious of wealth,
status, and success, the organizational theorists apply this notion
to institutions:

Corporations and other organizations direct both

workers and management to pursue the goal of organizational success,
which may be making a monetary or political profit.

These goals, it

is argued, occupy central importance, and require that certain means
are selected to achieve those goals.

The primary explanation of

criminality, then, is much like Merton's innovation mode of adapta
tion to strain:

If legitimate means for achieving organizational

goals are blocked, the organization will employ illegitimate means to
achieve the goal (see Gross, 1978, 1980; Needleman & Neealeman, 1979;
Schrager & Short, 1978; and Vaughn, 1982, 1983).
The social control of organizations is theorized to play a
significant role in whether an organization will innovate, or engage
in unlawful behavior.

As Finney and Lesieur (1982) note "whether or

not a strong performance orientation and operating problems lead to
crime depends also on the operationality of various social controls"
(p. 275).

Similarly, Kramer and Michalowski (1990) propose that

organizational crime is more likely to occur when various social con
trol mechanisms fail to arrest the tendency toward using illegitimate
means to resolve strain.
Quite clearly, the grounded theory proposed in this study has
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notable similarities with the organizational approach.

First, they

are similar in that institutional environments, rather than solitary
individuals, are viewed as critical to adequate explanation of organ
izational criminality.

Second, they share an interest in organiza

tional level goals, and the power such aspirations hold over the
behavior of individuals who occupy positions within the organiza
tion.

And finally, both theories place significant value on the

selection of means to achieve institutional goals.
The theories are disparate, however, on a number of key issues.
First, the grounded theory does not envision formal social control
mechanisms as deterrents to governmental crime.

Most varieties of

corporate and elite malfeasance are subject to official prosecution
and judicial punishment.

While it is true that such legal actions

are usually little more than mild setbacks to organizational proce
dure and have little punitive power, research has shown corporations
do indeed regard the possibility of legal reprisals as an important
consequence to consider.

However, as discussed earlier, social con

trol of international governmental crime relies more on informal
entities, normally international or domestic constituents and al
lies .
The second major difference between the theories is the pre
cise manner in which criminality results from the selection of means
to achieve goals. Organizational theorists tend to rely on the con
cept of innovation, i.e. using illegitimate means to achieve organ
izational goals when legitimate means fail.

But data have shown that
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the strain experienced by governmental actors is significantly dif
ferent than the strain experienced by corporate organizations in that
it does not appear to manifest itself in the form of choosing legiti
mate or illegitimate means.

While the grounded theory appreciates

the possibility that criminality may arise from the failure or inef
fectiveness of more traditional methods of goal attainment, it does
not presume actors hold clear definitions of criminal and non
criminal behavior.

In other words, the data and theory point to the

fact that there may be no conscious choice on the part of the actors
to engage in criminality.

Organizations are most likely aware of

the possible criminality of certain actions, while governments are
usually ignorant of, or do not have to consider, the legal status of
their actions.

Governmental crime does not result from the con

scious selection of illegitimate means, because subjectively, such
means are not defined as illegitimate--instead they are regarded as
the most effective or appropriate means. This is facilitated by the
considerably higher degree of secrecy and lack of accountability
which can be maintained by governments.

Thus the selection of means

which may be defined as criminal depends more on the ability of
governmental actors to conduct their activities in secret.
The third dissimilarity between the grounded theory and the
organizational approach is the attention devoted to the decision
making process.

Few organizational theorists have attempted to iso

late and diagram the precise flow of the process of decision-making
which may lead to governmental crime.

The grounded theory charts the
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course of decision-making with a peculiar degree of specificity, and
pinpoints the precise flow of events which most likely lead govern
mental crime.

Extant theories tend to address the process in gen

eralities, while the grounded theory proposed here isolates key
points and paths in the decision-making process.
Theories of Political Economy

The third theoretical view on organizational crime is the pol
itical economy perspective (Barnett, 1981; Box, 1983; Chambliss,
1988, 1989; Messersmith, 1986; Michalowski, 1985; Young, 1981).

The

primary assumption of this perspective is that the structure of cor
porate capitalism provides an incentive for organizations to use
illegitimate means toward achieving profit, if legitimate means are
blocked.

This perspective extends the rational goals blocked model

offered by the organizational theorists by considering the dynamics
of capitalism, and how this mode of production generates illegal
activity.
Michalowski (1985, p. 314) has suggested that the various crim
inal acts that are usually referred to as white collar crime can be
brought together in the more theoretically informed concept of
"crimes of capital," which are "socially injurious acts that arise
from the ownership or management of capital or from the occupancy of
positions of trust in institutions designed to facilitate the accumu
lation of capital."

He argues that corporate crime, governmental

crime, organized crime, and occupational crime all arise from the
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particular forms of social relations associated with the processes
of capital accumulation, concentration, and centralization.
The political economy theory shares some similarities with the
grounded theory.

Like the organizational theories, the chief unit

of analysis is not the individual, but the corporation; structural
goals and means are considered central to explaining organizational
crime; and both theories point to the importance of an institution's
desire to advance its economic and political status.

Rather than

standing in direct contradiction, however, the theories differ in
focus in one chief manner.
The structural level goals identified in the grounded theory
are considered more of a reflection of general ideological and poli
tical interests than of strictly economic concerns, the chief focus
of political economy theories.

While there is no question goals such

as containment and preventing communist expansion are to some extent
based on the protection of economic markets and the control of cap
ital (Chomsky, 1987), the structural level goals assumed by the
grounded theory reflect a concern with larger ideological concerns,
such as global political legitimacy, stature in the world community,
and military supremacy.

Thus, it is not that the political economy

theories are in complete incongruence with the proposed conceptuali
zation, but that they do not place primacy on solely economic factors.

Discussion

An attempt has been made to explain United States threats to
use nuclear and atomic weapons against the countries of North Vietnam
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and North Korea. Abstracting from this interpretation, a general
theory of the origins and causes of international governmental was
offered.

A diagrammatic model was then employed to explain the pre

cise flow of governmental decision-making processes which most likely
to lead to international governmental crime.

Finally, the grounded

theory was generally compared to extant theories of organizational
criminality.
The grounded theory created here has been generally devised in
the format prescribed by Glaser and Strauss (1967).

Their model has

guided not only the general approach of the study, but also the spe
cific manner in which theoretical concepts emerge from the analysis
of data.

It seems reasonable to suggest the grounded theory created

here, while having noticeable deficiencies, does shed considerable
insight into the manner in which governmental crime may commence,
continue, and flourish.

On a fundamental level, this is what was

envisioned when the research was initially designed:

To begin the

theoretical understanding of governmental crime via data pertaining
to governmental crime.

The theory thus draws its strengths and lim

itations as a result of its close association with data.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION
In this study, a journey has been made from discourse on gen
eral epistemological and definitional issues of criminality, to em
pirical documentation of a particular type of criminality, to theo
retical reflections on the etiological factors involved in interna
tional governmental crime.

It now seems appropriate to summarize

this journey, pointing out both the strengths and weaknesses of the
study.

The positive qualities of the endeavor are first reviewed

within the context of the general research objectives outlined in the
first chapter.

Definitional, methodological, and theoretical limita

tions of the study are discussed, which then leads to proposals for
future research.

The chapter ends with some general reflections on

the study.

The Research Objectives

The first objective of this study was to demonstrate that
socially deleterious governmental actions can be studied criminologically through the epistemological framework of international law.
I believe this goal was met, principally in the second and third
chapters of the study.

It was established that many harmful activi

ties of states are not necessarily beyond the domain of criminology.
Indeed, there are may laws which outlaw state behaviors such as
threats to the peace, use of disproportionate force, and general
164
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disregard for humanity.

But most criminologists have not studied

such events because they appear to be outside the parameters of the
discipline.

However, if we propose, as Sutherland (1949) did, that

criminology is devoted to the study of lawbreaking, lawmaking, and
the reactions to criminality, criminologists must acknowledge that
all events which are illegal are subject to criminological inquiry,
not simply acts which violate domestic law.

Through relatively de

tailed argument, it was established that violations of international
law, particularly nuclear weapons threats, are illegal acts, and thus
can be studied criminologically. The general goal, then, of estab
lishing that international law can be used as an epistemological
framework in the field ox criminology has clearly been met.

It is

hoped that this epistemology is not only valuable in an academic
sense, but also in furthering the social awareness of the serious
problem of state violence.
The second research objective was to document the existence of
governmental criminality in the area of nuclear weapons.
was accomplished through

This goal

detailed case studies of U.S. threats to

use nuclear weapons against the countries of North Korea and North
Vietnam.

It was deemed inadequate simply to discuss the threats

without reference to the historical context in which they were made.
Thus, both case studies noted the military and political history of
United States involvement in these regions, as well as the general
ideological and military climate of the Cold War.

On a strictly

academic level, few historians, and of course no criminologists to
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my knowledge, have investigated these threats in any comparable de
gree of detail.

Thus, the goal of demonstrating that international

laws prohibiting atomic and nuclear threats were violated was clear
ly met, but also these illegalities were for the first time docu
mented in significant detail.
The third goal of the study was to describe and compare the
patterns of United States' violations of international laws during
the Korean and Vietnam wars.

This goal was partially met in the

fifth and sixth chapters of the research.

In these chapters, con

clusions were drawn regarding the structural and institutional con
ditions which facilitated or generated the illegalities.

The objec

tive was further realized in the first part of chapter seven, in
which the similarities and differences between the threats were exam
ined.

Many structural similarities were found between the circum

stances faced by the Administrations of Eisenhower and Nixon.

Dis

similarities were found, but generally, these were disparate in con
tent, not form.

In general, the comparison revealed noticeable

threads of congruency in the behavior of the U.S. government.
The final objective of the study was to inductively generate a
theoretical framework in order to shed insight into the structurally
located etiological factors involved in both instances of U.S.
threats to use nuclear weapons.

This goal was met in the seventh

chapter where an explanatory model of international governmental
crime was developed.

On a presuppositional level, the grounded

theory directs our attention to the highly instrumental nature of
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governmental decision-making, the importance of organizational anal
ysis, and the lack of legal controls over governments.

On a more

institutional or structural level of analysis, the theory posits that
ideological and historical constraints, projected social reaction,
and the opportunity for secrecy play key roles in the decision-making
process leading to international governmental crime.

While the

theory is quite compatible with the data on which it is based, and
thus sheds insight into factors likely to facilitate a certain type
of governmental criminality, its degree of explanatory power relative
to other instances of governmental crime is difficult to gauge.
Presumably, it's value can only be gauged by future study.
Limitations of the Study

While the research objectives may be confidently viewed as
realized, there are both endogenous and exogenous limitations of the
study.

Some of these limitations are simply the result of the

grounded theory method, which requires extremely close association
between data and theory.

Others have their genesis in the decision

to employ nuclear threats as examples of international governmental
crime.

Along with suggestions for future research, these and other

limitations are outlined below.
The most obvious definitional limitation of this endeavor is
that socially harmful actions of governments are envisioned as crim
inal only if the act violates a law.

While in an general academic

sense this does not seem to be a major drawback, it is if we consider
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the fact that some harmful activities of governments cannot be stud
ied by criminologists if such a legalistic strategy is mandated.
While I have gone to great pains to illustrate the value of a legal
istic, or neo-legalistic epistemology, one can not ignore the nega
tive implications.

Most prominently, the approach requires crimin

ologists to maintain a reactive posture toward their subject matter.
Rather than selecting their own criteria for judging what constitutes
crime, criminologists are forced to accept state definitions of their
subject matter.

As Sellin (1938) pointed out, this compromises the

autonomy of the criminologist.

Despite this problem, which has been

noted by many scholars, I do believe that the definitional framework
proposed in this study, while limiting criminological analysis, none
theless represents a compromise which acts to increase disciplinary
autonomy.

The proper subject matter for the discipline of criminol

ogy has certainly not been established in this study; but the study
has presented a reasonable path by which to expand that subject mat
ter.

The debate over the definition of crime has and will continue

to hover over the discipline.
Methodologically, the study suffers most from

the decision to

employ U.S. nuclear threats as the empirical illustration and theo
retical foundation.
often times acute.

First, the obstacles to collecting data were
Even though many governmental documents concern

ing threats to use weapons of mass destruction have been declassi
fied, many of these documents have been noticeably censored.

On

many occasions, presumably when quite sensitive discussions were
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Caking place, the documents abruptly end without full documentation
or elaboration on more specific issues.

This problem was most acute

in the case study on atomic threats during the Korean War.

Data-

collection on the nuclear threats against the North Vietnamese was
made problematic by the general lack of declassification.

While

there were instances in which the authors obviously censored portions
of the documents, the quantity of governmental documents concerning
nuclear deliberations during the Vietnam War was significantly less
than those available for the atomic deliberations in the Korean War.
Thus, because of the apparent sensitivity of the whole atomic and
nuclear age, access to the full range of documents was somewhat lim
ited.

While I do not believe full access to these documents would

significantly alter the general thrust of the case studies or the
grounded theory, the degree of specificity found in the case studies
would have been enhanced.

If this is the case, the grounded theory

would also be characterized by a higher degree of exactness.

Future

research on the threats must employ those documents unavailable for
this study.
Another methodological problem with the study is that it fo
cuses on one of the more extreme forms of governmental criminality:
Deliberations and threats to use weapons which hold the capacity for
omnicide, or the complete obliteration of the globe.

While the

threats did not result in the actual use of these weapons, it is
clear that even the consideration of using such weapons is an example
of drastic and radical methods of achieving international foreign
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policy goals.

Thus, to what extent does the grounded theory reflect

this severe form of governmental criminality?

It is reasonable to

assume that since data and theory are so closely connected in this
study, the theory's applicability to less serious, but still harmful,
governmental activities must be questioned.

Again, however, because

there is such little attention given to the phenomenon of inter
national governmental crime, the theory's applicability to other
instances of criminality must be gauged through future research.
Thus, it is proposed that only by the investigation of other forms
of international governmental crime can the explanatory strength of
the theory be measured.

In order for research to be conducted on

similar phenomena, however, the definitional and epistemological
framework of international law outlined earlier must first be accept
ed by criminologists.
The grounded theory created in chapter seven also has limita
tions.

First, the theory may place too much importance on the abil

ity of social control entities to form independent conclusions on the
appropriateness and inappropriateness of governmental actions.

Re

call that the theory postulates that the anticipated reaction of
social control audiences plays a significant role in whether a govern
ment chooses more radical or more conventional methods of goal attain
ment.

It is theorized that if social control entities are envisioned

to react negatively to a governmental method, it is more likely that
the method is criminal, or at least more radical in nature.

It could

be argued, however, that domestic or international audiences are
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incapable of forming truly independent conclusions on the morality of
an action because of what Gramsci (1973) called hegemony.

This means

that just as governmental decision-makers are subject to pre-existing
definitions of the morality of goals and methods (e.g. containment,
domino theory, nuclear weapons), so are the opinions and judgments of
others dictated by structural-level ideologies beyond their control.
Thus, individuals may believe radical methods of goal attainment are
necessary in order to prevent communist expansion or the death of a
capitalist country.

This is not because actors have formed indepen

dent conclusions, but rather because they have been politically
socialized to accept such a position.

But the grounded theory's

reliance on the perception of how social control agencies may react
is indeed appropriate, given the facts of the two case studies.
Nevertheless, the notion of hegemony must be considered in future
attempts to theoretically explain the relationship between social
control entities and international governmental crime.
Another limitation of the theory, or at least an area which
needs elaboration, is the precise manner in which legitimacy for
governmental actions is obtained.

According to Habermas (1973),

the state must establish itself as a legitimate system of governance
or face the possibility of either insurrection or profound opposi
tion.

The case studies clearly illustrate that attempting to legit

imize either a method or goal is

important because of the state's

interest in maintaining legitimacy.

In Korea, it was Eisenhower's

attempts at erasing the distinction between atomic and conventional
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weapons, and in Vietnam, it was Nixon's attempt to solicit approval
for the entire U.S. campaign in Southeast Asia.

Thus, the theory

does include the notion that approval, or legitimacy, is needed by
the state in order to maintain popularity, but does not specifically
address methods of solicitation.

Future inquiries into international

governmental crime must consider this process in detail.
Another area of the grounded theory which requires elaboration
is the whole notion of who defines international governmental crime
as crime.

Recall that the theory presumes that methods of goal at

tainment are not typically viewed by governmental actors or important
social audiences as subject to legal or juridical control.

Thus, it

was deemed improper to speak in terms of the traditional criminolog
ical bifurcation of illegitimate/legitimate means, or illegal/legal
means.

In relative objectivity, i.e. from a pure legalistic point

of view, the legality of certain methods can certainly be discerned.
But this is from a more academic point of view, a view which does not
appear to hold significant popularity in either a government's or
general public's consciousness.

For most, it seems, the notion of a

criminal government, or a government which engages in criminality,
appears to be peculiar, perhaps even nonsensical categorization.

In

order for theoretical progress to be made, more attention needs to be
given to this subject-object relationship--the relationship between
those who have the power to define objective actions as appropriate
or inappropriate, and the subjective interpretation of those defini
tions by social audiences and other control entities.

This requires
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considerably more emphasis on the social construction or phenomen
ology of governmental crime, and thus points to the necessity of
employing a multi-paradigmatic approach to the theoretical under
standing of the phenomenon.
into such matters.

The study conducted here has not delved

Future research on international governmental

crime should consider these more subjective elements.
Finally, we must realize the inherent limitations of theoreti
cally abstracting from only two case studies.

While the two cases

reviewed are the only instances in which explicit nuclear threats
were relayed, such a limited empirical base is less than ideal for
theory-building.

And while I do not believe that the reliability

and validity of the conclusions are suspect, future research into
implicit or tacit nuclear weapons threats could add important in
sights to the theoretical understanding of international govern
mental crime.

Such research could also shed insight into whether

nuclear weapons threats are anomalous acts of international govern
mental crime.

That is, can there be a theory of nuclear crimes which

stands presuppositionally distinct to a general theory of govern
mental crime?

Moreover, can the instances in which a country threat

ens to use nuclear weapons be explained by the same or similar fact
ors as a country's illegal nuclear contamination, testing, or experi
mentation?

Furthermore, are criminal nuclear weapons policies onto-

logically distinct from other acts of state violence such as the
denial of civil and political liberties, police violence, and racist
and sexist state policies?

Questions such as these cannot be
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adequately answered here.

They will remain unanswered unless crim

inologists begin to understand the value and appropriateness of
studying the crimes of the state.
Reflections on the Study
Despite the limitations of this study, I think it that it can
be maintained, to some degree, that this endeavor not only advances
the criminological understanding of governmental crime, but in two
ways

illustrates the promise of a discipline commonly depicted as

myopic or ontologically and methodologically closed.

First, the

study demonstrates how seemingly disparate phenomenon such as crime
and nuclear weapons can be conjoined.

Unfortunately, academic disci

plines tend to be quite compartmental, and this often times tacitly
prohibits research of an inter-disciplinary character.

It has been

shown here that one does not need to be a political or military scien
tist to study nuclear weapons policies, presidential behavior, or
war.

Criminology does have its substantive limits, but one suspects

that if criminologists eschew territorial convictions, these limits
as are far from being exhausted.

I also believe the study illus

trates the value of employing an inductive approach to theorybuilding.

While deductive studies are clearly valuable for determin

ing the explanatory power of extant theories, and are quite necessary
for cumulative scholarly understanding, criminologists have generally
disregarded inductive approaches.

Other than the work of Cressey

(1953), Glueck and Glueck (1950), Sutherland (1937; 1949) and
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Wolfgang (1972), I an unaware of

criminological studies which have

exclusively relied on induction.

Moreover, I have never seen a crim

inologist cite the work of Glaser and Strauss' (1967).

I believe

that the grounded theory created in this study does have distinct
qualities, qualities which would not have been manifested had I em
ployed a deductive method.

In sum, while 1 believe this endeavor

makes a contribution to the understanding of a certain type of crim
inal behavior, it also illustrates the value of inter-disciplinary
research and inductive reasoning.
To conclude, the seeds of this research were planted several
years ago in discussions with colleagues interested in moving crimin
ology in a more inclusive direction.

The underlying inspiration for

this endeavor, then, was to make the case that the harmful activities
of states, or illegalities committed by governmental agents and agen
cies, should not be ignored by criminologists.

Throughout this

study, both on quasi-scientific and humanist levels, I have attempted
to express the merits of this proposition.
It seems to me a mistake to dismiss these arguments as merely
moral entrepreneurism.

How can one of any political or ideological

perspective escape the fact that international law holds dominion
over the behavior of states?

How can it be contested that interna

tional laws, some of which were developed prior to modernity (and
thus are quite established), are not legitimate guidelines for state
behavior?

And what is the value of international law if it cannot be

employed to gauge the lawfulness of governmental actions?

Moreover,
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what should we think of a discipline devoted to the study of illegal
behavior, but which refuses to investigate certain kinds of criminal
actions?

I hope that in the future, questions such as these will no

longer be required.

It is time to end arguments about the appro

priateness of the study of governmental crime to the discipline of
criminology, and move to more substantive questions about the con
struction, nature, and dimensions of the phenomenon.

I hope that in

some way this endeavor has facilitated such a movement.
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ENDNOTES

1There have been some moderately important works on govern
mental crime outside the discipline of criminology.

Examples include

Chomsky (1987; 1988), Roebuck and Weeber (1978), and various journal
istic accounts.
2For the past twenty years, the published literature on the
legal status of nuclear weapons has been nearly uniform in its con
clusion that the use and threatened use of these weapons are illegal
(see Meyrowitz).
3his argument has been repudiated several times.

Especially

damaging is the decision in the Shimoda case which in fact did find
the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki illegal under the laws of
war.

This case is explored in the next section of the dissertation.
AThis is also the official position of the government's of the

U.S. and Soviet Union.

See Meyrowitz (1990) for a comprehensive

analysis of this issue.
5The formal title of the resolution was "Declaration on the
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons."
6he official title of this resolution was "Limitation of Arma
ments, and Conclusion of an International Convention on the Prohibi
tion of Atomic, Hydrogen, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction."
7The Supreme Court of the United States in Filartiga v. PenaIrala also has accepted this interpretation of the legal status of
U.N. General Assembly resolutions.

In the judgement, the Court
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stated "A declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and
insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State prac
tice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down
rules binding upon states" (quoted in Citizens Petition to State and
Federal Authorities, 1991, p. 53).
8This conclusion has also been reached by a RAND corporation
study published under the authorship of Builder and Graubard (1982).
This U.S. Pentagon affiliated corporation even called for a less
political approach to the question of the legality of nuclear weapons
and urged "defense intellectuals outside the government, in univer
sities and corporations, to appreciate the essentials, if not the
details, of the international laws of war" (Builder & Graubard, 1982,
p. 48), and to conform their behavior and policies to the law (Falk,
1983).
9While the Shimoda case is the only instance in which indivi
duals have been found legally culpable in violating laws regulating
nuclear weapons, a 1991 Michigan Citizens' petition has been filed
against the operators of Williams International Corporation and the
U.S. Wurtsmith Air Force Base for conspiracy and planning to violate
international law.

The case, yet to be granted certiorari, goes much

further in its charges against those involved in nuclear weapons
decisions in that not only is the use and threat to use nuclear
weapons questioned, but also the manufacture, production, and deve
lopment of these weapons.
10Despite the court's decision, the plaintiffs were not
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awarded damages.

This is not because of a lack of evidence pertain

ing to the harms incurred, but rather because of the Japanese govern
ment's agreement in the 1951 Treaty of Peace to waive the right of
grievance against the Allied powers.
n It is unreasonable to argue that nuclear weapons have any
other purpose than to threaten an enemy state.

This has been noted

by many commentators as the "doctrine of nuclear deterrence" as well
as

a policy of "mutual assured destruction (MAD)."

These doctrines

"discourage attack, not by proposing to ward off that attack, but by
promising to retaliate in decisive fashion in response to it" (Bialer
& Mandelbaum, 1988, p. 57).
^In December 11, 1946, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously
adopted the Nuremberg Charter as legitimate set of international laws.
13Since the Nuremberg Principles were largely based on exist
ing conceptions of international laws, there have been no published
challenge to the relevance of the Principles to the nuclear weapons
issue.

Most arguments, as mentioned earlier, against the interpre

tation offered here, are based on the express prohibition argument.
As we have seen, .however, this line of reasoning fails to appreciate
the important international judgments which have clearly declared
that legal inference is an acceptable practice for determining ques
tions of legality.
14"Atomic" weapons are distinguished from the much more de
structive "nuclear" weapons in that they operate under the fission
principle, while nuclear weapons are based on the principles of
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fusion.

The U.S. stockpile during the Korean War consisted only of

fission weapons and thus this chapter employs the term "atomic"
rather than "nuclear" weapons.

Production of atomic weapons halted

in 1954 when the U.S. launched production of fusion hydrogen bombs.
15Kennan's article is regarded by some as the first and
most succinct statement on the policy of containment.

Ironically,

he rejected the policy of directly threatening adversaries.

Thus,

the Eisenhower and Nixon strategies of threatening to use atomic
and nuclear weapons were incongruent with the early theory of con
tainment
16Unlike the battle lines in the Korean War, in which the
38th parallel clearly designated communist versus capitalist regions,
North Vietnamese troops were scattered throughout both North and
South Vietnam, as well as Cambodia.

Thus, the U.S. expanded the

bombing zones to include the geographic areas it was ostensibly pro
tecting.
17In a December 11, 1969 visit with then-President Nixon,
Johnson recalled feeling that "all the bombing pauses were a mis
take and that he had accomplished nothing" (Nixon, 1978, p. 431).
Johnson reasoned that he had been misled by Soviet and Vietcong in
ferences of a forthcoming armistice.
18Ironically, massive U.S. public uproar ensued over U.S.
actions in Cambodia.

While air attacks were kept secret, the April

1970 ground invasion of Cambodia was publicized.

This lead to

massive student protests across the country and the infamous Ohio

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

181
National Guardsmen killings of four Kent State University students.
190f course the projected social response can be deliberated
at any point, or contemporaneously, during general considerations of
the methods.

But because of the power of social control is theorized

to have, it is treated as a separate stage.
20This assumption is also based on the belief that despite the
hegemonic power that ideologies such as militarism and intervention
ism hold on social control entities, these entities also possess
moderately humanistic and situationally ethical perspectives as well.
Since we are speaking of governmental acts which most would define as
immoral, principally because of their gravity and radicality, it
seems reasonable to assume most social audiences, domestic or interna
tional, would have significant objections to such methods.
21It should be noted that decisions concerning the projected
success or failure of an action can be made by reference to the suc
cess or failure of an action under a past Administration or Presi
dent.

Thus, the knowledge of the effectiveness of past methods may

well instruct a decision-maker's conclusion to employ, eschew, or
complement methods for contemporary dilemmas.

Most illustrative of

this was Nixon's decision to threaten the use of nuclear weapons be
cause he believed the method was instrumental in the U.S. victory in
Korea.
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